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ARTICLES
The Missing Pieces of the Debate Over
Federal Property Rights Legislation
by MAx KIDALov*
AND RicHARD H. SEAMON**
I. Introduction
The 105t" Congress came very close to passing property-rights leg-
islation that reflected a "new breed" of federal property-rights pro-
posals.' Property-rights bills in earlier Congresses would have
changed the substance of the Just Compensation Clause by making it
easier to prove that government action had "taken" private property.2
In contrast, last year's proposed legislation ostensibly changed, not the
substance of takings law, but the process for asserting takings claims
in federal court. Opponents of these process-oriented takings bills as-
serted, however, that the bills did change the substance of takings law,
and for that reason were unconstitutional. The debate over the consti-
tutionality of the bills has continuing importance in the 106th Con-
gress, where new process-oriented takings bills have been introduced.3
The debate has broader importance as well, for it raises fundamental,
unsettled questions about the power of the federal courts and Con-
* Clerk to the Honorable Loren A. Smith, Chief Judge, United States Court of Fed-
eral Claims; J.D., University of South Carolina. Nothing in this article should be construed
as expressing the views of the Court of Federal Claims or as an attempt to advance or
hinder the passage of any legislation before the Congress.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina; J.D., Duke University.
We thank Michael M. Berger, Steven J. Eagle, John D. Echeverria, Gideon Kanner, Daniel
R. Mandelker, Thomas E. Roberts, and Gregory M. Stein for their helpful comments on
drafts of this article.
1. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 37 (1998); Robert Meltz, Congressional Research Service,
"Property Rights" Bills Take a Process Approach: H.R. 992 and H.R. 1534, No. 97-877A,
Summary [hereinafter cited as "CRS Report"]; see also infra notes 80-96 and accompany-
ing text (discussing proposed legislation).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("Nor shall private property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.").
3. S. 1028, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2372, 106' Cong. (1999).
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gress to enforce the Just Compensation Clause against state and local
governments. Unfortunately, the legislative debate so far has not ade-
quately explored those questions. This article attempts to provide the
missing pieces.
The process-oriented takings bills that are the subject of this arti-
cle respond to a line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the best-known
of which is Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank.4 Those decisions all involved suits in federal courts against lo-
cal land-use agencies in which a land owner asserted a "regulatory
takings" claim-i.e., a claim that the local agency had "taken" the
owner's land by severely restricting the owner's use of it. The Court
in the Williamson line of cases developed two "ripeness" requirements
that a land owner must meet before bringing a regulatory taking claim
against a local agency in federal court. First, the owner must get a
"final decision" from the local agency on what land uses are permissi-
ble. Second, the owner must exhaust all available and adequate state
procedures, including state-court procedures, in his or her attempt to
obtain just compensation. Although there are exceptions to William-
son's "final decision" and "exhaustion" requirements for ripeness, the
exceptions are narrow. In a case that does not fall within an excep-
tion, Williamson's ripeness requirements make the litigation of a regu-
latory takings claim against a local agency in federal court an arduous
and usually futile process.
The main process-oriented takings bill considered in the 105th
Congress sought to streamline the current process by altering William-
son's ripeness requirements. Specifically, House Bill 1534 ("H.R.
1534") would have modified Williamson's "final decision" require-
ment to limit the time and effort that a property owner must spend
trying to resolve matters with the local agency.5 In addition, H.R.
1534 would have eliminated Williamson's "exhaustion" requirement
so that a property owner could assert a regulatory taking claim against
a local agency in federal court without seeking just compensation in
state court. This article focuses primarily on the second feature of
H.R. 1534, the provision eliminating Williamson's exhaustion require-
ment, because H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision raises constitutional
questions that neither Congress nor the courts have yet answered.
The opponents of H.R. 1534 challenged the constitutionality of
the bill's exhaustion provision on two grounds, to which the support-
4. 473 U.S. 172 (1985); see also S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 8 (1998) (describing William-
son as "a key decision" on takings-ripeness doctrine); H.R. REP. NO. 105-323, at 4 (1997).
5. H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. (1997).
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ers had one main response. First, opponents suggested that the ex-
haustion provision would violate Article III of the United States
Constitution because the exhaustion requirement is mandated by Ar-
ticle M's "case or controversy" requirement.6 They also argued that
the exhaustion requirement would make a substantive change in the
law of takings by eliminating a necessary element of a cause of action
for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause. In their view, such a
"substantive" change exceeded Congress' power. Supporters of H.R.
1534 countered both arguments by asserting that the exhaustion re-
quirement is a "prudential" requirement, not a constitutional require-
ment.7 In their view, its prudential nature made it dispensable by
Congress at will.
This debate over H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision raises three
questions about the power of federal courts and Congress to enforce
the Just Compensation Clause against local agencies. First, does Arti-
cle III bar a federal court from adjudicating a takings claim against a
local agency until the claimant has satisfied Williamson's exhaustion
requirement? Second, even assuming that Article III does not bar
such a claim, can the claimant establish a cause of action for a viola-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause if the claimant has not satisfied
the exhaustion requirement? Third, assuming that Article III does
not bar the claim of a plaintiff who has not met the exhaustion re-
quirement, but that such a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action
under the Just Compensation Clause, does Congress have power to
authorize the federal courts to award just compensation to the plain-
tiff anyway, if the plaintiff can prove that his or her property has been
taken?
The supporters and opponents of H.R. 1534 explored only the
first two questions, and even as to these, their analysis was incom-
plete. In terms of their bottom lines, though, each side was half-right.
The supporters of H.R. 1534 correctly contended that Article III does
not mandate the exhaustion requirement, and Congress can therefore
eliminate it without violating Article III. On the other hand, the op-
ponents of H.R. 1534 correctly contended that the exhaustion require-
6. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the judicial power of the United
States shall extend to certain "Cases" and "Controversies").
7. The term "prudential" is used to describe rules of justiciability that have been
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court and that prevent federal courts from hearing cases
that, in the Court's view, are more appropriately resolved in another forum. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction, §2.1, at 42 (2d ed. 1994). Prudential rules are not dic-
tated by the Constitution. Rather, they reflect discretionary principles of judicial "self-
governance." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); See also infra note 127.
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ment is an element of a cause of action for a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause. The elimination of that requirement would
change the substance of takings law in the sense that it would create a
new right to monetary relief in federal court. Neither the supporters
of H.R. 1534 nor its opponents, however, explored the third question
posed above: What enumerated power, if any, enabled Congress to
make such a substantive change? The supporters asserted that Con-
gress has the power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement because
it is merely prudential. The opponents asserted that Congress lacks
the power to eliminate the requirement because doing so would
change the substance of takings law.
These assertions mask a difficult question. If the exhaustion re-
quirement were only prudential, Congress plainly could eliminate it
under current precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that
Congress has plenary power to eliminate prudential rules of jus-
ticiability. The Court appears to consider that authority is encom-
passed within Congress' power to make rules for the federal courts.
Congress' rulemaking power does not enable it to eliminate the ex-
haustion requirement, however, because the exhaustion requirement
is not simply a prudential rule of justiciability. Unlike the prudential
justiciability rules, which are associated with Article III and are sup-
ported by separation-of-powers concerns, the exhaustion requirement
is instead rooted in the substantive right conferred by the Just Com-
pensation Clause and is supported by federalism concerns. Congress'
power to eliminate the requirement, as H.R. 1534's exhaustion provi-
sion sought to do, must therefore come from some source other than
its power to make rules for the federal courts.
Congress potentially has the power to enact H.R. 1534's exhaus-
tion provision under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
potential power exists because H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision en-
forces the Just Compensation Clause as it applies to local agencies
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The power is only potential be-
cause Congress has not yet met the stringent requirements for invok-
ing section 5 established by the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v.
Flores9 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Col-
lege Say. Bank.10 Those cases require Congress to: (1) identify the
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriation legislation, the provisions of this article.").
9. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631
(2000).
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violations of the Fourteenth Amendment to which its legislation
would respond; and (2) tailor that legislation to remedying or prevent-
ing the violations. In addition, to meet the first requirement, Con-
gress must have evidence of fairly widespread violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Congress that considered H.R. 1534 did
not have evidence in the record that states were routinely violating the
Just Compensation Clause. Nonetheless, the evidence may exist. If it
does, and if Congress can gather it, H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision
should be sufficiently tailored to remedy or prevent violations of the
Just Compensation Clause so that it would satisfy the second part of
the Florida Prepaid test.
Part II of this article describes the events leading to the congres-
sional proposal to eliminate Williamson's exhaustion requirement and
the legislative debate over the constitutionality of that proposal. Part
III evaluates the debate, and, in the course of that evaluation, ex-
plores the nature of the exhaustion requirement. Part IV addresses
the issue that was ignored in the debate: whether Congress has the
power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement.
H. Background
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed rules that make it almost
impossible for federal courts to remedy violations of the Just Compen-
sation Clause by local land-use agencies. Recently, Congress has con-
sidered bills that would change the Court's rules so as to allow federal
courts to remedy such violations. Opponents of those bills challenge
their constitutionality. This Part describes the Court's rules, the con-
gressional proposal to change the rules, and the debate over the con-
stitutionality of the congressional proposal.
A. The Ripeness "Mess".
1. The Ripeness Rules for Regulatory Takings Claims
The Just Compensation Clause prohibits federal, state, and local
governments from taking private property for public use without just
compensation.1' Most "takings" occur when the government appro-
11. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment
applies only to the federal government. See Barron v. The Mayor & City Council of Balti-
more, 32 U.S. 243, 247-51 (1833). The Supreme Court has often said, however, that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the just compensation
guarantee, making it applicable to state and local governments. See Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 & n.5 (1994). The case that the Court usually cites in support
of this incorporation principle did not actually rely on an incorporation theory. See id. at
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priates property outright-by condemning it, for example. 2 More
than seventy-five years ago, however, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that a "taking" also can occur when a government
regulation "goes too far" in restricting the use of property.1 3 Many
people know that the Supreme Court has had trouble explaining when
such a "regulatory taking" occurs.' 4 Less well-known than the uncer-
tainty about the substance of regulatory takings law is the uncertainty
that has arisen about the process by which a property owner can bring
a regulatory taking claim against a local agency in federal court.'5
The latter uncertainty stems from a series of Supreme Court cases
in the 1980s, the capstone of which is Williamson County Reg'l Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank.6 In each case, the Court held that a
regulatory takings claim against a local land-use agency was not "ripe"
383-84 & n.5, 405-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), is better understood as substantive due process deci-
sion); see also RIcHARD C. CORTNER, THs SuPREmE CouRT AND THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHrs 24-29, 215 (1981) (noting that Chicago, Burlington did not use incorporation ra-
tionale); Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence":
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes' Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106
YALE L.J. 613, 670 & n.262 (1996). Nonetheless, the incorporation principle seems well-
established with respect to the Just Compensation Clause. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 n.5.
12. See Lois J. Schiffer, Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CL.AA L. REv.
153, 153 (1997); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform:
A View from the Trenches-A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SATA
CLARA L. REv. 837, 838 (1998).
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see also Kirby Forest
Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) ("We have frequently recognized that a radi-
cal curtailment of a landowner's freedom to make use of or ability to derive income from
his land may give rise to a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, even if the
Government has not physically intruded upon the premises or acquired a legal interest in
the property."). Some commentators dispute the modem Court's view that the decision in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon was based on the Just Compensation clause. See Williamson
County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 197-98 & n.15 (1985); see
also, e.g., Brauneis, supra note 13, at 618-19 (summarizing author's thesis that Pennsylvania
Coal is mischaracterized as seminal regulatory takings case).
14. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 199; Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498,540-42
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985); Hage v. United States, 35 Fed.
Cl. 147, 152-53 (1996); Carol Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 562 (1984) (explaining confused nature of regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence).
15. Cf. Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness & Forum Selection in Fifth Amendment Takings
Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 37, 38 (1995) (noting that, despite ripeness re-
quirements for regulatory takings claims in federal courts, many reported cases fail to meet
those requirements, suggesting either that the Supreme Court's requirements "have not
penetrated the consciousness" of litigants and their lawyers or that those litigants and law-
yers have strong affinity for federal court).
16. 473 U.S. 172; see also supra note 6 (citing legislative history describing Williamson
as "key" case on takings-ripeness doctrine).
[Vol. 27:1
for adjudication by a federal court.17 In so holding, the Court articu-
lated two requirements for a claim to be ripe.' First, the plaintiff gen-
erally has to get a "final decision" from the local agency regarding the
permissible uses of the land.19 The Court explained that a final deci-
sion is necessary so a court can tell if an agency's restriction on land
use "goes [so] far" that it causes a regulatory taking.20 Second, the
plaintiff generally must exhaust state compensation procedures, in-
cluding procedures available in state court."- This exhaustion require-
ment, the Court explained, springs from the text of the Just
Compensation Clause, which prohibits only uncompensated takings of
private property for public use.2
17. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 735-38 (1997) (tracing
Court's takings-ripeness precedent); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477
U.S. 340,348-53 (1986); Wflliamson, 473 U.S. at 186-200; see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981) (holding that plaintiffs' as-applied
takings challenge to federal statute was not ripe because of their failure to seek administra-
tive relief by seeking variance from statutory restrictions); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that takings claimants did not present "concrete controversy
regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions" because they had not submitted
a development plan); cf Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528 (1992) (holding that
petitioners could not premise physical takings claim on practical difficulty of using proce-
dure that they had not yet tried); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
630-33 (1981) (holding that state court's decision on takings claim was not "final" under
the federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), that authorizes U.S. Supreme Court review of
certain "final judgments" of state courts); Washington ex. rel. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v.
Coats-Fordney Logging Co., 243 U.S. 251, 255-57 (1917); but cf Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1010-14 (1992) (holding that a regulatory takings claim was
ripe where the state supreme court ruled on merits of the takings claim, despite defend-
ants' assertion that post-lawsuit legislative amendment might have mitigated taking).
18. Similar ripeness rules apply to takings claims against the federal government. See
infra notes 186-187 and accompanying text. This paper addresses only the ripeness rules
for takings claims against local land-use agencies.
19. See, e.g., Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186 ("As the Court has made clear in several
recent decisions, a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of
a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the
regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the
property at issue.").
20. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 348; see also Williamson, 473 U.S. at 190 ("Our reluc-
tance to examine taking claims until such a final decision has been made is compelled by
the very nature of the inquiry required by the Just Compensation Clause... [T]his Court
consistently has indicated that among the factors of particular significance in the inquiry
are the economic impact of the challenged action and the extent to which it interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Those factors simply cannot be evaluated un-
til the administrative agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will
apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.") (citations omitted).
21. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194.
22. See, e.g., Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734 (explaining that exhaustion requirement "stems
from the Fifth Amendment's proviso that only takings without 'just compensation' infringe
that Amendment").
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To avoid confusion, we pause to define some terminology (the
abundance of which contributes to the confusion in this area of the
law). The Supreme Court cases from the 1980s developed what is
often called the "takings-ripeness" doctrine or, alternatively, the Wil-
liamson ripeness doctrine.3 These names reflect the doctrine's dis-
tinctness from the general doctrine of ripeness.2 4 The takings-ripeness
(or "Williamson ripeness") doctrine comprises two "ripeness" require-
ments or "prongs."' We refer to these requirements separately as the
"final decision" requirement and the "exhaustion" requirement. The
most common variants of these terms (which we hereafter avoid) are
the "finality-ripeness"2  and the "compensation-ripeness" '27
requirements.
As construed by the lower federal courts, Williamson's two ripe-
ness requirements make it difficult for a plaintiff to bring a regulatory
taking claim against a local agency in federal court. 8 Many lower
courts have held that, to get a final decision, plaintiff must first make a
"meaningful application" to the local agency to use his or her land in a
specific way. 9 This step actually may require a series of applications,
especially if the local agency denies initial applications for ostensibly
23. See, e.g., Duane J. Desiderio, Growing Too Smart-Takings Implications of Smart
Growth Policies, 13 J. NAT. REsouRCEs & Eiwr. L. 330, 333 (1998) (using term "takings
ripeness" doctrine); Martin A. Schwartz & George C. Pratt, Section 1983 Litigation, 14
TouRo L. REv. 299, 322 (1998) (using term "Williamson ripeness test").
24. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 742-44 (discussing general and takings-ripeness doctrines
in separate sections); Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine & the Judicial Relega-
tion of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 1, 2 (1992) (finding
that the Court has developed "a special ripeness doctrine" for property-rights claims).
25. E.g., Kassouni, supra note 26, at 3 (referring to Williamson's "two-prong ripeness
test").
26. See Roosevelt Campobello Int'l Park Comm'n v. United States EPA, 684 F.2d
1034, 1040 (1st Cir. 1982); S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 33 (1998); R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality
Ripeness in Federal Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE &
ENvm_. L. 101, 102 (1993).
27. See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 505 (9th Cir. 1990)
(using the term "compensation ripeness"); S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 33 (1998); Desiderio,
supra note 25, at 331.
28. See generally Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A
Survey of Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating
Land Use Cases, 10 J. LAND UsE & ENvTL. L. 91 (1994).
29. Cf MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 352-53 & nn.8-9 (construing lower court decision to
require plaintiff to have made "a meaningful application," and apparently approving that
requirement by noting that local agency's "[r]ejection of exceedingly grandiose develop-
ment plans does not logically imply that less ambitious plans will receive similarly unfavor-
able reviews"); Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 60-62 (1st Cir. 1991); see also,
e.g., Michael K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the Land-Use Context: The Municipal-
ity's Ally and the Landowner's Nemesis, 29 URBAN LAW. 13, 36 (1997) (discussing "mean-
ingful application" requirement).
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legitimate reasons.3" Once the agency denies a meaningful applica-
tion, the federal courts have held, the owner must then seek a vari-
ance or waiver of the regulatory restrictions that led to denial.31 Only
after the agency denies the waiver/variance request will the federal
courts say that a "final decision" has occurred. Next, the plaintiff
must exhaust all available and adequate state procedures for getting
just compensation. Usually this entails at least a suit in state court for
just compensation under the inverse condemnation doctrine.32 Fi-
nally, the plaintiff must lose his or her state-court suit for compensa-
tion.33 After all, if the state court awards just compensation, the
owner cannot go to federal court, because the owner will have gotten
everything to which he or she is entitled under the Just Compensation
Clause.34
If, on the other hand, the state courts deny just compensation, the
owner has two options. The owner can petition the U.S. Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.35 That is a long shot, of course, even if
the owner has a meritorious takings claim.36 Alternatively, the owner
can fie a new lawsuit in a federal district court. In that lawsuit, the
owner can assert a cause of action under section 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code,37 of which district courts have subject-matter ju-
30. See Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners:
The Ripeness & Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP.
LU. 73, 76, 81-82 (1988); see also infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing and
citing commentary on H.R. 1534's impact on reapplication requirement).
31. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 187-88; Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 297.
32. "Inverse condemnation is 'a shorthand description of the manner in which a land-
owner recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation pro-
ceedings have not been instituted."' Agins, 447 U.S., at 258 n.2 (quoting United States v.
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)); see also infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing constitutional nature of inverse-condemnation claim).
33. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195.
34. As discussed infra notes 74,423,427 and accompanying text, the supporters of the
federal legislation that has been proposed to relax Williamson's ripeness requirements em-
phasize the difficulty that regulatory takings claimants have getting relief in federal court
because of the current ripeness requirements. Almost no attention has been paid to the
success rate that victims of such takings have enjoyed in getting just compensation in state
court. See infra notes 437-438 and accompanying text. The authors have found no data on
that issue, and yet that data would seem to be crucial to assessing the need to relax the
barriers to getting just compensation in federal court.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994); see also, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009-10, 1031-32 (1992) (involving a plaintiff who successfully
sought review of state supreme court decision rejecting regulatory taking claim).
36. In the October 1998 Term, for example, the Court granted review in about 1.7% of
the cases that were on its docket and acted upon in the course of the Term. See Statistical
Recap of Supreme Court's Workload During Last Three Terms, 68 U.S.L.W. 3069 (1999);
see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 536.
37. Section 1983 provides:
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risdiction under sections 133138 and 134339 of Title 28 of the United
States Code. The district-court route may prove fruitless, however,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. §1983 (1994).
Section 1983 has been the basis for several of the regulatory takings claims addressed
by the Supreme Court. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1631
(1999), Suitum, 520 U.S. at 731; Williamson, 473 U.S. at 182. Nonetheless, some commen-
tators disagree about the extent to which plaintiffs use section 1983 as a vehicle for assert-
ing regulatory takings claims. Compare Vindication of Property Rights: Improving Citizens'
Access to Justice: Hearings on H.R. 1534 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 87 n.23 (1997) (reproducing Congressional Research Service Report according to
which "[t]he majority of takings actions against nonfederal defendants are brought under
section 1983") [hereinafter cited as "Senate Hearing"] and Mark S. Dennison, Zoning:
Proof of Wrongful Land Use Regulation Pursuant to Section 1983, in 30 AM. Jum3d, Proof
of Facts, § 2, at 508-09 (1995) (stating that section 1983 "has been used extensively... in
inverse condemnation cases"), with 9 DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROP-
ERTY, § 81.05(d), at 271 (2d ed. 1994) (describing section 1983 as "little used... alterna-
tive" to action in inverse condemnation). The dispute shows that it is unclear whether
regulatory takings claimants even need to rely on section 1983 to assert their claim in fed-
eral court. The Court held in 1987 that the Just Compensation Clause, standing alone,
generates a cause of action in inverse condemnation against a local agency that has caused
a regulatory taking. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-20 (1987). Once a claimant has sought and been denied
just compensation by the state court in an action in inverse condemnation, that cause of
action ripens into a cause of action for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause. Since
this constitutionally generated cause of action carries with it a right to an award of just
compensation, the statutory cause of action supplied in section 1983 could be effectively
superfluous. See infra notes 277-285 and accompanying text (discussing this point at
greater length); but cf. Daniel R. Mandelker, et. al., Federal Land Use Law: Limitations,
Procedures Remedies, §4.03[4][f], at 4-23 (1986) (suggesting that, by relying on §1983, tak-
ings claimant might recover damages in addition to just compensation, such as punitive and
consequential damages).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.")
39. Section 1343 provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for the equal rights of citizens or all person within the
jurisdiction of the United States[.]* * *.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (a)(3) (1994); See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 39,
§ 81.05(a)(2) (noting that section 1343 gives district courts jurisdiction of inverse-condem-
nation actions).
rWol. 27:1
FEDERAL PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGISLATION
because litigation of the taking claim there ordinarily will be barred by
the doctrines of issue or claim preclusion unless, as some federal
courts permit, the claimant reserves his or her taking claim while liti-
gating in state court.' The bottom line is that, in cases to which the
ripeness rules apply, federal courts almost never award just compensa-
tion for a regulatory taking by a local government.41
2. Exceptions to the ripeness rules for regulatory takings claims
There are four situations in which one or both of Williamson's
ripeness requirements do not apply. The exceptions are narrow. They
are nonetheless important to understanding the nature of the ripeness
requirements, which is, in turn, important to understanding Congress'
power to alter them.
First, it appears that a taking claimant need not satisfy either the
final decision requirement or the exhaustion requirement before chal-
lenging a local land-use restriction on its face in federal court.42 The
problem is that facial takings challenges are hard to prove.43 As a
40. See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135
F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta that taking claimant would be able to litigate
taking claim in federal court by reserving the claim when seeking compensation in state
court); Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport, 953 F.2d 1299, 1303-09 (11th Cir. 1992); cf
Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852,861-63 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that claim preclu-
sion did not bar litigation of taking claim in federal court); but cf. Dodd v. Hood River
County, 136 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that takings claim was precluded in
part). See generally Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. Of County Comm'rs., 142 F.3d 1319,
1323-34 (10th Cir. 1998); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to
State Courts: The Courts' Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson
County, 26 Ecology L.Q. 1 (1999); Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking Claims in
Federal Court: The State Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 UR-
BAN LAW. 479, 482 (1992).
41. See Overstreet, supra note 30, at 93; Blaesser, supra note 32, at 91 (estimating that
more than 94% of land use cases decided by federal courts in reported decisions from
1983-1988 were found unripe).
42. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10 ("Such 'facial' challenges to regulation are gener-
ally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed." (dicta); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 478, 481-502 (1987); Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295-97 (1981); cf. Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 237, 239-54 (1984) (addressing facial challenge to
state law in which plaintiffs asserted that state law violated Just Compensation Clause by
taking private property for private, rather than public, use); but see Roberts, supra note 17,
at 57-58 (arguing that plaintiff asserting facial takings challenge does not have to satisfy
final decision requirement but does have to satisfy exhaustion requirement).
43. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10 (quoting Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495); see also Vir-
ginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 295-96 ("A statute regulating the uses that can be made
of property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land."')
(quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
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practical matter, therefore, the exception for facial challenges does
not open the federal courthouse doors to many viable takings claims.
Second, a taking claimant need not pursue an administrative
route that would normally be required to get a final decision if it
would be futile to do so.' This "futility" exception to the final deci-
sion requirement is illustrated in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.45 Mr. Lucas challenged the application of a construction ban
to his property without bringing a state administrative proceeding
that, the defendants asserted, might have provided relief.46 The Court
held that Lucas's challenge was nevertheless ripe, because it would
have been "pointless" for Lucas to bring the administrative proceed-
ing.4 7 It was "pointless" in his case because the defendant agency had
stipulated in the litigation that it would have denied him relief in that
proceeding.48 As Lucas illustrates, the futility "exception" is really a
pragmatic gloss on, rather than an "exception" to, the final decision
requirement.49 As Lucas also suggests, the applicability of the excep-
tion (or gloss) depends partly on the agency's willingness to throw in
the towel.
Similarly, a takings claimant need not exhaust state compensation
procedures if it would be futile to do so because compensation would
not be available to that claimant. This futility exception to the exhaus-
tion requirement is illustrated in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes."0 The plaintiff in that case brought an as-applied regulatory
takings challenge in federal court without first seeking compensation
for the alleged taking in state court.51 At the time the plaintiff filed its
federal-court suit, the state courts did not provide compensatory rem-
edies for the type of regulatory taking alleged by the plaintiff.5 2 The
44. See, e.g., Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449, amended, 830 F.2d 968 (9th
Cir. 1987), (discussing futility exception to final decision requirement); Roberts, supra note
17, at 53-56 (describing this as "prong one futility").
45. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET. AL., FEDERAL LAND
USE LAW: LIMITATIONS, PROCEDURES, REMEDIES, §4A.02[5][c], at 4A-15 (1986) (stating
that futility exception is "not explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court," while citing
Lucas, with "But see" cite, in footnote accompanying this statement).
46. See id. at 1006-09, 1043.
47. Id. at 1012-13 n.3.
48. See id.
49. See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The
unavailability of state remedies is the functional equivalent of the denial of just
compensation.").
50. 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999).
51. See id. at 1633-34.
52. See id. at 1638-39; see also First English, 482 U.S. at 308-314 (discussing California
case law on temporary regulatory takings).
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Court observed that, under those circumstances, the plaintiff "was en-
titled to proceed in federal court" without exhausting state-court rem-
edies. 3 It would have been "pointless" for that plaintiff to seek
compensation at the state level. 4
Finally, a plaintiff does not need to exhaust state compensation
remedies that are unfair or otherwise inadequate.5 5 This inadequacy
exception to the exhaustion requirement differs from the futility ex-
ception to the exhaustion requirement discussed in the last paragraph.
To understand the difference, suppose that a state's courts used a coin-
toss to decide regulatory takings claims against its local agencies. It
would not necessarily be futile for a claimant to seek compensation in
state court; the claimant would have a 50% chance of getting compen-
sation. Nonetheless, the claimant would not have to go to state court,
because the court's use of a coin-toss would be constitutionally inade-
quate. 6 The Court has often said that "the Fifth Amendment does
not require that just compensation be paid in advance of or even con-
temporaneously with the taking;"57 it does, however, require that
"there ... be at the time of the taking 'reasonable, certain: and ade-
quate provision for obtaining compensation."' 58  Thus, a local
agency's taking of private property for public use violates the Consti-
tution not only when the state denies compensation for the taking af-
ter it occurs but also when the state does not, at the time of the taking,
provide "an adequate process for obtaining compensation. ' 59 In re-
53. Id. at 1638-39.
54. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012-13 n.3.
55. See MacDonald, 477 U.S. at 350 n.7; see also Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (stating
that, to claim a violation of Just Compensation Clause, taking claimant must exhaust ade-
quate state compensation procedures.
56. Cf. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 118 S. Ct. 1244, 1254 (1998) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that clemency procedure
would violate due process if coin toss were used for decision making).
57. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990); see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194; Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18,21 (1940) (quoting Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104
(1932).
58. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689 (1981) (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorg.
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,124-25 (1974), and Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.R. Co.,
135 U.S. 641, 659 (1890)); see Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194.
59. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194. The substantive and procedural features of just com-
pensation doctrine, to which the text refers, have counterparts in due process doctrine, a
correspondence that is not merely coincidental. The Court in Williamson based the ex-
haustion requirement on the principle that "a property owner has not suffered a violation
of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
just compensation through the procedure provided by the State for obtaining just compen-
sation." Id. at 195. The Court analogized that principle to one enunciated in a due process
case, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986). See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195. In Parratt, the Court held that a state
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gard to the Just Compensation Clause, therefore, the state has both a
substantive obligation (to award compensation) and a procedural obli-
gation (to provide a process for obtaining compensation). If the state
fails to meet that procedural obligation, the exhaustion requirement is
excused.
The last two exceptions discussed-which excuse exhaustion
when compensation is not available or when the procedures for ob-
taining it are inadequate-are both narrow. In First English Evangeli-
cal Church v. County of Los Angeles, the Court held that a cause of
action in inverse condemnation arises directly from the Just Compen-
sation Clause upon the occurrence of a regulatory taking.60 Since the
inverse-condemnation cause of action stems from the Constitution,
state courts can hear inverse-condemnation claims regardless of
whether state law recognizes the cause of action.61 All a state court
needs is appropriate jurisdiction.62 It appears that most, if not all,
states have courts with jurisdiction to hear constitutional inverse-con-
official's random and unauthorized destruction of the plaintiff's property did not violate
the Due Process Clause because the plaintiff could bring a state tort claim for the damage.
See id. at 536-44. The Williamson Court explained that, with respect to such random and
unauthorized state acts, the Due Process Clause "is satisfied by the provision of meaningful
postdeprivation process." Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195. "Thus," the Williamson Court con-
cluded, "the State's action is not 'complete' in the sense of causing a constitutional injury
'unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the prop-
erty loss."' Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,532 n.12
(1984)). As the Williamson Court understood Parralt, due process thus requires both "a
meaningful postdeprivation process" and "an adequate postdeprivation remedy." See id.
In this sense, due process doctrine parallels the just compensation precedent requiring
both "an adequate [post-taking] process for obtaining compensation" as well as an award
of just compensation at the culmination of this process. See id. at 194-95. The parallel may
reflect that due process doctrine encompasses principles of both substantive and proce-
dural due process, and that the substantive obligation to pay just compensation also is
conjoined with principles of procedural due process. In any event, Williamson's interpreta-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause as requiring the state to provide both an adequate
process and an adequate remedy is consistent with decisions involving takings by the fed-
eral government in which the Court has traced to the Fifth Amendment both the federal
government's substantive obligation to provide just compensation as well as its procedural
obligation to provide an adequate process for providing that compensation. See Preseault,
494 U.S. at 11; Hurley, 285 U.S. at 104; Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21.
60. 482 U.S. 304, 315-17 (1987); see also, e.g., 9 DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY § 81.05(a)(1), at 256-58 (1994) (tracing to First English the principle that
action in inverse condemnation for regulatory taking arises directly under Just Compensa-
tion Clause); Bruce Burton, Regulatory Takings, Private Property Protection Acts, and the
"Moragne Principle": A Proposal for Judicial-Legislative Comity, 49 S.C. L. REv. 83, 101 &
n.73 (1997) (same).
61. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315.
62. See 9 THompsoN ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 81.05(a), at 256-59.
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demnation claims.63 As long as the state courts handle those claims
consistently with the flexible demands of the Due Process Clause,' a
regulatory taking claimant will not be able to show that the state lacks
adequate compensation procedures. Furthermore, the claimant will
have trouble proving that compensation would not be available
through an inverse condemnation action in state court unless the state
courts have already rejected claims identical to the claimant's. 65 Thus,
it remains the general rule that, before coming to federal court, a tak-
ing claimant must "avail itself of an available and facially adequate
state procedure by which it might obtain just compensation. '66
3. Summary of takings-ripeness rules and their exceptions; transition
The Court has developed a specialized "ripeness" doctrine that
limits the litigation of regulatory takings claims against local agencies
in federal court. The doctrine generally requires someone asserting
such a claim (1) to get from the local agency a final decision that delin-
eates the permissible uses of the claimant's property; and (2) to ex-
haust available and adequate state compensation remedies, typically
by bringing an inverse condemnation action in state court. The claim-
ant can avoid both ripeness requirements by asserting a facial chal-
lenge, though such a challenge faces an uphill battle. Alternatively,
the claimant can avoid or mitigate one or both of the requirements by
showing that (a) it would be futile to pursue some administrative step
that would ordinarily need to be pursued in order to get a final deci-
sion from a local agency; (b) it would be futile to exhaust state com-
pensation procedures because compensation would not be available to
that claimant; or (c) the state compensation procedures are inade-
quate or otherwise unfair. As a practical matter, the claimant seldom
will be able to make any of those showings. If the claimant cannot do
63. See id. § 81.05(b), at 259; see also, e.g., Carlos Manuel VAzquez, What is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE LJ. 1683, 1788 (1997) (asserting that "all states permit
inverse condemnation actions").
64. The requirements of the Due Process Clause, however, are flexible. See Gilbert v.
Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (requirements of due process are "flexible").
65. Cf Austin v. Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) (regulatory taking claim-
ant bears burden of proving state compensation procedures are inadequate); Roberts,
supra note 17, at 67. ("The property owner bears a difficult burden to establish inadequacy
of the state's compensation remedy.").
66. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351 (1986); but cf.
Kruse v. Village of Chagrin Falls, Ohio 74 F.3d 694, 697-700 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that
availability of state-court remedies was too uncertain to require exhaustion); Clajon Prod.
Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1574-75 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that exhaustion was not
required because compensation was not available in state court).
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so, the claimant will usually find his or her taking claim barred in fed-
eral court by issue or claim preclusion.
Courts, commentators, litigants, and legislators disagree whether
it should be as hard as it is now to litigate regulatory takings claims
against local agencies in federal court.67 Critics condemn the takings-
ripeness doctrine as too complicated and unclear - a "mess."6 They
also believe that the doctrine unjustifiably prevents federal courts
from enforcing federal constitutional rights.69 In contrast, supporters
of current ripeness law consider it relatively clear and straightfor-
ward.7' They also believe that the ripeness doctrine preserves federal-
court resources and local control over land use disputes.7'
Criticism of current law led to the introduction in the last Con-
gress of bills that would "clean up" the ripeness "mess" by "streamlin-
ing" the process by which plaintiffs with regulatory takings claims
against local agencies could get their claims heard in federal court.72
This article does not address whether the proposed legislation embod-
67. See Roberts, supra note 17, at 70-71.
68. Amendment to the Webb-Kenyon Act; and the Private Property Implementation Act
of 1997: Hearings on H.R. 1063 and H.R. 1534 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 105th Cong. 69 (1997) [hereinafter cited as
"House Hearing"] (statement of Professor Daniel Mandelker); John J. Delaney & Duane
J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the "Ripeness Mess"? A Call for Reform So Takings
Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URBAN LAW. 195 (1999); Berger & Kanner,
supra note 14, at 864; see also 143 CONG. Rnc. H8941, 8942 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (state-
ments of Rep. Coble to interpret when a final decision has occurred have reached conflict-
ing and confusing decisions of Rep. Canady); S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 8 (1998); H.R. REP.
NO. 105-323, at 5 (1997); Kassouni, supra note 26, at 22 (describing holdings of two of
Court's takings ripeness decisions as "amorphous").
69. See 144 CONG. 1EC. S8022 (daily ed. Jul. 13, 1998) (statements of Sen. Hatch);
Delaney & Desiderio, supra note 70, at 200-01; Overstreet, supra note 30, at 92.
70. See 143 CONG. REc. H8944 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statements of Rep. Dingell);
S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 29; Lyman, supra note 28, at 101.
71. See 144 CONG. REC. S8038 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Murray);
143 CONG. REc. H8952 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statement of Rep. Nadler); S. REP. NO.
105-242, at 33 (1998); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 35 (testimony of John C. Dwyer,
Acting Assoc. Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice); Glenn P. Sugameli, "Takings Bills
Threaten People, Property, Zoning, and the Environment, 31 URBAN LAW. 177, 182-83
(1999); Sharon Buccino, Turmoil Over 'Takings' How H.R. 1534 Turns Local Land Use
Disputes Into Federal Cases, 28 ENrr. L. Rm,. 100083 (1998); Whitman, supra note 31, at 45
(concluding that ripeness doctrine "promotes judicial efficiency and prevents judicial
waste").
72. 144 CONG. REc. S8036, S8044 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (Letter from John H. Dres-
sendorfer, Vice President, American Forest and Paper Ass'n, to Sen. Hatch and remarks of
Sen. Craig);143 CONG. 1Ec. E2089 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statement of Rep. Harman);
143 CONG. REC. H8942 (daily ed. Oct. 22. 1997) (statements of Rep. Canady of Rep.
Young); Berger & Kanner, supra note 14, at 864.
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ies good policy.73 The policy pros and cons are discussed in the legis-
lative material and other commentary.74 Instead, this article focuses
on the constitutionality of a provision in the proposed legislation that
was challenged on constitutional grounds: the proposal to eliminate
Williamson's exhaustion requirement.
B. The Proposed Legislation for "Cleaning Up" the Ripeness "Mess"
Property-rights legislation has been proposed in every Congress,
including the current one, since 1990.7s Many early proposals re-
quired the government to compensate property owners for regulatory
actions that diminished the value of their property by more than a
prescribed percentage. 76  These proposals would have, in effect,
changed takings law in a substantive way by defining when govern-
ment regulation "goes [so] far" that it requires government compensa-
tion.7 Perhaps because of the consistent failure of these substantive
73. Indeed, this article's authors disagree with each other on whether congressional
proposals to alter Williamson's ripeness requirements are good policy.
74. Compare, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 6,8-12,20-24 (1998); Delaney & Desiderio,
supra note 70; Berger & Kanner, supra note 14; and Overstreet, supra note 30 (all arguing
in favor of legislatively revising Williamson's ripeness requirements) with S. REP. NO. 105-
242, at 30-33, 42-49 (1998) (minority report); Sugameli, supra note 73; Buccino, supra note
73; and Schiffer, supra note 14 (all arguing against revising Williamson's ripeness
requirements).
75. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 1 & n.2; Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Bills
Threaten Private Property, People, and the Environment, 8 FoRDHAM ENVTL. LJ. 521, 532-
50 (1997); see also id. at 532-50 (describing congressional property rights proposals intro-
duced from 1990 through 1996); Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Pro-
ject A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L.
REv. 509 (1998) (critical description of intellectual underpinnings of movement for legisla-
tive revision of takings law); John D. Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights, 50 OLA.
L. REv. 351 (1997) (critical analysis of political dimension of property-rights debate).
76. See Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, S. 1954, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(D)
(1996) (requiring compensation for government action reducing value of property by 50%
or more); Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(D) (33%
or more); Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995) (33%
or more); Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, 104th Cong. § 9000(a)(2)(B)
(10% or more); Private Property Owners Bill of Rights of 1994, S. 1915,103rd Cong. § 8(a)
(50% or more); Private Property Owners Bill of Rights of 1994, H.R. 3875, 103rd Cong.
§ 8(a) (50% or more); Just Compensation Act of 1993, H.R. 1388, 103d Cong. § 5(a) ("any
diminution in value"); see also Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1997, S. 781, 105th Cong.
§ 204(a)(2)(D) (1997) (requiring compensation for government action that deprives owner
of 33% or more of property); Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation & Management Act
of 1991, H.R. 1330, 102d Cong. § 3 (requiring compensation of fair market value for certain
land classified as wetland); R.G. Converse, Property Rights Legislation: Some Questions, in
TAKINGs 255 (David L. Callies ed. 1996) (describing H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995), in
detail).
77. Sugameli, supra note 77, at 528,553 (stating that "compensation"-type takings bills
essentially create new property entitlements).
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proposals, supporters of property-rights legislation came up with a
new approach in the 105th Congress.78  They introduced bills that
changed the process for bringing regulatory takings claims against lo-
cal agencies in federal courts by changing Williamson's ripeness re-
quirements.79 These bills disclaimed any intention of changing the
substance of takings law, ° and the supporters of the bills contended
that they made only "procedural" changes for the federal courts.8"
The main bill in the 105th Congress that contained a provision
modifying Williamson's ripeness requirements was H.R. 1534,82 and it
serves as the model for the bill introduced in the current (106 t") Con-
gress.8 3 H.R. 1534 passed the House by a wide margin (248-178) in
October 1997 and then went to the Senate.84 The Senate Judiciary
Committee reported out a bill that was still called H.R. 1534 and that
contained essentially the same ripeness provision.15 Before H.R. 1534
was debated in the Senate, it was replaced by another bill, Senate Bill
78. See CRS Report, supra note 3, at 1; see also 143 CONG. Ruc. H8938 (daily ed. Oct.
22, 1997) (statements of Rep. Frost) (describing process-oriented taking bill as a "far cry"
from past takings bills); 143 CONG. REC. H8948 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Skaggs) (stating that bill "takes a different approach" from past takings bill because
bill "at least in form, is a procedural measure, not one to revise the basic substantive law in
this area").
79. See infra notes 84-121 and accompanying text (discussing and citing bills). Some of
these bills would also have altered the process for asserting takings claims against the fed-
eral government. See, e.g., H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. §§ 5 and 6(a) & (b) (1997) (as reported
in the Senate on Feb. 26, 1998); S. 781, 105th Cong. § 205 (1997). That aspect of the bills is
not addressed in this paper.
80. See S. 2271, 105th Cong. § 6(a)(1)(c) (1998); H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 6(c) (1998)
(as reported in Senate).
81. See 144 CONG. Rc. S8022, S8024 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statements of Sen.
Hatch) (arguing that one purpose of S. 2271 is "to provide private property owners claim-
ing a violation of the Fifth Amendment's taking clause some certainty as to when they may
file the claim in federal court" by "addressing the procedural hurdles of the ripeness and
abstention doctrines"); id. at S8041 (statement of Sen. Coverdell) ("S. 2271 is strictly pro-
cedural in nature"); id. at S8044 (statement of Sen. Craig); 143 CONG. RPc. H8952 (daily
ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (remark of Rep. Dooley) ( "H.R 1534 is only a procedural bill"); id. at
H8957 (statement of Rep. Coble); S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 6, 21 (1998); House Hearing,
supra note 70, at 46 (statement of Rep. Gallegly); Berger & Kanner, supra note 14, at 874.
82. H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. (1997). In this paper, we discuss the version of H.R. 1534
that was reported out of committee in the Senate on February 26, 1998. See 144 CONG.
REc. 81068 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998). As discussed in the text infra, the main bill on the
Senate side was S. 2271, 105th Cong. (1998). Three other bills in the 105th Congress con-
tained provisions that would have altered Williamson's ripeness requirements. See S. 2271,
105th § 6(a)(1) (1998); S. 1204, 105th § 2 (1997); S. 1256, 105th § 8(c) (1997).
83. See Citizens Access to Justice Act of 1999, S. 1028, 106th Cong. § 6(c), reproduced
at 145 CONG. Rnc. S5267-68 (daily ed. May 13, 1999).
84. See 143 CONG. Ruc. H8964 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997).
85. See S. REP NO. 105-242, at 7 (1998) (stating that substitute for H.R. 1534 reported
out of Senate committee "included the substance" of H.R. 1534).
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2271, that retained the substance of H.R. 1534's ripeness provision."
That bill did not pass.a Bills virtually identical to the one that failed
were recently introduced in each House of the current Congress. 8
The provision in H.R. 1534 modifying Williamson's ripeness re-
quirements would have added a new subsection to section 1343.89
That new subsection, designated subsection "(e)," applied to "[a]ny
claim" brought under section 1983 "to redress the deprivation of a
property right or privilege secured by the Constitution."9" Subsection
(e)(1) declared that any such claim "shall be ripe" upon the rendering
of a "final decision" that caused the claimant "actual and concrete
injury."91 Subsection (e)(2) described when a "final decision" oc-
curs.92 Finally, subsection (e)(3) said that, to have a final decision, it
was not necessary for the claimant to exhaust state judicial remedies.93
Thus, subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) modified Williamson's final deci-
86. See S. 2271, 105th Cong. § 6(a)(1)(C) (1998).
87. See 144 CONG. Rc. S8048-49 (daily ed. July 13, 1998). The supporters of S. 2271
sought to have it considered on the floor of the Senate without making the bill first go
through a committee. To accomplish this procedurally, they had to make a motion in the
Senate to consider S. 2271. After that motion to consider was debated on the floor of the
Senate, there was a motion for cloture of the debate on the motion to consider S. 2271. A
vote in favor of cloture signified that the voter wanted the Senate to vote on the merits of
S. 2271. A majority of Senators voted in favor of the cloture motion; the vote was 52 in
favor of cloture, and 42 against cloture. To ensure a vote on the bill, however, 60 votes
were needed. See Senate Manual Rule XXII.2. Since the supporters of S. 2271 did not
have 60 votes, they ultimately withdrew their motion to proceed to consider the merits of
S. 2271. That action effectively killed the bill.
88. See S. 1028, 106th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (1999); H.R. 2372, 106 ' Cong. §2 (1999).
89. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (noting use of Section 1343 as jurisdic-
tional basis for takings claim in federal court against local agencies). As noted above
(supra note 84), the description of H.R. 1534's ripeness provision in this article is based on
the version of H.R. 1534 that was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb.
26, 1998. See 144 CONG. Rac. S1068 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1998); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 2-6
(1998) (reproducing bill as reported out of committee).
90. H.R. 1534, 105th CONG. § 6(c) (1997).
91. Id.
92. Id. A "final decision" would exist under three conditions: (1) the defendant
agency had made a "definitive decision regarding the extent of permissible uses on the
property that has been allegedly infringed or taken"; (2) "one meaningful application" to
use the property had been submitted to the defendant agency but had not been approved
within a reasonable time, and one appeal from, and one request for waiver of, the agency's
disapproval of that application had been sought; and (3) in a case involving real property
and where such review was available, the plaintiff had unsuccessfully sought review by
elected officials. Id. This part of the ripeness provision then provided for an exception,
under which a property owner did not have to apply for an appeal or waiver "if no such
appeal or waiver is available, if it cannot provide the relief requested, or if the application
or reapplication would be futile." Id.
93. H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 6(c) (1997).
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sion requirement, and subsection (e)(3) eliminated Williamson's ex-
haustion requirement.94
It matters for two reasons that the drafters of H.R. 1534 made its
ripeness provision applicable only to claims under section 1983. First,
this ensured that the ripeness provision would not apply to states or
state agencies.95 Those entities are not subject to liability under sec-
tion 1983 because they are not "person[s]" within the meaning of that
statute.96 Thus, the ripeness provision would apply primarily to suits
against local entities, such as cities and counties and their agencies.97
This focus reflects the drafters' chief concern with land-use restric-
tions, which are imposed primarily by local rather than state govern-
ments.98  Second, the decision to make the ripeness provision
applicable only to section 1983 claims ensured that it would encom-
pass claims for awards of just compensation. Such monetary relief is
one type of relief available in actions under section 1983. 9 The draft-
ers of the ripeness provision plainly intended to allow a federal court
not only to decide whether a local agency had engaged in a regulatory
taking but also to award just compensation (and perhaps other dam-
ages) if the agency had done so.
The provision in H.R. 1534 modifying Williamson's "final deci-
sion" requirement provoked no constitutional objections, for good
94. As a formal matter, the ripeness provision of H.R. 1534 should not have been
drafted as an amendment to section 1343 because the federal district courts have subject-
matter jurisdiction of takings claims against local agencies not only under section 1343 but
also under section 1331. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 117 (Letter from Leonidas
Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference of the United States, to Rep. Howard
Coble, Chairman, House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (Sept.
29, 1997), stating the Judicial Conference's position that, "by codifying the takings provi-
sions within 28 U.S.C. § 1343," H.R. 1534 "may create confusion because of the availability
of the general jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331").
95. See 144 CONG. RIc. S8035-36 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("The Supreme Court has long held that the Eleventh Amendment makes state govern-
ments acting under state law immune from suits ified under U.S.C. section 1983 ... S.2271
does nothing to change that.").
96. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
97. See Senate Hearing at 94 (statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting Assoc. Attorney
General, DOJ) Section 1983 has also been used to assert a taking claim against an agency
created by an interstate compact. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728-29; see also Lake Country
Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1979) (holding that
agency created by an interstate compact was a "person" within meaning of section 1983).
98. See, e.g., 144 CONG. Rc. S8035 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)
(observing that S. 2271, unlike H.R. 1534, was limited to claims regarding real property).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (authorizing "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress"); see also, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1624, 1645 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment) (stating that section 1983 authorizes money damages and injunctive relief).
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reason. One reason for the lack of constitutional objection was that
the provision described a "final decision" in a way that largely tracked
federal-court precedent applying Williamson."°o Both the provision
and the precedent emphasize the need for an owner to make a "mean-
ingful application" to a local agency and for the agency to make a
"definitive" decision on the permissible uses of property before a "fi-
nal decision" will be deemed to occur.'01 A second reason for the lack
of constitutional objection was that the provision deemed ripe only
claims involving final decisions that caused the claimant "actual and
concrete injury,"'" 2 thereby obviating any Article III objections.
Overall, the provision changed current law by ensuring that property
owners would not have to make an endless number of applications to
a local agency in order to get a final decision.0 3 Although opponents
attacked that change as unwise, unnecessary, and unclear, they did not
challenge it as unconstitutional; consequently it is not the focus of this
paper.1 4
100. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 55 (statement of Professor Daniel R.
Mandelker) (stating that Williamson County is the "patent" inspiration for provision in
H.R. 1534 defining "final decision"); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 73-74.
101. Compare MacDonald Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 352 n.8
(1986) (referring to the need for "meaningful application"), with H.R. 1534, 105th Cong.
§ 6(c), and compare Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comn'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 191 (1985) (referring to need for agency to reach "definitive
position" as to permissible uses of land), with H.R. 1534, § 6(c) (requiring agency to make
"definitive decision").
102. H.R. 1534, § 6(c).
103. See S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12 (1998) (asserting that under H.R. 1534, "a claimant
is required to obtain as few as three and as many as five decisions by local entities before
her claim will be ripe for review by a Federal court"); Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 87-
88 (Congressional Research Service Memo on H.R. 1534 stating that bill prescribes "a per
se rule that ripeness is established by one final decision as to permitted property uses and
one waiver/one appeal,[which]contrasts with existing law" under which "one or more re-
applications" could be required); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 37 (statement of John
C. Dwyer, Acting Assoc. Attorney General, DOJ) (noting that H.R. 1534 changed existing
ripeness requirements by requiring only one application to local agency by landowner and
relaxing "futility" exception to exhaustion requirement); id. at 46 (statement of Rep. Gal-
legly) ("The bill would define 'final decision' as one time through the application process
and one time through the [administrative] appeals process.")
104. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 38 (referring to H.R. 1534's definition of "final
decision" as complicated); Sen. Hearing, supra note 39, at 95 (statement of John C. Dwyer,
Acting Assoc. Attorney General, DOJ) (arguing that modification of Williamson's final
decision requirement was unwise); id. at 104 (letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney
General, DOJ). At least one opponent of the ripeness changes is one of the current tak-
ings bills, H.R. 2372, 106"' Cong. (1999), has challenged the constitutionality of the portion
of the provision that modifies Williamson's final decision requirement. Hearings on H.R.
2372. Before the subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 106"' Cong. (Sept. 15, 1999) (statement of Barbieri, Deputy Attorney General for
California, on behalf of California Attorney General Bill Lockyer) (visited Oct. 23, 1999)
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Instead, the opponents of H.R. 1534 challenged the constitution-
ality of the provision eliminating Williamson's exhaustion require-
ment,'°5"the exhaustion provision." Their attack on the exhaustion
provision was twofold. First, some opponents claimed that the ex-
haustion provision violated Article III. Specifically, they argued that,
"to the extent that ripeness is a constitutionally driven doctrine," Arti-
cle III prevented Congress from changing it.'0 6 This Article III objec-
tion was equivocal, as the opponents did not say that the exhaustion
(http:/www.house.gov/judiciary/barb09l5.htm). General Barbieri testified that "there can
be no injury and therefore, no taking, unless the government has taken final action." 1d
This is incorrect. A property owner suffers injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III
when a government regulation (1) requires the owner to get permission to use the prop-
erty in the way that he or she wishes (and is capable of doing so); and (2) prohibits the
desired use until the permission is granted. In this situation, the injury consists of the
present restriction on the desired use pending a "final decision" on the owner's application
for permission. In short, the injury occurs before a final decision is made. Cf infra notes
139-151 and 159-165 and accompanying text (discussing Article III requirements in relation
to Williamson's exhaustion requirement). A separate question is whether a taking (as dis-
tinguished from an injury) has occurred before the government rules on a property owner's
application for permission to use his or her property in a particular way. Although the
answer to that question will depend on the circumstances of each case, it certainly is a
question that the federal courts are competent to answer. See Steams Co. v. United States,
34 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (1995) (Court of Federal Claims will hold trial on whether a require-
ment to obtain a compatibility determination for a minerals estate constitutes a taking).
General Barbieri was therefore wrong, we respectfully submit, when he said that this ques-
tion would be "impossible" for the court to decide before a final decision was made. The
Deputy Attorney General overlooked that, even before a final decision is made, a federal
court can decide whether a taking has been caused by a property-use restriction that ap-
plies until a final decision is made. Cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 482
U.S. 304, 319 (1987) (government must pay for a taking even if it later invalidates the
regulation and the taking becomes temporary).
105. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 105-323, at 11 (1997) (letter from Andrew Fois, Ass't
Attorney General, DOJ), describing DOJ's earlier hearing testimony as raising "constitu-
tional objections" only "to the proposed elimination of the existing requirement that a
property owner seek compensation in state court before filing a Federal takings action");
Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 96 (statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting Assoc. Attorney
General, DOJ) (including among "serious constitutional issues" the elimination of exhaus-
tion requirement but not alteration of final decision requirement); see also Delaney &
Desiderio, supra note 70, at 197 (observing that "[t]he main contention of [H.R. 1534's]
detractors" concerned proposed elimination of exhaustion requirement). The legislative
history contains some expressions by opponents of doubt about the constitutionality of
H.R. 1534's ripeness provision as a whole, but the specific concerns invariably target the
portion of the provision that eliminated Williamson's exhaustion requirement.
106. H.R. REP. NO 105-323, at 20; see Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 112 (Letter
from Michael W. Blommer, Assistant Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, Judicial Con-
ference of U.S., to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Committee (Oct. 6,
1997), stating Judicial Conference's view that senate version of H.R. 1534 "might violate
Article III insofar as the legislation-by expediting a federal court's consideration of a tak-
ings claim before a property owner has been denied compensation-may circumvent the
requirement of a cognizable injury in the context of a constitutional taking").
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requirement, in particular, was "constitutionally driven."107 Second,
many opponents argued that the exhaustion provision exceeded Con-
gress' power. 08 This lack-of-power argument rested on the premise
that the exhaustion provision would change the "substance" of the
Just Compensation Clause.1° 9 The Department of Justice ("DOJ")
put it this way:
If the proposed legislation is interpreted to allow develop-
ers and other property owners to bring takings claims against
local governments in federal court without first seeking compen-
sation in state courts, it would alter not only ripeness principles
but the substantive standard under which district courts adjudi-
cate takings claims against state and local authorities. This
would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's guidance that
the obligation to seek compensation in state court before alleg-
ing an uncompensated taking derives from the nature of the
right defined by the Just Compensation Clause. We believe this
interpretation of H.R. 1534 would violate constitutional limits
on congressional power." 0
To support its contention that such a "substantive" change in tak-
ings law would exceed Congress' power, the DOJ cited City of Boerne
v. Flores."' The Attorneys General of forty states likewise cited
107. H.R. REP. NO. 105-323, at 20; see id. at 30 ("[I]f ripeness is constitutionally based,
or even partly so, Congress' actions to limit it will itself be futile. If this aspect of ripeness
is prudential, Congress may legislate jurisdictional; requirements. But, the difficulty of this
constitutional question argues for more hearings and testimony... "); see also S. REP.
NO. 105-242, at 31, 49-50 (stating that the courts very likely could not resolve claims which
are declared ripe by this bill but which fail to meet the constitutional standard of "finality."
108. See 144 CONG. Ruc. S8030 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (Statement of Administration
Policy on S. 2271) ("The bill would violate constitutional limits on congressional power if
read, as its supporters intend, to allow for a ruling that an uncompensated taking has oc-
curred even where the claimant fails to pursue available State compensation remedies.");
Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 124 (Letter from 40 State Attorneys General, stating
"Congress lacks the authority to interfere so directly in the operation of State and local
governments and to authorize suits against the States in federal court beyond its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."); House Hearing, supra note 70, at (statement of
Elizabeth M. Osenbaugh, Solicitor General, Iowa) ("By permitting suit in federal court
before state remedies are exhausted, the statute would authorize actions where there has
been no constitutional violation. We question whether federal courts could constitution-
ally hear such claims against State officials.").
109. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. H8941 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statements of Rep. Lof-
gren) (asserting that H.R. 1534 "could alter the substantive law of takings in favor of
developers").
110. House Hearing, supra note 70, at 38 (statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting Associ-
ate Attorney General, DOJ); H.R. REP. NO. 105-323, at 12 (Letter from Andrew Fois,
Assistant Attorney General, DOJ) (stating that "[C]ongress... lacks the power to alter
the constitutional obligations of the states" by eliminating exhaustion requirement).
111. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), cited in House Hearing, supra note
70, at 39 (statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting Associate Attorney General, DOJ).
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Boerne in contending that H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision would
make a "substantive" change that exceeded Congress' power. 1 2 The
Judicial Conference of the United States joined these executive-
branch officials in stating that the exhaustion provision would elimi-
nate one of the "substantive elements of a taking [claim]" (though the
Conference did not argue that Congress lacked power to enact the
provision)." 3 Other opponents complained more generally that H.R.
1534 would make "substantive," rather than "procedural," changes to
takings law.114
To counter these arguments, congressional supporters of H.R.
1534 contended that the compensation requirement was "merely pru-
dential in nature.""' 5 Accordingly, they argued it was "a court-created
barrier which Congress may alter."' 6 To support the argument that
the exhaustion requirement is prudential, the supporters of H.R. 1534
cited Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency," 7 and cases in
which the Court decided takings issues without addressing whether
the takings claimants were required to exhaust compensation reme-
dies. 1 8 The supporters' characterization of the exhaustion require-
ment as "prudential" seemingly underlay their assertion that its
elimination would make only a "procedural" change in takings law."19
112. Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 124 (reproducing Letter from 40 State Attorneys
General) (citing Boerne for proposition that "Congress lacks the power to substantively re-
define [sic] constitutional limits on the States").
113. Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 112 (Letter from Michael W. Blommer, Assistant
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, Judicial Conference of U.S.) (stating that even if
H.R. 1534 eliminated prudential concerns underlying exhaustion requirement, cases
brought under H.R. 1534 "might nevertheless be dismissed at the pleading stage for failure
to satisfy the substantive elements of a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments").
114. See 143 CoNrG. REc. H8941 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
("In addition to providing developers with special procedural advantages, [H.R. 1534]
could alter the substantive law of takings in favor of developers"); id. at H8946 (statement
of Rep. Boehlert) (stating that H.R. 1534 "violates the most basic principles of federal-
ism ... That is not, as some say, a narrow procedural fix.").
115. S. REP. NO 105-242, at 12 (1998).
116. Id.
117. 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
118. See S. REP. NO 105-242, at 12-15; 144 CONG. REc. S8025-26 (daily ed. July 13,
1998) (statements of Sen. Hatch).
119. See 144 CONG. REc. S8025 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("[T]he second prong of Williamson County is now merely prudential in nature... In other
words, the requirement of exhaustion is a court-created barrier which Congress may al-
ter."); S. Rep. No. 105-242, at 12 (1998) (to the same effect); Senate Hearing, supra note 39,
at 106 (Letter from Prof. Daniel Mandelker) (stating that ripeness requirements are "pru-
dential" and are therefore "court-created barriers" that "Congress is fully empowered to
address").
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M. Analysis of the Legislative Debate on the
Constitutionality of the Exhaustion Provision of the
Proposed Legislation
Each side in the congressional debate over the provision in H.R.
1534 that eliminates Williamson's exhaustion requirement was par-
tially correct. The supporters of H.R. 1534 correctly contended that
the bill's exhaustion provision would not violate Article III, because
Williamson's exhaustion requirement is not mandated by Article m]I.
The opponents of H.R. 1534 were correct in contending that William-
son's exhaustion requirement is substantive in the sense that it inheres
in the nature of the right protected by the Just Compensation Clause.
Indeed, the exhaustion requirement has a dual nature. It resembles
the prudential rules of justiciability associated with Article III, yet it
also is an element of a cause of action for a violation of the Just Com-
pensation Clause. Because neither side in the debate fully compre-
hended the nature of the exhaustion requirement, neither side
explored the question whether Congress has power to eliminate it.
A. The Exhaustion Requirement as a Rule of Prudence
By calling exhaustion a "ripeness" requirement, the Court has
linked exhaustion to justiciability, of which ripeness is a component. 120
The justiciability doctrine reflects both Article III limits and "pruden-
tial" rules of judicial "self-governance.' 121 The Article III limits of
the justiciability doctrine restrict the power of both federal courts and
Congress. Article III restricts the federal courts to deciding "[c]ases"
and "[c]ontroversies."' By the same token, Article III bars Congress
from authorizing federal courts to hear disputes that are not "cases or
120. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 733 n.7 (citing case law on general doctrine of ripeness in
discussing takings-ripeness requirements); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1012-13 (1992) (contrasting taking claimant's allegation of "Article III injury in
fact" with his failure to pursue administrative remedy, which "goes only to the prudential
'ripeness' of [plaintiff's] challenge"); Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985)
(comparing plaintiff's standing to make Article I challenge with plaintiff's standing to
make takings challenge to same federal statute); Gene R. Nichol, Ripeness and the Consti-
tution, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 164-70 (1987) (discussing takings-ripeness precedent as one
strain of Court's ripeness precedent).
121. See last v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984).
122. See U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also, e.g., Association of Data Processing
Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Article II. .. restricts judicial power to
'cases' and 'controversies."'). History leaves unclear the difference between "cases" and
"controversies." See, eg., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regard-
ing the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 149 n.278 (citing conflicting commentary);
cf. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723 (1838) (suggesting that,
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controversies."'" Article III would therefore bar Congress from au-
thorizing federal courts to hear. takings claims by plaintiffs who had
not met Williamson's exhaustion requirement, if that requirement
were a necessary ingredient of an Article III "case or controversy. '"124
Article Ill would impose no such bar, however, if the exhaustion re-
quirement were instead "prudential."'" The Court has not decided
whether the exhaustion requirement is dictated by Article III. The
Court's precedent nonetheless strongly suggests that the requirement
is not an Article III dictate; rather, it is akin to a prudential rule of
justiciability.
In Suitum, the Court described both of Williamson's ripeness re-
quirements (including the exhaustion requirement) as "prudential.' 1 26
Suitum does not settle the matter, however, because its description of
the exhaustion requirement as prudential was dictum. The only issue
before the Court in Suitum was whether the plaintiff had satisfied the
final decision requirement; there was no dispute about the exhaustion
requirement. 27 Moreover, the Court in Suitum did not explain why
the exhaustion requirement is prudential. The absence of an explana-
tion reduces the precedential weight of its dictum.' 28 Finally, some
people have perceived Suitum's dictum on the exhaustion require-
ment to be inconsistent with other statements by the Court. 29 For
whereas "controversies" encompasses only civil actions, "cases" encompasses both civil
and criminal actions).
123. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. 2312, 2318 n.3 (1997) ("It is settled that Con-
gress cannot erase Article III's standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.").
124. See id., 117 S. Ct. at 2315-22 (holding that Members of Congress lacked Art. III
standing to challenge constitutionality of Line Item Veto Act, despite provision in act au-
thorizing such a challenge to be brought by any Member of Congress); see also Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 397 U.S. at 154 (explaining that Congress can alter standing
rules "save as the requirements of Article III dictate otherwise").
125. See, e.g., Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 n.3 (acknowledging that statutory provision
authorizing a particular plaintiff to sue "eliminates any prudential standing limitations");
See generally CHEMERiNSKY, supra note 9, § 2.1, at 42-43 (2d ed. 1994) ("The distinction
between constitutional and prudential limits on federal judicial power is important because
Congress, by statute, may override prudential, but not constitutional, restrictions.").
126. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734.
127. See id.
128. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935) (stating that
dicta of prior cases "may be followed if sufficiently persuasive but they are not control-
ling") (emphasis added); cf County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us to adhere not only to the
holdings of our prior cases but also to their explications of the governing rules of law.").
129. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 91 (Congressional Research Service Report)
(stating that the Court "has sent mixed signals" about whether exhaustion requirement is
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these reasons, it is worth examining Supreme Court case law that sup-
ports Suitum's dictum. That case law includes decisions concerning
the general doctrine of ripeness and the nature of an Article III "case
or controversy."
The Court has said that the general doctrine of ripeness "is drawn
both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from pruden-
tial reasons,"' 3 ° but it has not explained how to distinguish prudential
ripeness rules from Article III ripeness rules. Instead, the Court has
described the ripeness doctrine, in its composite form, as having "a
twofold aspect, requiring [a federal court] to evaluate both the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration." 1 ' The Court has not specified to
what extent the "fitness" prong and the "hardship" prong partake of
Article III and prudential concerns. 32 Such specificity may be impos-
sible. Both the "fitness" of an issue for judicial review and the "hard-
ship" of postponing review are matters of degree, and Article III
requirements shade into prudential concerns without any discernible
boundary. 3
The Court's precedent on the general doctrine of ripeness none-
theless sheds light on the Court's specialized takings-ripeness doc-
trine. Roughly speaking, the "fitness" prong of the general doctrine
parallels the "final decision" requirement of the specialized doctrine.
Likewise, the "hardship" prong of the general doctrine roughly paral-
prudential or Article III rule); see also id. ("This takings-specific ripeness debate is playing
out against the backdrop of a broad Supreme Court trend toward regarding ripeness as
largely, though not exclusively, prudential.").
130. Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993), quoted in Suitum, 520
U.S. at 733 n.7; accord, e.g., Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138
(1974) ("[ijssues of ripeness involve, at least in part, the existence of a live 'Case or Contro-
versy,"' as well as "the exercise of judicial restraint from unnecessary decision of constitu-
tional issues").
131. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
132. Cf Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 138 (stating that, in deter-
mining ripeness, Court cannot be bound by parties' wishes, because ripeness partakes of
Article HI requirements as well as discretionary considerations, both of which are for court
alone to determine).
133. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968) ("The many subtle pressures which cause
policy considerations to blend into the constitutional limitations of Article III make the
justiciability doctrine one of uncertain and shifting contours.") (internal quotation marks
and footnote omitted); CrnmvminsKy, supra note 9, § 2.1, at 43 ("A clear separation of the
constitutional and prudential aspects of the justiciability doctrines is often difficult because
both reflect the same basic policy considerations."); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
500 (1975) (prudential rules of standing are "closely related to Art. III concerns").
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lels the "exhaustion" requirement of the specialized doctrine. 134 The
Court has not acknowledged these parallels, but they are evident in
the Court's explanations for the two specialized ripeness require-
ments. The Court has said that a "final decision" is necessary so a
federal court can determine whether a restriction on property use is so
severe that it causes a regulatory taking.135 Thus, a "final decision"
ensures that a regulatory taking claim is "fit" for judicial review. By
comparison, the Court has not suggested that the exhaustion require-
ment is necessary to make a regulatory taking claim fit for review.
Rather, the Court has said that exhaustion is required because, until a
state has denied just compensation for the taking of an owner's prop-
erty, no violation of the Just Compensation Clause has occurred. 36
Before exhaustion, in other words, the property owner has not suf-
fered a "hardship" forbidden by the Constitution.
Article III does not require the plaintiff to suffer a hardship for-
bidden by the Constitution or by any other federal law.' 37 To the con-
trary, any actual or imminent concrete hardship will do. This point
underlies the Court's shift in the 1960s and '70s from the "legal injury"
test of standing in favor of an "injury in fact" test. 38 More recently,
the Court has blurred the distinction by defining "injury in fact" to
134. See Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. CI. 147, 162 (1996) (citing general ripeness
factors articulated in Abbot Laboratories in discussing ripeness of takings claim); but see
Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts. 48 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 23 (1995) ("The state compensation [i.e. exhaustion] portion of [Williamson] finds
no parallel in the ripeness cases from other areas of the law.").
135. See, e.g., MacDonald Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)
("A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone 'too far' unless it knows how
far the regulation goes.").
136. See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of John-
son, 473 U.S. 172,195 (1985) ("[I]f a State provides an adequate procedure for seeking just
compensation, the property owner cannot claim a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause until it has used the procedure and been denied just compensation.").
137. See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1670-71 (1998) (ana-
lyzing hardship by asking whether plaintiff confronted "adverse effects of a strictly legal
kind," or "significant practical harm," or was immediately forced by challenged govern-
ment action "to modify its behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences").
138. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-154
(1970) (recognizing that precedent used "legal interest" test to assess standing but refusing
to follow that precedent, using "injury in fact" inquiry instead); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159,164 (1970) (plaintiffs had "personal stake" required by Article HI according to Associ-
ation of Data Processing Serv. Orgs.); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733
(1972) (noting that in Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. and Barlow, the Court
eschewed "legal interest" test of its precedent by holding "more broadly" that injury re-
quired by Article III was "injury in fact").
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mean "an invasion of a legally protected interest.' 1 39 Even this defini-
tion, however, does not require a takings claimant to show an uncon-
stitutional denial of compensation in order to prove hardship
sufficient to satisfy Article III. If the claimant challenges an actual
government appropriation of the claimant's property, the injury oc-
curs when the appropriation occurs, regardless whether the claimant
later receives just compensation for the taking.140  Similarly, if the
claimant challenges a regulatory restriction on the use of property, the
injury occurs as soon as the restriction takes effect, regardless of later
compensation.' 4 ' In each situation, the claimant suffers "an invasion
of a legally protected interest"' 42 in the use of his or her property. 4 3
As the Court noted in First English, "Though... an illegitimate taking
might not occur until the government refuses to pay, the interference
that effects a taking might begin much earlier."'144 In short, it is the
taking, rather than the denial of just compensation, that inflicts the
hardship - i.e., the injury in fact - required by Article III, even though
the taking itself does not violate the Constitution. 45
139. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560 (1992); see also Raines, 117 S. Ct.
at 2317 (stating for Article III standing, "the alleged injury must be legally and judicially
cognizable"); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997) (defining "injury in fact" as "an
invasion of a judicially cognizable interest"); Engdahl, supra note 124, at 164-65 (accusing
Justice Scalia of "turn[ing] what had been a dichotomy" between legal interest, on the one
hand, and injury in fact, on the other hand, "into an apposition").
140. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980) ("When a taking occurs by
physical invasion ... the usual rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of
taking, and '[it is that event which gives rise to the claim for compensation... '") quoting
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958); see also Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States,
467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984) (holding that, when government physically occupied land, owner could
bring inverse condemnation action to recover value of land measured on date of occupa-
tion); see also Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270,272-77 (1957) (assuming that cause of
action under Just Compensation Clause against federal government for requisitioning of
military supplies accrued on date that government took the supplies); but cf United States
v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 747-50 (1947) (stating that the statute of limitations on a takings
claim had not run where taking occurred by "a continuing process of physical events").
141. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 320 n.10 (1987) (stating that "the interference that effects a taking
might begin much earlier" than the denial of compensation); Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1012 (1992) (holding that plaintiff had established Art. HI
standing with respect to "constraints placed on the use of his parcels"); see also United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745,748 (1947) ("Property is taken in the constitutional sense
when inroads are made upon an owner's use of it to an extent that, as between private
parties, a servitude has been acquired either by agreement or in course of time.").
142. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
143. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137, 140 (1939) (including
right "of property" among "legal right[s]" that confer "a cause of action or a right to sue").
144. 482 U.S. at 320 n.10.
145. See Stein, supra note 136, at 27-29 (describing this as the "Effective Moment").
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Moreover, an interference with an owner's use of property consti-
tutes "injury in fact" even if it is not so severe as to constitute a regu-
latory taking.14 6 For example, the brickyard owner in Hadacheck v.
Sebastian undoubtedly had Article III standing to challenge a law that
prevented him from continuing to operate his brickyard, even though
the Court held that the law did not cause a taking of his property. 47
The application of the law caused injury in fact, and hence supplied a
necessary ingredient for an Article III case or controversy cognizable
in federal court." 8 It did not, however, constitute a taking, proof of
which was a necessary element of the brickyard owner's cause of ac-
tion for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause. 14 9
The distinction between the elements of an Article III case or
controversy and the elements of a cause of action for a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause is important to remember.'50 The support-
ers of H.R. 1534 lost sight of it.'5 ' Yet the distinction between the
elements of a case or controversy and the elements of a cause of ac-
tion are well-established, as reflected, among other places, in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 Had the brickyard owner in
Hadacheck sued in federal court to challenge the law prohibiting his
brickyard operation, the court could have dismissed his suit under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ. P.") 12(b)(6) because
of his failure to plead an essential element of his claim (i.e., a tak-
146. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64 n.21 (1979) (noting that plaintiffs had stand-
ing to bring a takings challenge to a federal regulation that did not cause a taking: "Be-
cause the regulation [plaintiffs] challenge restricts their ability to dispose of their property,
[plaintiffs] have a personal, concrete, live interest in the controversy.").
147. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 407, 410-12 (1915) (upholding a city
ordinance that prevented plaintiff from operating his brickyard, thereby allegedly reducing
the value of property from $800,000 to $60,000).
148. See Allard, 444 U.S. at 64 n.21.
149. The text discusses Hadacheck to illustrate the distinction between government
conduct that causes injury in fact and government conduct that gives rise to a cause of
action for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause. In Hadacheck, however, the plain-
tiff did not bring a civil action for such a violation, rather, he challenged the law in a
petition for habeas corpus after he was convicted and jailed for violating the law. See
Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 404-05.
150. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998)
(referring to "fundamental distinction" between an argument that the plaintiff lacks cause
of action and an argument that the plaintiff has not satisfied an element of Article III
standing); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) (noting that the lower court
apparently confused issue of whether plaintiff had standing with issue of whether plaintiff
had cause of action); but cf. William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.. 221,
223 (1988) (arguing that standing inquiry should be subsumed in merits inquiry).
151. See infra notes 204-210 and accompanying text.
152. FED. R. Civ. P., 28 U.S.C. App.
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ing).' 3 His suit, however, would not have been subject to dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), for lack of Article III standing, because
the law's interference with his use of his property caused him Article
III injury.154
The conclusion that Article III does not require exhaustion is re-
inforced by precedent holding that the exhaustion requirement does
not apply to facial takings challenges.155 In a facial challenge, the
plaintiff alleges that the mere adoption of a property restriction - for
example, by enactment of a law or promulgation of a land-use regula-
tion - causes a taking. 6 The Court has said that such facial chal-
lenges "are generally ripe" the moment the restriction is adopted. 57
This general principle reflects that a property owner suffers injury as
soon as the government adopts a rule that bars him or her from using
the property the way he or she wants and is able to.' 58 The qualifica-
tion to the principle - i.e., that facial challenges are only "generally"
ripe upon adoption of the challenged provision' 59-reflects that a fa-
cial challenge will not always involve an Article III case or contro-
versy. For example, it may be doubtful that the challenged law or
153. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6) (providing that defense of failure to state claim for
which relief can be granted can be raised by motion); see also, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132
F.3d 753, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (plaintiff's failure to plead a material element of his claim
warranted dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).
154. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012 (holding that plaintiff had properly established Article
III standing by alleging injury in fact with respect to laws that restricted use of his land).;
see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2119 v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 460, 464 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("[I]f a plaintiff cannot establish standing to sue . . dismissal under [FED. R.
CIV. P.] 12(b)(1) is the appropriate disposition."); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Liti-
gation, 14 F.3d 726, 733 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiff's failure to satisfy Article III
warranted dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
rather than under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state claim for which relief could
be granted).
155. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text
(discussing facial challenges as exception to both exhaustion and final decision
requirements).
156. See, eg., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295
(1981) ("Because [plaintiffs'] taking claim arose in the context of a facial challenge... the
only issue properly before [the courts] ... is whether the 'mere enactment' of the Surface
Mining Act constitutes a taking.") (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 260
(1980)).
157. See Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10.
158. Cf Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,14 (1984) (holding that no
taking occurred before the government tendered compensation because "[u]ntil title
passed to the United States, petitioner was free to make whatever use it pleased of its
property.").
159. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 736 n.10.
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regulation even applies to the plaintiffs property.160 Moreover, even
if the challenged government rule does apply to the plaintiff's prop-
erty, it may be unclear whether the government will enforce the rule
against the plaintiff or whether the rule will restrict only uses that the
plaintiff is unlikely to want, or be able to engage in.' 6 1 These situa-
tions fall short of presenting Article III cases or controversies because
it is not sufficiently clear that the plaintiff is injured or realistically
threatened with an injury. 6 2 In any event, the existence of an injury
in fact has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff asserting a facial
challenge has sought compensation for that injury.' 63
Likewise, Article III does not require a plaintiff to meet the ex-
haustion requirement before asserting an "as applied" takings chal-
lenge in federal court. Whereas a facial claim challenges government
action that takes legislative form, an as-applied claim challenges gov-
ernment action in its adjudicatory form. Because of this difference,
Article III may demand in the latter context that an adjudication actu-
ally occur, or that its result be foreordained, before the challenge is
brought. Furthermore, prudential concerns may demand an adjudica-
tion that is definitive and that immediately affects the owner's prop-
erty rights-i.e., a "final decision." But as long as the rules that are to
be applied in the challenged adjudication actually restrict the plain-
tiff's use of property (or imminently threaten an actual restriction),
Article III is satisfied whether or not the plaintiff who brings an as-
applied takings challenge has sought just compensation or is entitled
to it.
Support for this conclusion can be found in the Court's recent
decision in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons.'"
There, the Court held that a federal district court had subject-matter
160. See Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 293 n.35, & 294-95 (challenge to statutory
provisions was not ripe because plaintiffs had not identified any specific properties that
they owned and to which challenged provisions would apply).
161. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1988) (holding that landlords'
challenge to provision in rent control ordinance was premature because provision had yet
to be applied to restrict their rents).
162. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952) (holding action for
declaratory judgment unripe because "[c]laims based merely upon assumed potential inva-
sions of rights are not enough to warrant judicial intervention") (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 733 (1999) ("When...
there is no immediate effect on the plaintiff's primary conduct, federal courts normally do
not entertain pre-enforcement challenges to agency rules and policy statements.").
163. Cf. Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 137-46 (holding ripe
the issue whether a 'flicker Act remedy was available if challenged federal statute caused a
taking).
164. 118 S. Ct. 523 (1997).
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jurisdiction over a case removed from state court. 6 5 The plaintiffs in
that case asserted an as-applied taking challenge to local regulatory
action.'66 The plaintiffs did not seek compensation in their state-court
lawsuit, 67 even though it appears that compensation was available in
the state courts.68 If exhaustion of the state compensation remedy
were required by Article III, the Court should not have upheld the
federal district court's removal jurisdiction over the takings claim.'1 6 9
Although the exhaustion issue was not before the Court, its decision
upholding jurisdiction implies that exhaustion is not an Article III re-
quirement for as-applied, regulatory takings claims.17 °
Although Article III does not require exhaustion, Williamson's
exhaustion requirement is, like other prudential rules, justifiable as a
"matter[ ] of judicial self-governance." 171 One of the reasons for pru-
dential justiciability rules, including prudential ripeness rules, is that
they conserve federal-court resources.172 The exhaustion requirement
165. See id. at 529-34.
166. See id. at 527.
167. See id. at 529 (observing that plaintiffs asserted their constitutional claims under
Illinois Administrative Review Law, 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT., §§ 5/3-101-13) (West 1992)); see
also 735 ILL CoMP. STAT., § 5/3-111(a)(4)-(a)(7) (Supp. 1997) (including among reviewing
court's powers under Illinois Administrative Review Law the powers to reverse, affirm, or
remand, but not the power to award compensation); see also Beverly Bank v. Illinois, 579
N.E.2d 815, 824 (Ill. 1991) (holding that an action for damages based on a taking cannot be
brought under Illinois Administrative Review Law).
168. See Zeitz v. Village of Glenview, 592 N.E.2d 384,387-89 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing that a complaint alleging regulatory taking stated a cause of action for inverse condem-
nation), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 479 (Il. 1992).
169. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989) ("to create jurisdiction"
in lower federal courts, "[t]he Constitution must have given to the court the capacity to
take it, and an act of Congress must have supplied it"), quoting Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S.
247, 252 (1867).
170. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (1998) (plurality opinion) (in
holding that the federal district court had original jurisdiction, and the Court had appellate
jurisdiction, over a takings claim, the Court relied partly on prior decisions in which it had
upheld takings challenges on the merits without questioning the district court's or its own
jurisdiction); see also Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1949) (up-
holding its own and lower courts' jurisdiction based on a prior case in which the Court had
decided a similar case on the merits); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 307
(1962) (acknowledging that the Court is not bound by exercises of jurisdiction in prior
cases that reached the merits without considering jurisdiction; but also attaching weight to
a long line of such cases with respect to a particular issue of jurisdiction before it).
171. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
172. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1671 (1998) ("The
ripeness doctrine reflects a judgment that the disadvantages of premature review that may
prove too abstract or unnecessary ordinarily outweigh the additional costs of-even repeti-
tive-post-implementation litigation.") (emphasis added); Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 568-81 (in gauging ripeness, Court takes into account that
threatened injury "may not occur at all"); CBEMERINSKY, supra note 9, § 2.4.1, at 116 (stat-
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serves that function. It ensures that a federal court will not hear a
claim based on a local agency's taking of property until after a state
court has had the chance to award just compensation for the taking. If
the state court makes such an award, federal court intervention will
not be necessary to protect the claimant's right to just compensation,
and federal-court resources will be saved.173
Because the exhaustion requirement is not dictated by Article III,
but is instead "prudential," Congress can eliminate it without violating
Article 111.174 The opponents of H.R. 1534 were therefore wrong in
suggesting that the bill's exhaustion provision violated Article HI.175
But the conclusion that H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision would not
have violated Article III does not resolve the opponents' other consti-
tutional argument, which was that Congress lacked the power to enact
the provision.176 That argument rested on the assertion that the ex-
haustion provision would have changed the substance of takings
law, 17 7 an assertion that we examine next.
B. The Exhaustion Requirement as an Element of a Cause of Action
In Williamson, the Court said that the exhaustion requirement is
not only a rule of "ripeness" but also an element of a cause of action
for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause.' 78 By eliminating
this element, H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision would-have allowed
federal courts to award just compensation to plaintiffs who had not
proven a violation of the Clause. The opponents of H.R. 1534 were
therefore correct in contending that its exhaustion provision would
ing that "the ripeness requirement, like all justiciability doctrines, enhances judicial econ-
omy by limiting the occasion for federal court jurisdiction and the expenditure of judicial
time and revenues"); see also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138
(1974) (prudential ripeness rules reflect "the exercise of judicial restraint from unnecessary
decision of constitutional issues"); cf Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (explaining that, without pru-
dential rules of standing, federal courts would have to decide cases "even though judicial
intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights").
173. Cf. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) (explaining that judicially de-
veloped doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies "promot[es] judicial effi-
ciency" because "a judicial controversy may well be mooted" by administrative remedy).
174. See supra notes 121-127 and accompanying text and infra notes 325-330 and ac-
companying text (discussing Congress' power to eliminate "prudential" rules).
175. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (describing opponents' Article I
argument).
176. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text (describing opponents' lack-of-
power argument).
177. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (describing opponents' contention
that H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision changed the "substance" of takings law).
178. See infra notes 185-187 and accompanying text.
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"alter . . . the substantive standard under which [federal] district
courts adjudicate takings claims." 17 9
The supporters of H.R. 1534, however, believed that Williamson
is not "binding authority." ' They also believed that other Court pre-
cedent established that "a governmental action can be considered an
unconstitutional taking" regardless whether the victim of the taking
has sought or is owed compensation.8 The supporters accurately la-
beled some of the Court's precedent in this area "seemingly contradic-
tory."" 2 None of that precedent, however, casts doubt on the Court's
conclusion in Williamson that the exhaustion requirement is an ele-
ment of a cause of action for a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause.
1. Williamson's discussion of exhaustion as an element of a cause of
action
In Williamson, the Court determined that the plaintiff's failure to
exhaust state compensation procedures had two effects: it rendered
the plaintiff's taking claim "not yet ripe," and it prevented the plaintiff
from "claim[ing] a violation of the Just Compensation Clause."' 83 The
Williamson Court found support for that dual determination in prece-
dent on taking claims against the federal government. Under that
precedent, the Court explained, "taking claims against the Federal
Government are premature until the property owner has availed itself
of the process provided by the Tucker Act."'" Furthermore, until the
owner has exhausted that process and been denied compensation, it
179. House Hearing, supra note 70, at 38 (prepared statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting
Associate Attorney General, DOJ).
180. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12 (1998).
181. Id. at 13.
182. Id. at 14.
183. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95.
184. Id. at 195 (citing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1016-20); see also Preseault v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1994) (holding that challenge in that case was "pre-
mature" because plaintiff had not sought remedy available under Tucker Act); see also
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978) (holding
that plaintiffs' taking challenge to federal statute was "a matter appropriately left for an-
other day" in light of availability of compensation under Tcker Act). The Tcker Act
waives the federal government's sovereign immunity from, among other claims, claims
founded on the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491 (1994). The Act is only juris-
dictional; it does not create a substantive right to a remedy against the government. See
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983) quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United
States, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (holding that a Tucker Act claimant must iden-
tify some other federal law that can "be interpreted as mandating compensation"); see also
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976) (because Tucker Act is "merely jurisdic-
tional," a Tucker Act plaintiff must plead with specificity source of right of action).
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"has no claim" against the federal government for a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause.185 Thus, Williamson makes clear that ex-
haustion is both an element of ripeness and an element of a cause of
action for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause.
The Williamson Court's treatment of the exhaustion requirement
as having a dual nature-partaking of both justiciability and the sub-
stance of a cause of action-is neither unique nor internally inconsis-
tent. The requirement that a taking claimant demand just
compensation from the state before suing in federal court for a viola-
tion of the Just Compensation Clause operates somewhat like the "de-
mand" requirement of other causes of action.' 6 In each situation, the
denial of the demand invariably occurs, if at all, after the obligation
arises upon which the demand is premised. That temporal relation-
ship, coupled with the possibility that the demand will be granted,
makes it appropriate to say that a case is not "ripe" until the demand
requirement is met. It may also be appropriate, however, to say that
185. Williamson, 473 at 194-95 (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013, 1018 n.21); accord,
e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985) (reciting
"the principle that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact
taken, the government action is not unconstitutional"); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297 n.40 (1981) ("an alleged taking is not unconsti-
tutional unless just compensation is unavailable").
186. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (requiring plaintiff in shareholder derivative suit to
allege efforts made to obtain relief from corporate authority), described as a "demand"
requirement in 7C CARIu._s ALAN WRiGirr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1831 (2d ed. 1986); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 206(a) (McKinney 1990) ("where a demand is neces-
sary to entitle a person to commence an action, the time within which the action must be
commenced shall be computed from the time when the right to make the demand is com-
plete"); Williams Management Enter., Inc. v. Buonauro, 489 So. 2d 160, 164 n.8 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) ("many causes of action require a demand as an element"); U.C.C. § 3-
122(2)-(3) (providing that various causes of action accrue "upon demand"); 60 AM. JUR. 2D
PAYMENT § 139 (1987) (including among checklist of allegations required for nonpayment
of debt "[a]n allegation of demand (unless unnecessary under the circumstances)"; ROB-
ERT I. WEL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACnCE GuIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL,
§1:843 (1998) ("There are a number of causes of action in which plaintiff is required to give
some sort of notice or demand to the defendant before filing suit.");15A RONALD A. AN-
DERSON, CoucH ON INSURANCE § 58:83 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1983) (noting
that, "under some [insurance] statutes an express demand for payment of the claim must
be made as a condition precedent to liability" for penalty for wrongful refusal to pay);
Bradley T. Ferrell, Note, A Hybrid Approach: Integrating the Delaware and the ALl Ap-
proaches to Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 Omo ST. LJ. 241, 246-47 (1999) (stating
that "[a]ll jurisdictions have a demand requirement as one of the procedural steps in bring-
ing a derivative action"). Of course, the exhaustion requirement differs from other de-
mand requirements in one critical way. Under the exhaustion requirement, the claimant
must demand compensation from a state court, which is not the same entity as the entity
that has taken the property and that will be the defendant in any suit on the takings claim.
In contrast, in other contexts, the plaintiff makes the demand on the entity that becomes
the defendant.
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the demand requirement is an element of the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion, especially if the defendant's denial of the demand is necessary to
make the defendant's conduct wrongful, as is true of the demand upon
a state court for just compensation for a local agency's taking.187 For
this reason, while there is a clar distinction between the elements of an
Article III case or controversy and the elements of a cause of ac-
tion, 88 there is no such clear line between the prudential feature and
the substantive feature of Williamson's exhaustion requirement. 89
To say that exhaustion is an element of a cause of action for a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause does not mean that it is an
invariable element. As discussed above, a takings claimant does not
need to exhaust state compensation procedures if compensation
would not be available through those procedures and hence exhaus-
tion would be futile.190 In that situation, it is fair to say that, even if a
violation of the Just Compensation Clause has not occurred (because
compensation has not actually been denied), a violation is immi-
nent.19' In addition, a claimant does not have to exhaust state com-
pensation procedures that are unfair or otherwise inadequate. 92 That
is because the state's failure to provide adequate compensation proce-
dures at the time of the taking constitutes a violation of the Constitu-
tion that is distinct from the constitutional violation that arises from
the state's denial of compensation. 93 Thus, the exhaustion require-
187. See First English, 482 U.S. at 320 n.10 ("an illegitimate taking might not occur until
the government refuses to pay") (emphasis added); Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 (as-
suming existence of state procedures for obtaining just compensation, "no constitutional
violation occurs until just compensation has been denied"); cf., e.g., Solomon R. Guggen-
heim Found. v. Lubbell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the de-
mand requirement for replevin reflects that, "[u]ntil demand is made and refused,
possession of the stolen property... is not considered wrongful").
188. See supra notes 152-156 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between
elements of an Article III case or controversy and elements of a cause of action).
189. See Nichol, supra note 122, at 164-67 (arguing that in Williamson, among other
cases, "the ripeness determination is inescapably intertwined with both the substance of
the claim on the merits and the procedural posture of the case on review").
190. See supra notes 52-56 (describing exception to exhaustion requirement applicable
when compensation is not available through state procedures). Similarly, there is often a
futility exception to the demand requirement that is an element of other causes of action.
See, e.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460-61 (1882).
191. Cf. Railroad Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 143 ("One does not have to
await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is
certainly impending, that is enough.") quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553,
593 (1923).
192. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (describing exception to exhaustion
requirement applicable when state compensation procedures are inadequate).
193. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (describing constitutional require-
ment that states provide adequate compensation procedures at time of taking).
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ment has a pragmatically justified futility exception, and, in addition
to the constitutional cause of action that arises when a state denies
compensation after a claimant has sought it, a separate cause of action
arises when a state fails, at the time of the taking, to provide adequate
compensation procedures. The existence of the futility exception and
the other cause of action does not undermine Williamson's holding
that exhaustion is an element of a cause of action for a violation of the
Just Compensation Clause.
2. The direct attack on Williamson by the supporters of H.R. 1534
The supporters of H.R. 1534 believed that, for four reasons, Wil-
liamson was no longer good law insofar as it held that exhaustion is an
element of a cause of action for a violation of the Just Compensation
Clause.194 We respectfully submit that the supporters were wrong.
First, the supporters believed that Williamson was "outdated" in
light of First English.195 As the supporters observed, First English did
"clarif[y]" the law of takings.196 It did so by holding that it is not
enough for a state court prospectively to invalidate a regulation that
has already caused a taking; the Just Compensation Clause requires
compensation for the taking.197 The supporters reasoned, "Now that
this Federal remedy has been clarified, there is no reason to compel a
citizen to litigate State court remedies in State court first."' 98 That
reasoning appears to rest on the erroneous belief that the original pur-
pose of the exhaustion requirement was to allow state courts to deter-
mine what type of remedy was available under state law for a taking.
Instead, Williamson made clear that the purpose of the exhaustion re-
quirement is to give the state a chance to provide the compensation
remedy required by the U.S. Constitution and thereby to avoid a con-
stitutional violation.199 First English reaffirmed that a taking is not
194. See S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12-13 (1998).
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id.
197. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los An-
geles, 482 U.S. 304, 319 ("Invalidation of the ordinance or its successor ordinance after this
period of time, though converting the taking into a 'temporary' one, is not a sufficient
remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation Clause."); id. at 321 ("We merely
hold that where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."); see also supra notes
62-68 and accompanying text (discussing First English).
198. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12 (1998).
199. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95 & n.13; see also infra notes 287-290 and accom-
panying text (explaining that exhaustion requirement reflects federalism concerns).
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"illegitimate... until the [state] refuses to pay. ' '2 '° That principle is
also reaffirmed by post-Williamson precedent involving takings by the
federal government.201 The exhaustion requirement thus is not out-
dated; it continues to serve the important function of giving the state
an opportunity to legitimize a local agency's taking before a federal
court intervenes.
Second, the supporters asserted that Williamson's exhaustion re-
quirement "is now merely prudential in nature."2 2 In support of that
assertion, they cited Suitum's statement that both of Williamson's
ripeness requirements are "prudential. 20 3 As discussed above, the
Court's precedent does establish that the exhaustion requirement is
prudential.2 4 To say that the exhaustion requirement is "prudential,"
however, means only that it is not an essential ingredient of an Article
III case or controversy. Thus, a takings claimant who has not met the
exhaustion requirement may still bring a case that meets the require-
ments of Article Ill. By the same token, Congress would not violate
Article III if it authorized federal courts to award just compensation
to a plaintiff who proved a taking but had not met the exhaustion
requirement. Yet the "prudential" nature of exhaustion does not
make it dispensable as an element of a claim for a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause. On the contrary, to establish such a violation,
a plaintiff must exhaust available and adequate state compensation
remedies.0 5 A federal statute that dispensed with that requirement
would therefore recognize a cause of action that is distinct from a
200. First English, 482 U.S. at 320 n.10.
201. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990) ("If the gov-
ernment has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to
that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim against the
Government' for a taking.") (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013, 1018 n.21); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985) (reciting "the principle
that so long as compensation is available for those whose property is in fact taken, the
governmental action is not unconstitutional").
202. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12 (1998).
203. Id (citing Suitum, 520 U.S. at 734).
204. See supra notes 128-176 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-96. The Congressional Research Service
("CRS") observed that the Court in Suitum described the exhaustion requirement as both
"prudential" and "constitutionally based." Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 91 n.36 (re-
producing CRS Report). The CRS wondered, "If the state compensation [Le., exhaustion]
prong is constitutionally based, how can it be only prudential (discretionary)?" Id. The
answer, as discussed in the text, is that the exhaustion requirement is "prudential" in the
sense that it is not dictated by Article III; it is nonetheless "constitutionally based," be-
cause it is rooted in the text of the Just Compensation Clause and is an element of a cause
of action for a violation of the Clause.
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cause of action for a violation of the Clause.2 °6 This is why the oppo-
nents of H.R. 1534 said that the bill's exhaustion provision would "al-
ter.., the substantive standard under which [federal] district courts
adjudicate takings claims against state and local authorities.""2 7 When
the supporters of H.R. 1534 countered that assertion by relying on the
"prudential" nature of the exhaustion requirement, they were confus-
ing the elements of an Article III case or controversy with those of a
cause of action for a constitutional violation.20 8
Third, the supporters of H.R. 1534 erroneously believed that Wil-
liamson's discussion of the exhaustion requirement was "only
dicta."209 The Williamson Court held that the takings claim before it
was not ripe for two reasons: because of (1) the plaintiff's failure to
meet the final decision requirement; and (2) the plaintiff's failure to
meet the exhaustion requirement.21 0 The plaintiff's failure to obtain a
final decision was enough, standing alone, to justify the Court's ripe-
ness holding. The supporters of H.R. 1534 reasoned that, because the
Court's discussion of the exhaustion requirement "was neither essen-
tial nor necessary to support the decision," it was dicta.211 That rea-
soning contradicts "[t]he usual rule in th[e] Court" that "when two
independent reasons are given to support a judgment, 'the ruling on
neither is obiter [dicta], but each is the judgment of the court and of
equal validity with the other." 212 The supporters' reasoning also ig-
206. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 112 (reproducing Letter from Michael W.
Blommer, Assistant Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, Judicial Conference of U.S., to
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 6, 1997), stating Judicial Confer-
ence's position that cases brought under H.R. 1534 "might nevertheless be dismissed at the
pleading stage for failure to satisfy the substantive elements of a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments"); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 35-36 (statement of John C.
Dwyer, Acting Assoc. Attorney General, DOJ) ("[I]f the [taking] claimant has failed to
seek compensation from the State, the claimant will have failed to establish a constitutional
claim for a taking without just compensation. The Federal court will have no choice but to
dismiss the action.").
207. House Hearing, supra note 70, at 38 (prepared statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting
Associate Attorney General, DOJ).
208. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1013 (1998) (referring
to "fundamental distinction" between argument that plaintiff lacks cause of action and
argument that plaintiff lacks standing); see also supra notes 139-156 and accompanying text
(discussing the distinction).
209. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 12 (1998).
210. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186-97.
211. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 13 (1998).
212. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 689 n.10 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Title Ins. Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924)); accord Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537 (1949).
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nores a later case in which the Court relied on Williamson's discussion
of the exhaustion requirement to hold a takings claim unripe.213
Finally, the supporters of H.R. 1534 simply disagreed with Wil-
liamson's reading of the Just Compensation Clause. Williamson con-
cluded that "the nature of the constitutional right" conferred by the
Just Compensation Clause "requires that a property owner utilize pro-
cedures for obtaining compensation" before claiming a violation of
the Clause.214 The supporters, in contrast, concluded that "the text of
the takings clause does not require that property owners must exhaust
State or local compensation procedures."2 "5 It does not matter which
conclusion is correct.21 6  Congress' mere disagreement with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution does not empower
Congress to enact legislation overruling the Court's interpretation.1 7
3. The collateral attack on Williamson by the supporters of H.R. 1534
In addition to attacking Williamson directly, the supporters of
H.R. 1534 challenged it collaterally. They lumped it, as well as First
213. See Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1990) see also
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127-29 (citing Williamson in
holding that, because compensation would be available for instances in which federal regu-
latory program caused a taking, statute establishing program should not have been nar-
rowly construed to avoid supposed constitutional concerns).
214. 473 U.S. at 194 n.13.
215. S. REP. No. 105-242, at 13 (1998). Based on their view that the Just Compensation
Clause does not require exhaustion, the supporters of H.R. 1534 contended that a govern-
ment taking "is still considered an unconstitutional taking," regardless of payment of com-
pensation. 144 CONG. Ruc. S8026 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statements of Sen. Hatch).
Since the taking itself violated the Constitution, their argument ran, "the compensation
requirement of the Takings Clause is merely a remedy that may or may not be awarded in
a state or federal court, depending on the fairness of the situation." S. REP. No. 105-242, at
14 (1998). On this view, when a federal court awarded just compensation for a taking, it
would merely be exercising its traditional authority to remedy constitutional violations.
See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("Once a
right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable reme-
dies."); see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1945) (referring to federal courts' power
to remedy constitutional violations).
216. The supporters of H.R. 1534 buttressed their interpretation by observing that the
exhaustion requirement, coupled with the preclusion doctrines, often prevents takings
claimants from having their claims against state and local agencies decided by the federal
courts. See S. REP. No. 105-242, at 13 (1998). The supporters doubted that this situation
accorded with "the intent of the drafters and ratifiers who promulgated and adopted Fed-
eral rights amendments [Le., the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] and established the
Federal forums to protect them." Id.
217. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523-24, 529, 535-36 (1997) (discussing
separation-of-powers concerns that would arise if Congress had unrestrained power to re-
interpret its constitutional powers in an way that deviated from Court's interpretation).
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English, together with a body of Court precedent that was "seemingly
contradictory." ' Indeed, the Court's precedent on the power of fed-
eral courts to decide takings claims "ha[s] not been consonant. '219
Furthermore, the dissonance has created confusion in the lower
courts.2 0 Properly read, however, none of the Court's precedent es-
tablishes that federal courts can award just compensation to takings
claimants who have not exhausted available and adequate state com-
pensation remedies.221 The precedent accordingly does not under-
mine Williamson's holding that exhaustion is an element of a cause of
action for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause.
The supporters observed that, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhat-
tan CATV Corp.,222 the Court decided a taking issue without deciding
whether the plaintiff was owed compensation for the taking.22
Loretto does not, however, establish that federal courts can decide
takings claims regardless whether the claimant has exhausted compen-
sation remedies. The Loretto case came to the U.S. Supreme Court
from the state courts, where Ms. Loretto had sought and been denied
compensation. 24 Thus, Ms. Loretto satisfied the exhaustion require-
ment before presenting her taking claim to a federal court (which in
that case was the U.S. Supreme Court). Accordingly, the Court's deci-
sion to address the merits of her taking claim in no way undermines
Williamson's holding that a taking claimant must exhaust state com-
218. S. REP. No. 105-242, at 14 (1998).
219. In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 492 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 913
(1995).
220. See Bay View, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 105 F.3d 1281, 1285 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing
"common and oft-overlooked error" by federal courts in determining when they have juris-
diction to address takings claims and tracing that error to Court's precedent); see also East-
ern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2158 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part) (declining to join plurality's discussion of "a jurisdictional ques-
tion.., which has divided the Courts of Appeals"); id. at 2145 (plurality opinion) (discuss-
ing disagreement among federal courts of appeals on whether plaintiffs with takings claims
against federal government can seek relief in federal district court without first seeking
compensation). Compare Chevron Chem. Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D. Del.
1980) (holding that Court's precedent authorized district court to determine whether
Tucker Act compensation remedy was available but, if court determined that such remedy
was available, "a declaratory judgment or other injunctive relief on the taking issue was
unwarranted"), afj'd, 641 F.2d 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981), with
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Costle, 481 F. Supp. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (suggesting that,
without regard to availability of compensation under the Tucker Act, Court's precedent
allowed district court to issue declaratory judgment determining whether taking was
caused by same statute that was at issue in Chevron).
221. See infra notes 224-64 and accompanying text.
222. 458 U.S. 419, 437 n.15 (1982).
223. See S. REP. No. 105-242, at 13-14 (1998).
224. 458 U.S. at 424.
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pensation remedies before a federal court can review the taking
claim. 2
The supporters also cited Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ-
mental Study Group, Inc.226 as a case establishing "that a Federal
court may decide takings issues before compensation is ascer-
tained."'227 To the contrary, the Court in Duke Power declined to de-
cide the takings claim because of the availability of compensation for
the asserted taking.2' Specifically, the Court determined that, if the
federal statute that the plaintiffs challenged did cause a taking at some
future point, compensation from the federal government would be
available under the Tucker Act. 29 Duke Power reflects that, when
there is an "actual controversy" about the availability of compensa-
tion for an alleged taking, a federal district court can issue a declara-
tory judgment resolving the controversy.230 If the court determines
225. See id; cf. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 312 n.6 (1987) (holding that plaintiff's taking claim was ripe for
review by U.S. Supreme Court because state courts in that case had dismissed plaintiff's
taking claim, establishing "that 'the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable"')
(quoting Williamson, 473 U.S. at 197); see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1011-12 (1992) (holding that plaintiffs taking claim was ripe in light of state
supreme court's decision holding that challenged state law did not cause a taking).
226. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
227. S. REP. NO. 105-242, at 15 (1998). In Duke Power, the plaintiffs challenged a
federal statute that capped the tort liability of private nuclear power plants for nuclear
accidents. See 438 U.S. at 67-68. The plaintiffs brought their challenge to this federal stat-
ute in a federal district court, arguing, among other things, that the statute violated the Just
Compensation Clause. See id. at 68. They based that argument on the assertion that a
nuclear accident would destroy their property. See id. at 68 n.12 68-69, 94 n.39. They con-
tended that, to the extent that the federal statute capped their recovery in state tort actions
for the loss of their property, it took that property without just compensation. See id. at 94
n. 34. They asked the federal district court for a declaratory judgment that the federal
statute was unconstitutional. See i at 67. They did not seek compensation for the taking
that the federal statute would allegedly cause. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 71 n. 15.
228. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94 n.39.
229. See id.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the claim that... [a nuclear] accident would consti-
tute a 'taking' ... since on our reading the [challenged federal statute] does not withdraw
the existing Thcker Act remedy ... [Plaintiffs] concede that if the Tucker Act remedy
would be available in the event of a nuclear disaster, then their constitutional challenge...
under the Just Compensation Clause must fail. The further question of whether a taking
claim could be established under the Fifth Amendment is a matter appropriately left for
another day. (citations omitted).
230. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (Declaratory Judgment Act) (empowering a federal court
to issue a declaratory judgment "[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction").
The Court in Duke Power held that the Declaratory Judgment Act "allows individuals
threatened with a taking to seek a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed gov-
ernmental action before potentially uncompensable damages are sustained." 438 U.S. at
71 n.15. The plaintiffs in Duke Power initially confronted "potentially uncompensable"
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that compensation would be available, however, Duke Power indicates
that the court cannot decide whether a taking has actually occurred.231
The court's inability to decide the taking issue in that situation stems
from the fact that a taking for which compensation is available does
not violate the Constitution.' 2 Thus, Duke Power is consistent with
the principle of Williamson that, until a taking claimant has exhausted
available compensation remedies, no violation of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause has occurred.233
Despite Duke Power, in some later cases the Court has decided
takings claims without addressing whether compensation was avail-
able for the alleged taking."~a All of these cases, with the possible
exception of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,15can be recon-
ciled with Duke Power.23 6 Several of these cases do, however, raise an
unsettled issue about federal-court power over takings claims. The
damages only because of uncertainty about the availability of compensation under the
Tucker Act. See id. at 94 n.39. The Court's declaration that a Tacker Act remedy was
available amounted to "a declaration of the constitutionality of the disputed governmental
action." Id. The challenged federal law was constitutional-ie., it did not violate the Just
Compensation Clause-because it left the Tcker Act remedy undisturbed. Cf. Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1981) (holding that, because plaintiff contended
that government action would effect a taking for which no compensation was available,
there was a ripe question about whether Thcker Act remedy was available); Cities Serv.
Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330, 335-36 (1952) (declaring that parties before the Court would
have right of recoupment against federal government if, after making payment to federal
government under federal statute, they were later held liable to private party for additional
payment). Thus, Duke Power signifies that a taking for which compensation is available
does not violate the Constitution.
231. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94 n.39; see also Preseault, 494 U.S. at 11-17 (declin-
ing to address plaintiffs taking challenge to federal statute after determining that chal-
lenged statute did not withdraw Tacker Act remedy); Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co.,
309 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1940) (declining to decide whether challenged government action
caused a taking because, if it did, compensation was available under Tacker Act); but see
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004-14 & 1017-19 (1984) (deciding whether
federal statute caused a taking in action by non-exhausting plaintiffs); see also Bay View,
105 F.3d at 1285-1286 (stating that Monsanto is inconsistent with other precedent of
Court).
232. See supra note 232 (discussing Duke Power's construction of Declaratory Judg-
ment Act).
233. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95 & n.13; see also supra note 232.
234. See Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1929-34
(1998); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 236-45 (1997); Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Con-
struction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 641-47 (1993); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 713-18 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 221-28 (1986);
see also Eastern Enter., Inc. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2145 (1998) (plurality opinion) (dis-
cussing these cases); S. Rep. No. 105-242, at 14-15 (1998) (citing most of these cases).
235. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
236. See supra note 236 (citing these cases); infra notes 240-264 and accompanying text
(explaining why these cases, with one possible exception, are consistent with Duke Power).
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issue is whether a federal court can enjoin a statute that causes a tak-
ing if compensation is not available for the taking. One of us believes
that the cases indicating that federal courts do have such power are
incorrect2 37 In any event, these cases concern the power of federal
courts when compensation for a taking is not available. The cases
therefore do not undermine Williamson's holding that federal courts
lack power to decide a takings claim when the plaintiff has not proven
the unavailability of compensation.
The key to the post-Duke Power cases in which the Court has
addressed takings claims without addressing the availability of com-
pensation is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.3 s A plurality of the Court
in Eastern Enterprises upheld an as-applied, regulatory takings chal-
lenge to a federal statute by a plaintiff who had not sought compensa-
tion for the alleged taking.?3 9 The plurality held that the plaintiff's
failure to seek compensation did not prevent the U.S. Supreme Court
from deciding the takings claim-nor did it so prevent the federal dis-
trict court or court of appeals-because compensation was not avail-
able for the alleged taking.2 40 Compensation was not available, the
plurality determined, because the federal statute that the plaintiff
challenged had presumptively withdrawn the Tucker Act remedy.241
The Court based that presumption on the nature of the challenged
statute. 42 The statute required the plaintiff, a coal mining company,
to make payments into a statutorily created fund to pay the health
care costs of widows and relatives of the mining company's former
237. See Richard H. Seamon, An Analysis of the Jurisdictional Analysis in Eastern En-
terprises v. Apfel, 61 ALA. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2000).
238. 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998), cited in 144 CONG. REc. 88026 (daily ed. July 13, 1998)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch), and S. Rep. No. 105-242, at 14 (1998).
239. See id. at 2144-53 (plurality opinion). Whereas a plurality of four Justices deter-
mined that the challenged statute violated the Just Compensation Clause, a fifth Justice
(Justice Kennedy) determined that the statute violated substantive due process. See id. at
2154, 2158-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). Because
Justice Kennedy did not rely on the Just Compensation Clause, he did not address the
question whether the lower courts and the Court itself had jurisdiction to review the tak-
ings claim. See id. at 2158 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part)
(declining to join the plurality's jurisdictional ruling). The Justices who dissented in East-
ern Enterprises did not discuss the jurisdictional issue, either. See id. at 2160-61 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 2161-68 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
240. See id. at 2144-46 (plurality opinion).
241. See id. at 2144 (plurality opinion) ("'[T]he presumption of fucker Act availability
must be reversed where the challenged statute, rather than burdening real or physical
property, requires a direct transfer of funds' mandated by the Government") (quoting In
re Chateaugay, 53 F.3d at 493).
242. See id. at 2145 (plurality opinion) (upholding district court jurisdiction "[b]ased on
the nature of the taking alleged in this case").
Fall 19991
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
employees. 43 The plurality reasoned that, when Congress enacts a
law requiring someone to transfer funds to the government or a third
party, it presumably intends to bar that person from recovering the
funds from the government under the Tucker Act.2" Thus, the plural-
ity addressed a takings claim by a non-exhausting plaintiff because
compensation was presumptively unavailable and it therefore would
have presumably been futile for the plaintiff to seek it.245
The reasoning of the Eastern Enterprises plurality explains two of
the cases in which the Court has decided takings claims without ad-
dressing the availability of compensation: Concrete Pipe & Prods. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust Fund46 and Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp.47 Like Eastern Enterprises, Concrete Pipe and
Connolly involved as-applied, regulatory takings challenges to federal
statutes that required the plaintiffs to transfer funds to third parties.2'
Under Eastern Enterprises, such "transfer-of-funds" statutes presump-
tively withdrew the Tucker Act remedy that otherwise would have
been available to the plaintiffs in the Court of Federal Claims.249 Be-
cause compensation was unavailable, the plaintiffs did not have to
243. See id. at 2141-43 (plurality opinion).
244. See id. at 2145 (plurality opinion).
245. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text (describing futility exception to ex-
haustion requirement). In addition to reflecting the futility exception, Eastern Enterprises
indicates that, when compensation is not available for an alleged taking by the federal
government, a federal district court can decide whether a taking has indeed occurred. See
Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2146-53 (plurality opinion) (addressing takings claim on
the merits after determining that compensation for alleged taking was unavailable). Simi-
larly, a district court should be able to decide whether action by a state or local govern-
ment has caused a taking when compensation for the alleged taking is unavailable from the
state. If so, and if the holding in Duke Power is likewise applicable to alleged takings by
state and local governments, the Eastern Enterprises plurality and Duke Power establish
clear rules for the federal district courts to follow when confronted with takings claims
brought against state and local agencies by non-exhausting plaintiffs. The district court can
resolve any controversy about the availability of just compensation from the state for the
alleged taking or the adequacy of the state compensation procedures. If the district court
determines that compensation would be available and that the procedures are adequate, it
should refuse to address the taking claim on the merits. If, on the other hand, the district
court determines that compensation is unavailable or that the procedures for obtaining it
are inadequate, the district court may decide whether a taking has occurred and embody
that decision in a declaratory judgment.
246. 508 U.S. 602 (1993), cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8026 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (re-
marks of Sen. Hatch), and S. REP. No. 105-242, at 15 (1998).
247. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
248. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 605-11 (describing statute); id. at 641-47 (addressing
takings challenge to statute); Connolly, 475 U.S. at 214-16 (describing statute); id. at 221-28
(addressing takings challenge to statute).
249. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2144-46 (plurality opinion).
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seek it before asking a federal district court to decide the merits of
their taking claim.
The Eastern Enterprises plurality may also account for the Court's
decision addressing a takings claim without regard to the availability
of compensation in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. Like
Eastern Enterprises (and Concrete Pipe and Connolly), Phillips in-
volved an as-applied takings challenge to a statute that required the
plaintiffs to transfer funds to a third party.- ° Unlike those three
cases, however, Phillips concerned a state law, not a federal law. 1 It
might be appropriate under Eastern Enterprises for a federal court to
presume that, when a state enacts a transfer-of-funds statute, the state
intends to withdraw any compensation remedy that would otherwise
be available in state court. 2 If such a presumption were appropriate,
the Court's decision in Phillips to address the merits of a takings
claims would be justified because compensation for the alleged taking
was not available.
Unless such a presumption is read into Phillips, the Court's deci-
sion to address the merits of an as-applied takings claim in that case
conflicts with the Court's refusal to do so in its earlier Williamson de-
cision. The Court in Williamson refused to address the claim because
the plaintiff had not exhausted state compensation procedures and
had not shown that those procedures were unavailable or constitution-
ally inadequate."53 The same was true of the plaintiffs in Phillips" 4
250. 524 U.S. 156, 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1927-29 (1998), cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8026 (daily
ed. July 13, 1998); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 14 (1998). The state law challenged in Phillips
transferred the interest earned on lawyer trust accounts to a nonprofit corporation estab-
lished by the Texas Supreme Court. The corporation used the money primarily to fund
legal services for low-income people. See Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at 1928-29.
251. See id. at 1929.
252. The Eastern Enterprises plurality reasoned that it would be "pointless" for Con-
gress in one statute to require a person to transfer funds to the government or a third party
but thereafter permit the person to recover the funds from the government under the
Tucker Act. See 118 S. Ct. at 2145 (plurality opinion). The same reasoning appears appli-
cable when a state government enacts a transfer-of-funds law. Moreover, similar reasoning
may justify a presumption that compensation is unavailable in other contexts involving
takings challenges to state and local action. For example, a presumption that compensa-
tion was unavailable might be appropriate if a state expressly "disavowe[d] traditional
property interests long recognized under state law" by declaring that what had been re-
garded as a property interest would no longer be regarded as such. Phillips, 118 S. Ct. at
1931; see also Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)
("[A] State by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without
compensation[.]").
253. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 ("A second reason that the taking claim is not yet
ripe is that respondent did not seek compensation through the procedures the State has
provided for doing so."); id. at 196-97 ("Respondent has not shown that the inverse con-
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We believe that Phillips is better read as resting on a presumption that
compensation was unavailable than as silently creating a conflict with
Williamson. So read, Phillips-like Eastern Enterprises, Concrete
Pipe, and Connolly-merely reflects the futility exception to the ex-
haustion requirement and, like those cases, is consistent with William-
son's application of the exhaustion requirement in a case that did not
fall within the futility exception.
The futility exception also accounts for the two remaining cases in
which the Supreme Court has decided takings claims without address-
ing the availability of compensation: Babbitt v. Youpee 55 and Hodel
v. Irving." In each case, the Court decided the merits of an as-ap-
plied, regulatory takings challenge to a federal law by plaintiffs who
had not sought compensation for the alleged taking. 5 7 The Court did
not address the exhaustion requirement in either case. 58 The Court's
decision to reach the merits of the takings claim in Youpee and Irving
cannot be justified by the Eastern Enterprises presumption. Unlike
the federal law at issue in Eastern Enterprises, the federal law chal-
lenged in Youpee and Irving, the Indian Land Consolidation Act
("ILCA"), did not compel a transfer of funds to the government or a
third party.5 9 Instead, the ILCA caused certain interests in land
owned by private individuals to be transferred to Native American
tribes.26 ° It is doubtful that Congress' enactment of such a transfer-of-
property-interests statute should, like its enactment of a transfer-of-
demnation procedure [recognized under state law] is unavailable or inadequate, and until
it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.").
254. The plaintiffs in Phillips apparently brought their taking claim in federal district
court without first seeking compensation in state court. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex.
Equal Access to Justice Found., 873 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (describing procedural
history), affd in part & rev'd in part, 94 F.3d 996 (5th Cir. 1996), affd, 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.
Ct. 1925 (1998); Brief for Petitioners, Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156
(1998) (No. 96-1578, at 10-12 (same); Brief for Respondents, Phillips, at 7-10 (same). At
the time of their suit, however, Texas courts recognized a cause of action in inverse con-
demnation. See DuPuy v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 103, 107-10 (1965) (holding that Texas
Constitution authorized property owner to bring inverse-condemnation action to recover
compensation for taking).
255. 519 U.S. 234 (1997), cited in 144 CONG. REC. S8026 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (re-
marks of Sen. Hatch); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 15 (1998).
256. 481 U.S. 704 (1987), cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8026 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (re-
marks of Sen. Hatch); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 15 (1998).
257. See Youpee, 519 U.S. at 236-45; Irving, 481 U.S. at 708-18.
258. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2145 (citing Youpee and Irving as cases in
which Court "granted equitable relief for Takings Clause violations without discussing the
applicability of the Tucker Act").
259. See 25 U.S.C. § 2206, discussed in Youpee, 519 U.S. at 236-41.
260. See id.
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funds statute, invariably be presumed to withdraw the Tucker Act
compensation remedy.261 Nonetheless, Youpee and Irving fell within
the futility exception, because the federal government conceded in
each case that compensation was not available to the plaintiffs under
the Tucker Act.262
We have shown that, in the cases after Duke Power in which the
Court has decided takings claims without addressing the availability of
compensation, including Phillips, it was either conceded or fair to pre-
sume that compensation was not available. That showing establishes
that these post-Duke Power cases do not undermine Williamson's ap-
plication of the exhaustion requirement in a case where compensation
was not shown to be unavailable. Nonetheless, there is a significant,
unsettled issue raised by two of these post-Duke Power cases, as well
as by the plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises. The Court in
Youpee and Irving, and a plurality of the Court in Eastern Enterprises,
upheld federal-court injunctions against federal statutes that were
found to cause a taking.263 As one of us has argued elsewhere, that
ruling conflicts with precedent establishing that federal courts lack the
power to enjoin an authorized governmental taking of private prop-
erty for public use when compensation for the taking is available.2 "
For present purposes, however, this aspect of the Court's precedent is
irrelevant. It concerns the power of a federal court to remedy a taking
for which compensation is unavailable. The precedent therefore does
not cast doubt on Williamson's requirement that taking claimants ex-
haust compensation remedies that are available. Nor does the prece-
dent support the power granted to federal courts under H.R. 1534's
exhaustion provision to award just compensation regardless of the
availability of compensation.
261. Cf. Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2144 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that pre-
sumption of Tucker Act unavailability is not appropriate if challenged statute "burden[s]
real or physical property") (quoting In re Chateaugay, 53 F.3d at 493).
262. See Brief for the Petitioners in Youpee at 13 n.5 (No. 95-1595); Brief for the Ap-
pellant in Irving at 25 n. 16 (No. 85-637). The Court did not expressly acknowledge the
government's concession of Tucker Act unavailability in either Youpee or Irving, perhaps
because, had it done so without resolving the issue, it could have been accused of reaching
the takings issue under the later-rejected doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction." See Steel
Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012-1016.
263. See Eastern Enterprises, 118 S. Ct. at 2146; Youpee, 519 U.S. at 243-45; Irving, 481
U.S. at 716-18.
264. See Richard H. Seamon, An Analysis of the Jurisdictional Analysis in Eastern En-
terprises v. Apfel, 61 A A. L. RFv. (forthcoming Spring 2000); see also, e.g., Monsanto, 467
U.S. at 1016 ("Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private prop-
erty for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation can be brought
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking.") (footnote omitted).
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4. Summary
The part of Williamson that H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision
would have overruled is still good law. Williamson held that a takings
challenge against a local agency was "not yet ripe" and stated "no
claim against the Government" because the plaintiff "did not seek
compensation through the procedures the State has provided for do-
ing so" and did not show that those procedures were "unavailable or
inadequate." '265 That holding reflects that, to prove that a local
agency's taking of private property for public use violates the Consti-
tution, the victim of the taking must show one of three things: (1) he
or she has been denied just compensation after exhausting state com-
pensation procedures; (2) it would be futile to exhaust state compen-
sation procedures because compensation would not be available
under the state procedures; or (3) the state compensation procedures
are unfair or otherwise inadequate. The first showing, which entails
satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement, is thus an element, but not
an invariable element, of a cause of action for a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause.
The exhaustion holding in Williamson is not undermined by any
of the precedent cited by the supporters of H.R. 1534, with the possi-
ble exception of Phillips. The precedent establishes that federal dis-
trict courts can issue declaratory judgments to resolve uncertainty
about whether compensation would be available for an alleged taking.
Furthermore, when a court determines that compensation is not avail-
able or that adequate compensation procedures do not exist, the court
can address a takings claim on the merits. Only Phillips can be read to
suggest that federal courts can decide takings claims on the merits re-
gardless of the availability or adequacy of compensation procedures.
Phillips is better read, however, as a case in which a federal court's
decision on the merits of a takings claim was justified by the unavaila-
bility of compensation.
C. The Dual Nature of the Exhaustion Requirement
We must still examine an apparent paradox about the exhaustion
requirement. We showed in Section A that the exhaustion require-
ment is not dictated by Article III; instead, it is akin to prudential
rules of justiciability because, like those rules, it saves federal-court
resources.266 We showed in Section B that the exhaustion require-
265. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-97.
266. See supra notes 122-79 and accompanying text.
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ment is rooted in the text of the Just Compensation Clause and is an
element of a cause of action for a violation of that Clause.2 67 Thus,
the exhaustion requirement partakes of prudential justiciability, but,
unlike other prudential justiciability rules, it is rooted in the Just Com-
pensation Clause; it is not associated with Article III. This dual or
hybrid nature is paradoxical, for it causes the exhaustion requirement
to straddle the borders between procedure and substance and be-
tween nonconstitutional and constitutional rules.
The paradox inheres in the Court's reading of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause. As the Court reads the Clause, it is not violated-and a
cause of action for a violation of the Clause does not arise-until the
victim of a taking has unsuccessfully exhausted available and adequate
compensation remedies.268 Yet the Court has also read the Clause to
give rise to a cause of action in inverse condemnation whenever the
government takes property without instituting condemnation pro-
ceedings.269 Thus, when a state or local agency engages in a regula-
tory taking, the Clause itself furnishes a claim for compensation
enforceable in any state court of appropriate jurisdiction.270 The ex-
haustion requirement imposed by that same Clause, however, gener-
ally bars federal district courts from hearing those inverse-
condemnation claims, even though the claims would otherwise fall
within the district courts' federal-question jurisdiction.271 The federal
district courts generally must wait until a state court's denial of just
compensation causes an inverse-condemnation claim to ripen into a
267. See supra notes 180-267 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes185-195 (describing case law establishing that exhaustion is element
of cause of action for violation of Just Compensation Clause).
269. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315-17; see also supra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text and infra notes 282-284 and accompanying text (discussing First English).
270. See id. at 315 ("[A] landowner is entitled to bring an action in inverse condemna-
tion as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect
to compensation.") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 316 ("[I]n the event of a
taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.") One commentator has
argued that, under Williamson County, a federal taking claim is not ripe in either state
court or federal court until a property owner has been denied just compensation after
exhausting state-law remedies. See Kovacs, supra, note 39, at 18, 23, 30. We respectfully
disagree. This argument ignores that the Just Compensation Clause gives rise to two dis-
crete causes of action: (1) a cause of action in inverse condemnation, which arises when the
taking occurs and which can be asserted in a state court of appropriate jurisdiction; and (2)
a cause of action for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause, which arises only after
the state has denied compensation for the taking.
271. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-question statute); Williamson, 473 U.S. at 196 (taking
claim not ripe in light of availability of state inverse-condemnation procedure).
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claim based on a violation of the Just Compensation Clause.272 In
sum, the Court has interpreted the Clause to generate two distinct
causes of action - a cause of action in inverse condemnation and a
cause of action for a violation of the Clause - as well as a "prudential"
restriction that prevents federal courts from hearing the first cause of
action.273
The multifaceted nature of the Just Compensation Clause, as con-
strued by the Court, accounts for the legislative dispute about the ef-
fect that enactment of H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision would have
had. The provision seems procedural if one views it as merely remov-
ing the "prudential" barrier that prevents federal district courts from
exercising their federal-question jurisdiction over inverse-condemna-
tion claims against local agencies. 274 The provision seems substantive,
however, if one views it as eliminating an element of a cause of action
for a violation of the Just Compensation Clause and thereby empow-
ering federal district courts to award just compensation against local
agencies in cases in which the courts currently lack such power and in
which no violation of the Constitution by the local agency has been
proven.
The federal district courts' inability to hear inverse-condemnation
claims against local agencies is reflected in, but not explained by, the
text of the statute under which many of these claims are asserted, 42
U.S.C. § 1983.275 Section 1983 requires proof of a "deprivation" of a
272. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 ("[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes
takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensa-
tion has been denied. The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a prop-
erty owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983
action.") (emphasis in original). As discussed above, supra notes 44-68 and accompanying
text, the general rule requiring exhaustion is subject to several exceptions.
273. In addition, a third cause of action arises when, at the time of a taking, the state
fails to provide adequate compensation procedures. See supra notes 59-61 and 194-195 and
accompanying text.
274. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. H8952 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (remarks of Rep.
Dooley) (H.R. 1534 "creates no new cause of action against local governments. H.R. 1534
is only a procedural bill.").
275. As noted above, supra note 39, there is some dispute about the extent to which
section 1983 is used as the basis for regulatory takings claims against local agencies. Com-
pare Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 87 n.23 (reproducing Congressional Research Ser-
vice Report according to which "[t]he majority of takings actions against nonfederal
defendants are brought under section 1983") and Mark S. Dennison, Zoning: Proof of
Wrongful Land Use Regulation Pursuant to Section 1983, in 30 AM. JuR.3d, Proof of Facts
§ 2, at 508-09 (1995) (stating that Section 1983 "has been used extensively * ** in inverse
condemnation cases"), with THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 39, § 81.05(d), at
271 (describing section 1983 as "little used * * * alternative" to action in inverse
condemnation).
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federal right.276 The Just Compensation Clause does not give prop-
erty owners a right to be free from governmental takings of their
property for public use.277 Thus, such a taking does not, standing
alone, cause a "deprivation" of a federal right under section 1983.278
It would nonetheless be a mistake to consider the exhaustion require-
ment a limitation imposed by section 1983. For one thing, the Court
has not tied the exhaustion requirement to the text of section 1983
but, instead, to the text of the Just Compensation Clause.279 More
fundamentally, any attempt to tie the exhaustion requirement to sec-
tion 1983 would be a shell game. First English establishes that the Just
Compensation Clause itself creates a cause of action in inverse con-
demnation.28 Because "it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy
for interference with property rights amounting to a taking,"
"[s]tatutory recognition [of the cause of action] [i]s not necessary."' 1
Section 1983 is therefore irrelevant to the power of federal courts over
inverse-condemnation claims against local agencies. All that the fed-
eral courts would need to hear those claims, but for the exhaustion
requirement, is a valid statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction,
276. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, reproduced supra note 39.
277. See, e.g., First English, 482 U.S. at 314 (Just Compensation Clause "does not pro-
hibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power"); Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 ("The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the tak-
ing of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation."); cf. Rose Acre Farms,
Inc. v. Madigan, 956 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that, although Just Compensa-
tion Clause "does not forbid" takings by federal government, "Congress could of course
create an entitlement to be free" of such takings).
278. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13 ("[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes
takings without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just compensa-
tion has been denied. The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a prop-
erty owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a § 1983
action.") (emphasis in original); see also Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1644 ("A federal
court, moreover, cannot entertain a takings claim under § 1983 unless or until the com-
plaining landowner has been denied an adequate post-deprivation remedy.")
279. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13. Because a taking claimant must meet the
exhaustion requirement to establish a "deprivation" under section 1983, the elimination of
that requirement proposed in H.R. 1534 was "in tension with, and arguably [would have]
amend[ed] by implication, section 1983 itself." Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 91 (repro-
ducing CRS report).
280. See First English, 482 U.S. at 315 ("a landowner is entitled to bring an action in
inverse condemnation as a result of the self-executing character of the constitutional provi-
sion with respect to compensation") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); id. at
316 ("in the event of a taking, the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution");
see also Ws. Cent. Ltd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 95 F.3d 1359, 1368 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "the Takings Clause provides both the cause of action and the remedy" for a state's
taking of private property) (citing First English).
281. First English, 482 U.S. at 315 (quoting Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16), and 316 n.9.
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which is supplied by the federal-question statute.282 Thus, the exhaus-
tion requirement does not stem from section 1983; instead, the ex-
haustion requirement prevents inverse-condemnation claims from
being cognizable-either in their own right or under section 1983-in
the federal district courts.8 3
We think that the key to understanding the exhaustion require-
ment lies in the Court's description of it as a rule of "prudence"
rooted in the text of the Just Compensation Clause. Like the "pru-
dential" rules of justiciability associated with Article III, the exhaus-
tion requirement conserves federal-court resources.284 Unlike the
prudential rules surrounding Article III, however, the exhaustion re-
quirement serves federalism concerns rather than separation-of-pow-
ers concerns?85 Specifically, the exhaustion requirement prevents
federal courts from intervening until it is clear that state courts will
not provide relief for a taking. That bar to federal-court intervention
finds support in the Just Compensation Clause. Although the Wil-
liamson Court described the exhaustion requirement as inhering in
the "nature of the * * * right" conferred by the Clause, 6 the require-
ment can also be explained in terms of the nature of the obligation
imposed by the Clause. When a local agency takes private property
for public use, the Clause imposes the obligation to pay just compen-
sation on that agency and the state of which it is a part; the obligation
does not fall on the federal courts or any other part of the federal
government?' At least as a prudential matter, federal courts should
not assume from the mere occurrence of a taking that the local agency
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
283. See, e.g., Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95 ("If the government has provided an ade-
quate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process yield[s] just com-
pensation, then the property owner has no claim against the Government for a taking.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (brackets supplied by Court in
Williamson).
284. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text (explaining how exhaustion re-
quirement conserves federal-court resources).
285. See, e.g., Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 ("IT]he law of Art. III standing is built on a
single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers.") (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 752 (1984)); Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("The 'case or controversy' requirement defines
with respect to the Judicial Branch the separation of powers on which the Federal Govern-
ment is founded.").
286. Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194 n.13.
287. See Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1642 ("Although the government acts lawfully
when, pursuant to proper authorization, it takes property and provides just compensation,
the government's action is lawful solely because it assumes a duty, imposed by the Consti-
tution, to provide just compensation."); Jacobs, 290 U.S. at 16 (upon occurrence of taking,
"a promise [to pay just compensation] was implied"), quoted in First English, 482 U.S. at
315.
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and the state will breach their obligation to pay just compensation.288
Indeed, the contrary assumption is appropriate unless the state actu-
ally denies compensation; or the victim of the taking shows that com-
pensation would not be available or that the procedures for obtaining
it are inadequate.
A similar assumption underlies the Court's precedent on the Due
Process Clause and is justified by the text of that Clause.289 The
Clause obligates states to provide adequate procedures when they (or
their local subdivisions) deprive people of life, liberty, or property.290
The Court has held that, for certain types of deprivations, adequate
procedures consist of post-deprivation remedies for wrongful depriva-
tions.2 91 The main types of deprivations for which such post-depriva-
tion remedies suffice are (in addition to government takings of private
property for public use)292: (1) random and unauthorized depriva-
tions of liberty or property2 93 and (2) unconstitutional collection of
taxes.2 94 One could reasonably argue that federal courts should be
288. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,2266 (1999) ("We are unwilling to assume the
States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States."); see also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-41 (1977) (explaining that
Younger abstention doctrine rests in part on assumed ability of state courts to enforce
federal rights); cf Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107-
16 (1981) (holding that principle of comity barred federal-court action under Section 1983
for damages caused by allegedly unconstitutional administration of state tax system, given
availability of relief in state courts).
289. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (relating exhaustion requirement of takings-ripe-
ness doctrine to due process case law), discussed supra note 61.
290. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall * * * deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."). In addition to its procedural compo-
nent, the Due Process Clause has a substantive component that limits government action
that is arbitrary or that intrudes on fundamental rights. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494
U.S. 113, 125 (1990).
291. See generally Richard H. Seamon, The Sovereign Immunity of States in Their Own
Courts, 37 BRANrDEIs LJ. 319, 394-405 (1999).
292. See, e.g., Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95,104 (1940); see also supra notes 59-61 and
accompanying text (discussing constitutional requirement that, at time of taking, states
provide adequate procedures for post-taking compensation).
293. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131-32 (holding that due process would be satisfied by
post-deprivation tort remedies for random and unauthorized deprivations of liberty); Hud-
son, 468 U.S. at 530-34 (holding same with respect to random and unauthorized, but inten-
tional, deprivations of property); Parratt, 451 U.S. at 538-44 (holding same with respect to
random and unauthorized negligent deprivations of property), overruled in part by Daniels,
474 U.S. at 328, 330 (holding that negligent acts of state official causing unintended loss of,
or injury to, life, liberty, or property do not violate Due Process Clause); cf. Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-38 (1982) (holding that post-deprivation reme-
dies did not satisfy due process when deprivation occurred under "established state
procedure").
294. See, e.g., Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582,587
(1995) ("As long as state law provides a clear and certain remedy, the States may deter-
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able to remedy these wrongful deprivations as soon as they occur, and
without regard to whether the victim of the deprivation has sought a
remedy from the state.295 After all, the occurrence of the deprivation
supplies. injury in fact that satisfies Article III, and section 1983 could
be read to supply a cause of action for the wrongful deprivation. The
Court, however, has not construed the Due Process Clause that way
with respect to deprivations for which post-deprivation remedies suf-
fice. Instead, the Court has held that a violation of the Clause does
not occur, and thus a cause of action under section 1983 does not
arise, until the victim of the wrongful deprivation has unsuccessfully
exhausted any post-deprivation procedures that are made available by
the state and are adequate to remedy the deprivation.296 That hold-
ing, which effectively adopts an exhaustion requirement for certain
due process claims, seems to reflect the same federalism concerns that
underlie Williamson's exhaustion requirement.297
D. Summary and Transition
The exhaustion requirement is not dictated by Article III. It is,
instead, a rule of prudence that, like the prudential rules of jus-
ticiability associated with Article III, conserves federal-court re-
sources. Unlike the prudential rules surrounding Article III, however,
the exhaustion requirement is rooted in the text of the Just Compen-
sation Clause and reflects federalism concerns rather than separation-
mine whether to provide a pre-deprivation process (e.g., an injunction) or instead to afford
post-deprivation relief (e.g., a refund)" for wrongful taxation) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
295. See Henry Paul Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 86 CoLtm. L. REv. 979, 989 (1986) ("The Court is quite wrong in
thinking that the point in time at which a substantive deprivation occurs is a function of the
point in time at which the state can reasonably provide corrective process.").
296. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 (with respect to random and unauthorized depri-
vations, "the State's action is not 'complete' in the sense of causing a constitutional injury
unless or until the State fails to provide an adequate post-deprivation remedy for the prop-
erty loss"') (quoting Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532 n.12); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542 (quot-
ing with approval decision in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Stevens, J.), modified en banc, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932
(1978), stating that, when misconduct of state officers damages property, "the state action
is not necessarily complete," given state remedies for such misconduct).
297. See Monaghan, supra note 297, at 987 (arguing that Parratt and its progeny are
defensible if construed as adopting "a special abstention doctrine," because federal courts
"seem ill-used if their task is to superintend the routine administration of state government
where the states are themselves willing to correct abuses and no fundamental rights are
involved"); see also Mark R. Brown, De-Federalizing Common Law Torts: Empathy for
Parratt, Hudson, and Daniels, 28 B.C. L. Rav. 813 (1987) (arguing that Parratt and its
progeny reflect federalism concerns).
[rVol. 27:1
of-powers concerns. The Just Compensation Clause obligates states
and local agencies, not the federal government, to pay just compensa-
tion for their takings. As a matter of prudence, federal courts should
not assume a breach of that obligation upon the mere occurrence of
such a taking. Such an assumption is warranted only when: (1) just
compensation is denied; (2) it is clear that just compensation is un-
available; or (3) the state has failed at the time of the taking to have in
place adequate procedures for providing just compensation.
The question remains whether Congress has the power to elimi-
nate the exhaustion requirement. Neither the supporters nor the op-
ponents of H.R. 1534 explored that question. The supporters assumed
that, because H.R. 1534 made only a "procedural" change by eliminat-
ing a "prudential" requirement, Congress had the power to enact it.298
The opponents asserted that, because H.R. 1534 made a "substantive"
change, Congress lacked the power to enact it.2 99 We hope that this
Part of our article has demonstrated that neither side completely un-
derstood the exhaustion requirement or the effect that its elimination
would have on takings law. This Part has tried to shed light on those
issues as a prelude for exploring the unexamined issue of Congress'
power.
IV. Congress' Power to Eliminate the
Exhaustion Requirement
The supporters of H.R. 1534 apparently believed that the elimi-
nation of the exhaustion requirement fell within Congress' power to
make rules for the federal courts.3° Congress' rulemaking power
would have worked fine if the exhaustion requirement were only a
rule of prudence akin to the prudential rules of justiciability associ-
ated with Article 1]1.301 Because the exhaustion requirement is also
an element of a cause of action for a violation of the Just Compensa-
tion Clause and is rooted in that Clause, however, its elimination ex-
ceeds Congress' rulemaking power.3 °z Congress potentially has the
power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. °3 The power is only potential, though, be-
cause Congress has not yet met the stringent conditions for invoking
298. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text.
300. See infra notes 308-324 and accompanying text.
301. See infra notes 325-330 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 325-343 and accompanying text.
303. See infra notes 344-456 and accompanying text.
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Section 5 under the Court's recent decisions in City of Boerne v. Flo-
res304 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank.0 5
A. Congress' Power to Make Rules for the Federal Courts
The legislative material on H.R. 1534 does not clearly identify the
source of Congress' power to enact the bill's exhaustion provision.
The House report on H.R. 1534 cited the Necessary and Proper
Clause as the sole authority for the entire bill.306 At the hearings on
the bill, in contrast, the only supporters to address the question as-
serted that H.R. 1534 fell within Article II, Section 1, which, accord-
ing to those supporters, empowered Congress "to shape and qualify
the jurisdiction of the United States district and circuit courts. '30 7 For
their part, the opponents of H.R. 1534 denied that Congress had
power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement.0 8 In short, the issue
of congressional power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement gen-
erated little discussion and no agreement in the legislative debate on
H.R. 1534.
Nonetheless, it is fair to infer that the supporters of H.R. 1534
believed that the bill's exhaustion provision fell within Congress'
power to make rules for the federal courts. The key evidence of that
belief is the supporters' repeated insistence that the exhaustion re-
quirement is a "prudential" rule the elimination of which would effect
304. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
305. 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
306. H.R. REP. No. 105-323, at 9 (1997) ("the Committee finds the authority for this
legislation in Article I, clause 18, section 8 of the Constitution"); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause) (empowering Congress "[rio make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof").
307. Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 45 (reproducing Letter from John J. Delaney and
Duane J. Desiderio, Linowes & Blocher law firm, to Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney
General, DOJ (Sept. 5,1997)); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 167 (same); see also Senate
Hearing, supra note 39, at 106 (reproducing Letter from Prof. Daniel R. Mandelker to Sen.
Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 14, 1997), stating that Williamson's
ripeness requirements are "jurisdictional hurdles" that "Congress is fully empowered to
address * * * as it sees fit"). Article I, § 1, vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and
"such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
Although this provision refers to Congress' power to "ordain and establish" the lower fed-
eral courts, the provision itself does not confer that power. The power is conferred, in-
stead, in Art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (Tribunals Clause) (empowering Congress "[t]o constitute
Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court").
308. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text (describing opponents' lack-of-
power argument).
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only a "procedural" change.30 9 They apparently had in mind Supreme
Court precedent indicating that Congress can abolish prudential, as
distinguished from constitutional, rules of justiciability.31 0 Although
most of that precedent concerns the prudential rules of standing, it
also applies to prudential rules of ripeness.31'
Unfortunately, the Court has never identified the source of Con-
gress' power to eliminate prudential justiciability rules.312 All the
Court has said is that the congressional elimination of prudential
rules, unlike the congressional elimination of rules mandated by Arti-
cle III, would not violate Article IHI. 31 3 As Professor David Engdahl
309. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. H8952 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (remark of Rep. Dooley)
("Simply put, [H.R. 1534] * * * amends Federal procedural laws governing the jurisdiction
of the U.S. district courts."); see also supra notes 83, 117-121 and accompanying text
(describing and citing additional instances in which supporters asserted that H.R. 1534
made only "procedural" changes to a "prudential" rule).
310. See Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 119 S. Ct. 765, 772
(1999) (stating that "Congress ha[d] eliminated any prudential concerns in th[at] case" by
authorizing suits by any aggrieved persons); Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2318 n.3 (stating that
federal statute describing who could challenge Line Item Veto Act in federal court "elimi-
nate[d] any prudential standing limitations," but holding that statute did not give plaintiffs
Art. III standing); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 164-65 (1997) (stating that pruden-
tial standing requirements, unlike Article III requirements "can be modified or abrogated
by Congress;" holding that federal statute authorizing "any person" to bring federal-court
suit "negate[d]" or "expand[ed]" prudential zone-of-interests test for standing); Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372-73 (1982) (stating that federal statute extended
standing "to the full limits of Art. III" and therefore courts "lack the authority to create
prudential barriers" to suits under statute; upholding plaintiffs' standing based on this con-
struction) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 109 (1979) (stating that "Congress may * * * expand stand-
ing to the full extent permitted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one who otherwise
would be barred by prudential standing rules;" holding that plaintiffs had standing under
federal statute that authorized standing to extent permitted by Art. HI) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (stating that, as long as Article HI
requirements are satisfied, "Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who
otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules"); see also Fed. Election Comm'n
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,19 (1998) (evaluating plaintiff's standing under federal statute that, in
authorizing suit by "aggrieved" persons, suggested "a congressional intent to cast the
standing net broadly-beyond the common-law interests and substantive statutory rights
upon which 'prudential' standing traditionally rested"); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (agreeing with lower court that federal statute "defined
standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III," and upholding plaintiffs' standing under
that statutory interpretation).
311. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990) (observing that
Congress can statutorily authorize judicial review of a regulation even though review
otherwise would not be ripe before the regulation was enforced against the plaintiff).
312. See David E. Engdahl, supra note 124, at 166 (stating that "no attempt seems ever
to have been made to articulate any rationale supporting a general power of Congress to
dictate or dispense with prudential standing rules").
313. See cases cited supra note 312.
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has pointed out, however, those statements mean only that Article III
does not constrain Congress' use of its enumerated powers to elimi-
nate prudential justiciability rules.314 The statements do not resolve
the separate question of what enumerated powers enable Congress to
do so.
The modem Court has traced Congress' general authority to
make rules for the lower federal courts to the Tribunals Clause, as
referenced in Article III and as supplemented by the Necessary and
Proper Clause,315 and for the U.S. Supreme Court to the Exceptions
Clause (with respect to cases within the Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion).316 These powers underlie Congress' authority to prescribe rules
limiting subject-matter jurisdiction," 7 rules of evidence," 8 rules of
civil and criminal procedure, 1 9 and rules authorizing declaratory
judgments.32 The same powers probably allow Congress to eliminate
314. See Engdahl, supra note 124, at 77 ("The fact that Congress lacks the power to
dispense with rules that are 'constitutional' in character does not imply that it has the
power to make or unmake rules about everything so long as those rules are non-constitu-
tional in character").
315. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (Tribunals Clause) (empowering Congress "[t]o consti-
tute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court"); id. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in
Supreme Court and "such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish"); supra note 308 (reproducing Necessary and Proper Clause); see, e.g., Willy
v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136 (1991) (citing Tribunals Clause, together with Necessary
and Proper Clause, as authorizing Congress to "enact laws regulating the conduct of those
courts [Le., lower federal courts] and the means by which their judgments are enforced");
Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 n.3 (1987) ("Article III * * *, augmented by
the Necessary and Proper Clause * * * empowers Congress * * *, impliedly, to establish
procedural Rules governing litigation in [the lower federal] courts"); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (aug-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make
rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts * * * .").
316. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (Exceptions Clause) (giving U.S. Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over various cases "with such Exceptions, and under such Regula-
tions as the Congress shall make"); see Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996) (fed-
eral statute authorizing Supreme Court to grant, vacate, and remand cases fell within
Tribunals and Exceptions Clauses); cf. South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 396 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (observing that Exceptions Clause does not
apply to cases within Court's original jurisdiction).
317. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) (Article III, § 2,
does not grant jurisdiction to lower federal courts over any cases but instead "delimit[s]
those in respect of which Congress may confer jurisdiction upon such courts as it creates").
318. Cf Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 (1976) (stating that Con-
gress "has plenary power over the promulgation of evidentiary rules for the federal
courts").
319. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 353 & n.11 (1959) (recognizing Con-
gress' power to make rules of criminal procedure); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472 (recognizing
Congress' power to make rules of civil procedure).
320. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
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prudential justiciability rules. Prudential ripeness rules, in particular,
involve the proper timing of a federal court suit.321 Rules of timing
are at least arguably procedural, which is all that is necessary under
the Court's modem precedent for them to fall within Congress'
rulemaking power.322
The Court's precedent nonetheless would not allow Congress to
use its rulemaking power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement.
The precedent that most directly blocks it is Williamson and other pre-
cedent establishing that the exhaustion requirement is an element of a
cause of action for a violation of the Takings Clause.32  Nothing is
more substantive than the elements of a cause of action.324 To hold
that the rulemaking power authorizes the elimination of the exhaus-
tion requirement, the Court would have to adopt the position that,
contrary to its precedent, the requirement is only a rule of
justiciability.
Such a repudiation of precedent is particularly unlikely consider-
ing its ramifications. Consider how the Court would explain a deci-
sion holding that Congress could use its rulemaking power to enact a
statute eliminating the exhaustion requirement. The Court would
have to highlight the procedural character of the exhaustion require-
ment. To do so, the Court presumably would emphasize that the fed-
eral statute eliminating the requirement merely allowed federal courts
to hear a cause of action (that of inverse condemnation) that arises
directly under the Constitution. That is true, but the same could be
said of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, in a way section 1983 is even more
procedural, and less substantive, than a statute eliminating the exhaus-
321. See, e.g., Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557, 558 (1995) (per curiam) ("ripeness is
peculiarly a question of timing") (quoting Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. at 140).
322. See, e.g., Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) (upholding federal
statute authorizing transfer of venue as falling within Congress' power "to regulate matters
which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are ra-
tionally capable of classification as either") (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472).
323. See, e.g., Williamson, 473 U.S. at 194-95; see also supra notes 185-191 and accompa-
nying text (discussing and citing this precedent).
324. See Kamen v. Kemper Fmn. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991) (holding that
demand requirement for shareholder derivative action "clearly is a matter of 'substance,'
not 'procedure,"' and therefore that it was not consistent with Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072(b), to construe Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1 as imposing federal demand requirement
in shareholder derivative action based on Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-l(a) et seq.); see also Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 146-50 (1988) (holding that Wis-
consin "notice of claim" provision, which required civil rights plaintiffs to notify defendants
before bringing suit, was preempted as applied to suits under Section 1983, partly because
the provision functioned as an exhaustion provision and, as such, was integrally related to
nature of substantive rights made actionable by Section 1983).
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tion requirement would be.3as Section 1983 conditions a remedy on
proof of a violation of some other federal law,32 6 whereas no such
violation would be necessary to recover just compensation under a
federal law that eliminated the exhaustion requirement.327 Still, no
one has ever thought that section 1983 falls within Congress' rulemak-
ing power. Instead, the Court has always supposed, with the clear
support of history, that section 1983 is an exercise of Congress' power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 328
Another statute that has been thought to rest on Congress' power
over substantive matters is the Federal Arbitration Act.329 The Act
declares valid and enforceable only arbitration provisions in contracts
that involve interstate commerce or admiralty.330 Consistent with that
scope, the Court has held that the Act "is based upon and confined to
the federal foundations of control over interstate commerce and over
325. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (predeces-
sor of Section 1983 "did not provide for any substantive rights" but instead had a "proce-
dural character").
326. See, e.g., Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1645 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("the legal duty which is the basis for relief [under section
1983] is ultimately defined not by the claim-creating statute [ie., section 1983] itself, but by
an extrinsic body of law to which the statute refers, namely 'federal rights elsewhere con-
ferred."') (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,144, n. 3 (1979)); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989) (to state cause of action under
section 1983, "[f]irst, the plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right.").
327. The text accompanying this note discusses the way in which section 1983 seems
more "procedural" than a provision eliminating the exhaustion requirement. In another
way, however, section 1983 seems more substantive than such a provision. Section 1983
gives federal courts the power to grant remedies for deprivations of federal rights. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983; but cf. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution,
68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995) (arguing that section 1983 is unnecessary to federal courts'
power to remedy constitutional violations). A provision eliminating the exhaustion provi-
sion, in contrast, would not give federal courts any new remedial powers. The remedy of
just compensation springs from the Just Compensation Clause. See First English, 482 U.S.
at 315-316. Therefore, no statute is necessary to give courts the power to grant that
remedy.
328. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 28 (1991) (Congress enacted § 1983 "to en-
force provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment") (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 243 (1974), and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-72 (1961)); Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 722 (1989) ("What is now § 1983 was enacted as § 1 of 'An Act to
Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consitution of the United
States and For Other Purposes,' Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693, 699-700 (1976) (section 1983 and the criminal statute counterpart were "in-
tended by Congress to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) ("It is clear from the legislative debates surrounding
passage of § 1983's predecessor that the Act was intended to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment * *
329. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.
330. See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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admiralty."'33 Moreover, the Court has said that the Act might raise a
constitutional question if its application in diversity actions rested
solely on Congress' power to regulate the procedure of the federal
courts.332 Nonetheless, the Federal Arbitration Act is, in a sense,
more procedural than a provision eliminating the exhaustion require-
ment would be. The Act does not give federal courts jurisdiction over
any claims that they previously could not hear.333 Rather, the Act
merely prescribes a means of dispute resolution (i.e., arbitration) in
certain cases of which the federal courts already have jurisdiction. In
contrast, a provision eliminating the exhaustion requirement would
give federal courts jurisdiction over claims-namely, inverse-condem-
nation claims against local agencies-of which they do not now have
jurisdiction (because of the exhaustion requirement). Furthermore,
many of the plaintiffs asserting these claims would never get to federal
court under current law. Their inverse-condemnation claims would
never ripen into claims for violation of the Just Compensation Clause
because the plaintiffs would get just compensation in state court.
Thus, a federal law eliminating the exhaustion requirement would give
federal courts jurisdiction over many cases that they cannot now hear
and, concomitantly, would give many claimants a right to relief in fed-
eral court that they do not now have. Such a law seems much more
substantive than the Federal Arbitration Act, which has no such
effects.334
331. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967); see
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 201-02 (1956) (construing provi-
sion in Arbitration Act in light of legislative history stating that "one foundation" of the
Act was "the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty"); see also
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984) ("The Federal Arbitration Act rests on
the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause."); but see
id. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Congress that enacted Federal Arbi-
tration Act believed it derived "largely from the federal power to control the jurisdiction of
the federal courts"); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
271-72 (1995) (acknowledging that "some initially assumed that the Federal Arbitration
Act represented an exercise of Congress's Article III power to 'ordain and establish' fed-
eral courts"; but declining to reconsider Prima Paint and other cases treating Act as exer-
cise of commerce and admiralty powers).
332. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202 ("a constitutional question might be presented" if
Arbitration Act provision were construed to apply in diversity action; question would be
"whether arbitration touched on substantive rights, which Erie R. Co v. Tompkins [304
U.S. 64 (1938)] held were governed by local law, or was a mere form of procedure within
the power of the federal courts or Congress to prescribe").
333. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15 n.9 ( "While the Act creates federal substan-
tive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any in-
dependent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or otherwise.").
334. Cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,77 n.29
(1982) (plurality opinion) (Congress's power to assign adjudicatory functions to adjuncts to
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The only precedent arguably supporting Congress' use of its
rulemaking power to eliminate the exhaustion requirement is the pre-
cedent holding that federal district courts can grant declaratory judg-
ments in connection with some takings claims.335 The Court has
upheld the Declaratory Judgment Act as an exercise of Congress'
rulemaking power.336 As the Court has interpreted the Act, it does
not allow a federal court to decide a taking claim when compensation
for the alleged taking is available. 37 The Court has not expressly
based that interpretation on any intrinsic limits on Congress' rulemak-
ing powers, though, and it therefore would not prevent Congress from
amending the Declaratory Judgment Act to permit federal courts to
issue declaratory judgments deciding takings claims without regard to
whether the claimant met the exhaustion requirement. Indeed, such
an amendment may well fall within Congress' rulemaking power. Af-
ter all, the amendment would not change the nature of the Act or of
proceedings currently authorized under the Act. It would merely ex-
pand the circumstances under which federal district courts could ad-
dress takings claims by allowing the courts to address claims asserted
by plaintiffs who had not met the exhaustion requirement. And, if
Congress could use its rulemaking powers to allow federal courts to
issue declaratory judgments resolving such claims, why could it not
use those powers to authorize the federal courts to award just com-
pensation on those claims?338
Article III judges depends in part on whether "Congress' adjustment of the traditional
manner of adjudication can be sufficiently linked to its legislative power to define substan-
tive rights.").
335. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 71 n.15; see also supra notes 228-239 and accom-
panying text (discussing Duke Power).
336. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) ("[T]he operation of
the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural only. In providing remedies and defining pro-
cedure in relation to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense the Congress is
acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Con-
gress is authorized to establish.").
337. See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 94 n.39; see also Preseault, 494 U.S. at 10-17 (holding
that takings claim raised in federal-court review of ICC order was premature because of
availability of compensation under the Thcker Act); but see Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1004-14
& 1017-19 (deciding whether challenged federal statute caused a taking despite availability
of compensation for alleged taking).
338. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (holding that Eleventh Amendment
barred declaratory relief that would have the effect of creating monetary obligation by
state); cf Jefferson County v. Acker, 119 S. Ct. 2069, 2076 (1999) (Court has
"[r]ecogniz[ed] that there is 'little practical difference' between an injunction and anticipa-
tory relief in the form of a declaratory judgment") (quoting California v. Grace Brethren
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982)).
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Although such a use of the rulemaking power might not exceed
any intrinsic limits on that power, it probably would violate the extrin-
sic limits imposed on Congress' use of Article I powers imposed by
our system of dual sovereignty. 33 9 As discussed above, the exhaustion
requirement serves federalism concerns by assuming that state and lo-
cal governments will honor their obligations under the Just Compen-
sation Clause.340  The requirement thereby avoids exposing those
governments to unnecessary federal-court money judgments entered
without proof that the governments had violated the Just Compensa-
tion Clause.
The federalism concerns that would arise if the exhaustion re-
quirement were eliminated do not arise when Congress, as it has done
in the past, eliminates prudential justiciability rules for lawsuits
against the federal government or private parties. 41 This is why the
precedent indicating that such congressional action falls within the
rulemaking power does not support the use of that power to eliminate
Williamson's exhaustion requirement.
339. See generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997) (discussing dual
sovereignty system); see also Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 88 (reproducing Congres-
sional Research Service Report, which stated that H.R. 1534 implicated federalism issue
"by requiring federal judges to rule on takings and other claims against local government
that formerly could have been deflected to the state courts or postponed pending further
local proceedings"); id. at 111 (reproducing letter from Michael Blommer, Assistant Direc-
tor, Office of Legislative Affairs, Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Oct. 6, 1997), stating Judicial Conference's position that
H.R. 1534 "would alter deeply-ingrained federalism principles by prematurely involving
the federal courts in property regulatory matters that have historically been processed at
the state and local levels"); cf. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66,69 (1971) (companion case
to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), holding that, in light of principle of comity, fed-
eral court should have denied declaratory as well as injunctive relief with respect to state
statute under which plaintiff was being prosecuted in state-court prosecution initiated
before federal-court suit); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 296-
302 (1943) (holding that, in light of comity principle, federal court should have declined
declaratory relief against allegedly unconstitutional administration of state tax system).
340. See supra notes 288-290 and accompanying text.
341. For example, Congress often authorizes federal courts to hear "pre-enforcement"
challenges to federal regulations even though those challenges would not otherwise be
ripe. See Ohio Forestry Ass'n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 118 S. Ct. 1665, 1672 (1998) (citing
federal statutes authorizing pre-enforcement review of various federal actions in federal
courts); Lujan, 497 U.S. at 891 (1990) (indicating that such statutes are valid). Thus, DOJ
erred when it said at a congressional hearing on H.R. 1534, "It is virtually unprecedented
for a federal statute to deprive federal courts of the ability to keep their dockets free from
unripe claims." Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 104 (reproducing Letter from Andrew
Fois, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ, to Sen. Patrick
Leahy, U.S. Senate (Aug. 15, 1997)). In addition to relaxing prudential rules of ripeness
for actions challenging conduct of the federal government, Congress has relaxed the pru-
dential rules of standing for certain private actions under the federal Fair Housing Act. See
supra note 312 and infra notes 448-451 and accompanying text.
Fall19991
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
B. Congress' Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
The logical basis for H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision is Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress to "en-
force" the Fourteenth Amendment by "appropriate" legislation. 42
That is a logical basis because the purpose of H.R. 1534's exhaustion
provision was to enforce the Just Compensation Clause as it applies to
local agencies under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 43 Moreover, the federalism concerns that limit Con-
gress' use of Article I powers to eliminate the exhaustion requirement
carry little weight when Congress legislates under Section 5.344 Ironi-
cally, it was primarily the opponents of H.R. 1534, rather than its sup-
porters, who recognized that Section 5 provided an arguable basis for
the exhaustion provision. The opponents cited City of Boeme v. Flo-
res, a case involving Section 5, in arguing that the exhaustion provision
exceeded Congress' power.3 45 The opponents thought that the provi-
sion exceeded Congress' power under Section 5, however, because it
changed the "substance" of takings law.34 6 We showed in Part III that
342. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
343. See infra note 402 (citing instances in which supporters of H.R. 1534 described its
purpose as enforcing the Just Compensation Clause). The Section 5 power includes en-
forcement of the Due Process Clause. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519 ("The 'provisions of this
article,' to which § 5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787,789 (1966) ("We have no doubt of the power
of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.") (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). As noted above (supra note 13), the Court has consistently construed the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to incorporate the Just Compensation Clause.
344. See, e.g., Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) ("'[P]rinciples of federal-
ism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overrid-
den by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation."'); see
also Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (Congress can override state sovereign immunity under Sec-
tion 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); cf Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991) ("the
Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism").
345. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 96 (prepared statement of John C. Dwyer,
Acting Associate Attorney General, DOJ, also citing Boerne); id. at 124 (Senate Hearing,
supra note 39, at 124 (reproducing Letter from (40) State Attorneys General to Sen. Henry
Hyde, Chairman, Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 24, 1997), citing Boerne); House Hearing,
supra note 70, at 38 (prepared statement of John C. Dwyer, Acting Associate Attorney
General, DOJ) (citing Boerne); see also State Approaches to Protecting Property Rights:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Constitution of House Judiciary Comm. (Sept. 23, 1997)
(testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle) (arguing that "the Congress has the right to expand
the Constitutional protections for property rights beyond the Supreme Court's current in-
terpretation using its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"; citing
Boerne), available at 1997 WL 626959.
346. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 70, at 38 (prepared statement of John C.
Dwyer, Acting Associate Attorney General, DOJ), stating that H.R. 1534's exhaustion
provision would "alter * * * the substantive standard under which district courts adjudicate
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the "substantive" label does not fully capture the nature of the ex-
haustion requirement. We now show that the supporters erred in as-
suming that the "substantive" nature of the requirement precluded
Congress' use of Section 5 to eliminate the requirement.
1. The Court's two-part test for Section 5 legislation
In Boerne, the Court emphasized that Section 5 empowers Con-
gress to pass laws that remedy past violations, or prevent future viola-
tions, of the Fourteenth Amendment. 347  In contrast, the Boerne
Court said, Section 5 does not empower Congress to enact laws that
change the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment.348 The Court
recognized in Boerne that "the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substan-
tive change in the governing law is not easy to discern. '349 In Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, the
Court clarified where the line lies by stating that Congress must meet
two requirements "to invoke § 5. ''311 "[I]t must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions,
and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct. 315 1 An examination of Boerne and Florida Prepaid further
clarifies what Congress must do to meet those two requirements. It is
not easy.
At issue in Boerne was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA"). 352 The RFRA required all generally applicable laws that
substantially burdened the free exercise of religion to be supported by
a compelling governmental interest and to reflect the least restrictive
means of furthering that interest. 53 A violation of that requirement
created a claim or a defense that could be asserted in court (for exam-
ple, in a civil action to invalidate a law, or in a prosecution under a
takings claims against state and local authorities"); see also supra notes 110-116 and accom-
panying text (describing opponents' lack-of-power argument); Kovacs, supra note 39, at 9
n.48 (asserting that, "[s]ince Williamson County is based upon the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the text of the Fifth Amendment rather than prudential considerations, it is
beyond Congress' authority to override that decision, regardless of which constitutional
provision provides the source for its enactment"; and that H.R. 1534 and similar bills there-
fore "are unconstitutional").
347. See 521 U.S. at 519-29.
348. See id. at 527-29.
349. Id. at 519.
350. 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
351. Id.
352. See Boerne, 524 U.S. at 512-16 (discussing RFRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq.).
353. See id. at 515-16.
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law, that violated the RFRA requirement).354 In imposing this re-
quirement, the RFRA sought to "restore" the level of protection that
the Court accorded under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment355 before the Court's decision in Employment Div. v.
Smith.3 5 6 Smith had held that "neutral, generally applicable laws may
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a com-
pelling governmental interest. 357
The Court in Boerne held that, as applied to generally applicable
laws enacted by state and local governments, the RFRA exceeded
Congress' power under Section 5.358 The Court explained that, for a
federal statute to fall within Section 5, "[tjhere must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented and the means
adopted to that end. '359 "Lacking such a connection," the Court de-
clared, "legislation may become substantive in operation and ef-
fect. '360 The Court determined that the RFRA lacked the required
connection. 361 For one thing, the legislative record disclosed few con-
stitutional injuries for the RFRA to remedy or prevent. 62 Congress
had almost no evidence of generally applicable state or local laws in
the modem day that violate the Free Exercise Clause.3 63 The Court
determined, however, that "[t]his lack of support in the legislative rec-
ord * * * [was] not RFRA's most serious shortcoming. ' 364 Its most
serious shortcoming was that it was "so out of proportion to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive object. ' 365 The RFRA applied to all
sorts of state and local laws, from zoning laws to prison regulations. 66
Moreover, where applicable, the RFRA required the state or local
354. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2).
355. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof * * * .").
356. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (stating as one of purposes of
RFRA "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth" in specified Supreme Court
decisions pre-dating Smith).
357. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (describing Smith); see also Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-90.
358. See 521 U.S. at 529-36.
359. IM at 520.
360. Id
361. See id. at 529-36.
362. See id. at 529-31 (discussing "lack of support" for RFRA "in the legislative
record").
363. See id. at 530 ("RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.").
364. Id. at 531.
365. Id. at 532.
366. See id. at 532 ("Sweeping coverage ensures [RFRA's] intrusion at every level of
government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description
and regardless of subject matter.").
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government to satisfy an extremely demanding legal test to save the
challenged law (by proving that it furthered a compelling governmen-
tal interest using the least restrictive means). 67 The Court thought
that these features illustrated "the substantive," and hence impermis-
sible, "alteration of [Smith] attempted by FRA.:1368
In contrast to the RFRA, the federal statute at issue in Florida
Prepaid, the Patent Remedy Act, did not seek to overturn any
Supreme Court decision and was narrower in scope.369 The Act "clar-
ified" that the federal patent laws authorized private infringement ac-
tions against states in federal court and was expressly premised on
Congress' power to authorize such suits under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 370  These features of the Act responded to
Supreme Court decisions holding that: (1) when Congress intends to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court, it must express its
intent to do so unequivocally in the abrogation statute 371; and (2)
Congress cannot abrogate that immunity using Article I powers, such
as the Patent Clause, but can do so under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.372
In holding that the Patent Remedy Act exceeded Congress'
power under Section 5, the Court focused more on the lack of evi-
367. See id. at 533 ("The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be
achieved. * * * Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has
adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test
known to constitutional law.").
368. See id. at 534 (Court's observations on scope of RFRA "illustrate the substantive
alteration of [Smith's] holding attempted by RFRA").
369. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 (discussing Patent and Plant Variety Protec-
tion Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), which the Court called "Patent Rem-
edy Act" for short).
370. Patent Remedy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, preamble, 106 Stat. 4230 (purpose of the
Act is to "clarify that States, instrumentalities of States, and officers and employees of
States acting in their official capacity, are subject to suit in Federal court by any person for
infringement of patents and plant variety protections"), quoted in Florida Prepaid, 119 S.
Ct. at 2203; see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205 (citing legislative history indicating
that Patent Remedy Act was based on, among other powers, Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment).
371. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2203 (observing that Patent Remedy Act re-
sponded to lower court decisions construing existing patent laws in light of Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985), which held that, when Congress in-
tends to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must express that intent
clearly and unambiguously).
372. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (reaffirming Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, while holding that Congress lacked power to
do so using Article I powers).
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dence supporting the Act than on its breadth.373 Congress had evi-
dence of some instances of patent infringement by states.374 The
evidence did not, however, establish a "pattern" of state patent in-
fringements.375 More fundamentally, the Court observed, "a State's
infringement of a patent * * * does not by itself violate the Constitu-
tion. '3 76 "Instead," the Court explained, "only where the State pro-
vides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent
owners for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of
property without due process result. 377 Thus, the chief defect of the
Patent Remedy Act was that it was based on only "a handful of in-
stances of state patent infringement that did not necessarily violate
the Constitution."378 Although the Court faulted the Act mostly be-
cause of this lack of evidence, the Court also disapproved the Act's
breadth.379 The Court remarked that "[a]n unlimited range of state
conduct" could expose a State to liability for patent infringement.380
The Court complained, in particular, that Congress had done "nothing
to limit the coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitu-
tional violations."3 81 The Court concluded that, in light of "the scant
support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress in-
tended to remedy" and the Act's "indiscriminate scope," it "simply
cannot be said that 'many of [the acts of infringement] affected by the
congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional.' "382
In sum, Congress can exercise its Section 5 powers only by: (1)
"identifying" violations of the Fourteenth Amendment that need to be
remedied or prevented; and (2) "limit[ing] the coverage" of its legisla-
tion so that, for the most part, it reaches only state or local action that
violates the Fourteenth Amendment or has a "significant likelihood"
373. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207-11. The Court devoted more than three
pages in the Supreme Court Reporter to discussing the lack of evidence in the legislative
record to support the Patent Remedy Act. See id. at 2207-2210. By comparison, it devoted
only one paragraph to discussing the breadth of the Act. See id. at 2210.
374. See id. at 2207.
375. See id. ("In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, ** * Congress identified no pattern
of patent infringements by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations.").
376. Id. at 2208.
377. Id. (citing Parratt, 451 U.S. at 539-41; Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532-33 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
378. Id. at 2210.
379. See id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 2210 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532) (bracketed text supplied by Court in
Florida Prepaid).
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of doing So.383 Moreover, Florida Prepaid makes clear that, as a "crit-
ical part" of the "identif[ication]" process, Congress must have evi-
dence of actual violations.3" Although the Court did not require
evidence of any particular number of such violations, it strongly sug-
gested that they need to be fairly "widespread," approaching a
",pattern.,38 5
383. See id. at 2210.
384. See id. ("Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not determinative,
identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of our § 5
calculus") (citation omitted).
385. See id. at 2207 ("Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."); id. at 2210 ("The legislative record
thus suggests that the Patent Remedy Act does not respond to a history of 'widespread and
persisting deprivation of constitutional rights' of the sort Congress has faced in enacting
proper prophylactic § 5 legislation") (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). The twin issues of
violations by the States and state law remedies for such violations received further atten-
tion in Kimel v. Florida Bd of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000), which was handed down by
the Court after this article was completed. Kimel struck down the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (1994 ed. & Supp. HI), as exceeding Congressional
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Applying the "congruence and proportionality" framework, the Court first attacked
the range of applicability of the ADEA. It found that "[t]he Act, through its broad restric-
tion on the use of age as a discriminating factor, prohibits substantially more state employ-
ment decisions and practices than would be likely be held unconstitutional under the
applicable equal protection, rational basis standard." 120 S.Ct. at 647.
Second, the Court examined the legislative record of ADEA and concluded that
"Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response to a per-
haps inconsequential problem." Id at 648-49. The Court chided plaintiffs-petitioners for
presenting evidentiary record that "falls well short of the mark," that is, of "any pattern of
age discrimination by the States." Id. As described by the majority, such insufficient evi-
dence consisted "almost entirely of isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legis-
lative reports," as well as a report on age discrimination practices in the State of California
and in the private industry. The Court appeared to count for naught the legislators' state-
ments about constituent correspondence detailing multiple and systemic violations of the
elderlies' constitutional rights by state agencies. To buttress its point, the majority pointed
out that Senator Bentsen actually relied on press articles about age discrimination by fed-
eral agencies while touting extending ADEA protections to the states. The Court also
found that California's purported violations, standing alone, "would have been insufficient
to support Congress' 1974 extension of the ADEA to every State of the Union." 120 S.Ct.
at 649. Finally, findings of private-sector violations were "beside the point," for Congress
made no findings regarding the States and "extrpolat[ion]" of findings from the private to
the public sector was doubtful. See id.
The Court's analysis confirms that, in considering legislation modifying Williamson's
ripeness requirements, Congress must provide as much specificity as possible regarding the
states in which the violations occur. It would do Congress little good to cite, for example,
cases involving state agencies or creatures of an interstate compact as evidentiary justifica-
tion for takings bills that appear to local agencies and municipalities.
The Justices in Kimel also debated the availability of remedies under state anti-dis-
crimination laws. The majority did not rely on the availability of state remedies in its
application of the "congruence and proportionality" text, but invoked it apparently to con-
sole the public about the long-range policy implications of rendering federal ADEA pro-
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tections unenforceable. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, observed "[o]ur decision
today does not signal the end of the line for employees who find themselves subject to age
discrimination at the hands of their state employers,... [because s]tate employees are
protected by state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their
state employers, in almost every State of the Union. Those avenues of relief remain avail-
able today, just as they were before this decision." Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 650.
The problem immediately posed for Congress by the Court's statement is that these
remedies were not nearly as available at the time of the enactment of ADEA Amendments
in 1974 as they were at the time of the decision in the year 2000. In 1974, state remedies
for age discrimination varied widely and were available against public employers only in 24
states. See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 651, n.2. Four dissenting Justices observed, in our opinion
correctly, that "[w]henever Congress passes a statute, it does so against the background of
state law already in place; the propriety of taking national action is thus measured by the
metric of existing state norms that Congress seeks to supplement or supplant." Id. at 651.
(opinion of Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in
part.
Logically, the Court's observation on state remedies appears to be dicta, for it is
nearly impossible to reconcile the present-look approach with the Court's focus on discern-
ing legislative intent. Nevertheless, both sides engaged in the takings debate must carefully
examine comparable legislative protections at the state level. Congress should identify the
various kinds of protections for private property rights available under state statutes and
make finding on whether those protections are adequate to redress the different constitu-
tional violations cognizable under the Due Process Clause and the Just Compensation
Clause. In September of 1997, while H.R. 1534 was percolating through the House Judici-
ary Committee, its Subcommittee on the Constitution actually conducted such a hearing.
See State Approaches to Protecting Private Property Rights: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 58-268 (1997). The
purpose of the hearing was "to examine State approaches to protecting private property
owners by providing compensatory or regulatory relief." Id at 7 (Statement of Chairman
Charles T. Canady). The testimony from the hearing noted considerable diversity of state
protections for property rights. About twenty States have adopted some form of property
rights protections, although some have later rescinded their protections through referenda
or otherwise. See, e.g. id. at 87, 101 (Statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason
University) (listing 17 States); id. at 106-107 (Statement of Prof. Harvey M. Jacobs, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin) (citing references listing up to 25 States); id. at 120 (Statement of Nancie
G. Marzulla, President and Chief Legal Counsel, Defenders of Property Rights) (22
States). There are several recognized categories of state laws, including: (1) takings impact
assessment bills, (2) compensation bills; (3) conflict resolution bills, or (4) combinations of
any or all of the above. See id. at 106-111 (Statement of Prof. Jacobs); id. at 131 (Statement
of Ms. Marzulla); see also id. at 12-21 (Statement of former Florida State Rep. Dean Saun-
ders) and 45-51 (Statement of South Carolina State Rep. Chip Campsen) (discussing alter-
natives considered). The record reflected that these laws vary widely in the scope of
government actors and actions covered, the relief provided, and the practical impact on
decisions of land use regulators. See id. at 23-27. (Statement of New Hampshire State Sen.
Richard L. Russman); id. at 27-44 (Statement of Jane Cameron Hayman, Deputy Gen.
Counsel, Florida League of Cities); id. at 88, 100-101 (Statement of Prof. Eagle); id. at 102-
103 (Statement of Prof. Jacobs); and id. at 141-145 (Statement of Ms. Marzulla). These
statutes do not universally provide the kind of availability of judicial redress for constitu-
tional violations that the Court found so comforting in KimeL Congress should view simi-
lar hearings as part and parcel of its deliberations on the takings legislation and tailor the
legislation to the considered evils.
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2. The applicability of the Court's two-part test to H.R. 1534"s
exhaustion provision
To decide if H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision falls within Section
5, we must initially determine whether the provision would even get a
chance to meet the Court's two-part test. One could plausibly argue
that, the exhaustion provision should not get that chance but should
instead be found, as a threshold matter, to lie outside of Section 5.
First, none of the legislative material cited Section 5 as a basis for the
exhaustion provision.386 Second, the provision was designed to over-
rule Williamson's holding on the exhaustion issue.387 Although these
facts pose problems for the provision when it is analyzed under the
two-part test for Section 5 legislation, they do not preclude that
analysis.
a. Congress' failure specifically to invoke Section 5
For a long time, the lower federal courts and commentators have
believed that Congress does not need to invoke Section 5 for a law to
be upheld under Section 5.388 That belief rests primarily on EEOC v.
Wyoming.38 9 There, the Court rejected the notion that "Congress
need anywhere recite the words 'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amend-
ment"' for a law to be upheld under Section 5.390 The Court ex-
plained that "the nature of [udicial] review of congressional
legislation defended on the basis of * * * § 5" demands only that the
court "be able to discern some legislative purpose or factual predicate
that supports the exercise of" Section 5.391 This portion of the Court's
opinion was dictum.3 9 2 Nonetheless, most lower courts and commen-
386. See infra notes 390-406 and accompanying text.
387. See infra notes 407-418 and accompanying text.
388. See Richard H. Seamon, Damages for Unconstitutional Affirmative Action: An
Analysis of the Monetary Claims in Hopwood v. Texas, 71 TEMPLE L. Rnv. 839, 870 n.188
(1998) (citing case law); Jacqueline D. Ewenstein, Seminole Tribe: Are States Free to Pirate
Copyrights With Impunity?, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 91, 114 (1997) (asserting that "it
is irrelevant whether Congress mentions the Fourteenth Amendment in the legislative text
or legislative history of a statute"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. Rnv. 163,
172 n.59 (1998) (commenting that, "when Congress legislates under Section 5, it need not
do so explicitly").
389. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
390. Id. at 243-44 n.18.
391. Id.
392. The Court in EEOC v. Wyoming held that, as applied in the case before it, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") was a "valid exercise of Congress' powers
under the Commerce Clause." 460 U.S. at 243. The Court accordingly found it unneces-
sary to decide whether the ADEA "could also be upheld under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. Thus, it was likewise unnecessary for the Court to discuss whether Con-
Fall 19991
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
tators have assumed that the dictum was solid, even after the Court
applied strict scrutiny in Boerne to a law challenged as exceeding Con-
gress' power under Section 5.393
After Florida Prepaid, that assumption may no longer be war-
ranted. In a footnote to its opinion, the Florida Prepaid Court refused
to consider whether the Patent Remedy Act could be upheld under
Section 5 on the theory that it enforced the Just Compensation
Clause.3 94 The Court observed that "[t]here is no suggestion in the
language of the statute itself, or in the House or Senate Reports of the
bill which became the statute, that Congress had in mind the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.139  The Court deter-
mined that, "[s]ince Congress was so explicit about invoking its au-
thority under Article I and its authority to prevent a State from
depriving a person of property without due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment," Congress' failure specifically to rely on the
Just Compensation Clause "preclude[d] consideration of [it] as a basis
for the Patent Remedy Act. '396
It is hard to know what to make of this. The Court might have
meant to adopt a hard-and-fast rule that requires Congress not only to
say that it is relying on Section 5 but also to specify which Fourteenth
Amendment right it intends to enforce. On the other hand, the Court
might have meant only as a matter of prudence to decline to entertain
a theory that seems to have been devised for the first time in litigation
and that did not occur to Congress despite Congress' careful consider-
ation of the constitutional source of its power to enact the statute.
The latter, prudential interpretation seems more likely given the
Court's treatment of the issue in a footnote. The narrower, prudential
interpretation is also more consistent with the dictum in EEOC v. Wy-
oming. Narrowly read, the Florida Prepaid footnote appears to reflect
prudential concerns related to "the nature of judicial review, '3 97
gress must express an intent to rely on Section 5 for a law to be upheld under that grant of
congressional power. At least one commentator has nonetheless described the Court's
discussion as a "holding." Ewenstein, supra note 390, at 114. The authors of this article
respectfully disagree with that description.
393. See, e.g., Brown v. North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 703 (4th
Cir. 1999) (in determining whether statute fell within Section 5, court did not need to find
that Congress specifically cited Section 5 as basis for the statute; citing EEOC v. Wyo-
ming); Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v. Department of Revenue Oregon, 139 F.3d 1259,
1265-66 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Rotunda, supra note 390, at 172 n.59 (same).
394. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243-44 n.18.
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rather than categorical precepts about how Congress should legislate.
The EEOC v. Wyoming dictum likewise required Congress to provide
evidence of an intent to rely on Section 5 only to the extent required
by "the nature of judicial review."3 98 Whatever it means exactly, the
Florida Prepaid footnote makes it important for Congress to express
clearly its intention to rely on Section 5.
It is debatable whether the 105th Congress spoke with enough
clarity in proposing to eliminate the exhaustion requirement. On the
one hand, neither the text of H.R. 1534 nor its supporters expressly
relied on Section 5.399 On the other hand, both the text of the bill and
the legislative material showed that it was meant to enforce the right
to just compensation.4 °" It appears that Congress omitted reference
to Section 5 because of its belief that Congress' rulemaking power
supported H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision.40 1 This article has ar-
gued that this belief is erroneous.4 °" The belief is certainly under-
standable, though, given the Supreme Court's own unexplained
suggestions that Congress can freely eliminate prudential rules.40 3 In
these circumstances, the Supreme Court would not be in the best posi-
tion to refuse to consider whether the exhaustion requirement falls
within Section 5.1°
398. Id.
399. Cf Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208 n.7.
400. See, e.g., 144 Cong. Rec. S8037 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Gramm)
("The real issue before us is that there are * * * many locally elected officials who do not
support our fifth amendment rights."); 143 CONG. REc. H8940 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997)
(remarks of Rep. Coble) ("H.R. 1534 is about Congress' duty to implement the 5th and
14th amendments to the Constitution[, which] * * * protects individuals from having their
private property 'taken' by the Government without receiving just compensation."); id. at
H8944 (remarks of Rep. Hutchinson) (identifying just compensation principle as one of
two principles "at stake in" H.R. 1534); id. at H8959 (remarks of Rep. Stenholm) (para-
phrasing Just Compensation Clause and describing H.R. 1534 as "guarantee[ing] the pro-
tection of the fifth amendment"); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 6 (1998) (identifying one purpose
of H.R. 1534 as "to provide private property owners claiming a violation of the fifth
amendment's taking clause some certainty as to when they may file the claim in Federal
court"); H.R. REP. No. 105-323, at 3 (1997) (same); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 2
(statement of Rep. Coble) ("This bill [Le., H.R. 1534] is about the Congress' duty to imple-
ment the fifth amendment to the Constitution.").
401. See supra notes 308-324 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 325-343 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 312-324 and accompanying text (discussing and citing precedent
establishing Congress' broad power to eliminate prudential justiciability rules).
404. Cf Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction
Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 63, 93 (1997) (arguing that it "would prove use-
lessly formalistic" to invalidate a federal statute just because Congress passed it under the
"wrong' power").
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b. Congress' intent to "overrule" Williamson
No one can read Boerne without sensing the Court's indignation
at Congress' attempt in the RFRA to overrule Smith.4 °5 One might
initially think that similar indignation would greet a law that overruled
Williamson's holding on the exhaustion issue.40 6 Indeed, both laws
change the "substance" of constitutional law in a sense.40 7 That is not
fatal, however, for the Court has not condemned every law defended
as an exercise of Section 5 that in some sense could be said to change
the substance of constitutional law.
In Boerne, the Court defined an impermissibly substantive law as
one that was not congruent or proportional to the constitutional viola-
tions that the law aimed to remedy or prevent.408 In other words, the
Court used the term "substantive" merely to denote a law that failed
what, in Florida Prepaid, became a two-part test.40 9 Thus, if someone
challenging a law shows that it fails that test, the law will be labeled
"substantive" and, hence, found to exceed Congress' Section 5 power.
But it does not work the other way: A person challenging a law can-
not establish that the law exceeds Section 5 by arguing, without refer-
ence to the two-part test, that the law is substantive in some sense.
This is clear from the Court's reaffirmance of its voting rights
cases in Boerne and Florida Prepaid.41 0 One such case upheld, as
405. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535-36 (last paragraph of majority opinion ending
with the statement that "it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control").
406. See S. RnP. No. 105-242, at 38 (1998) (minority report) (H.R. 1534 "attempt[s] to
overturn the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County"); Senate Hearing, supra
note 39, at 117 (reproducing Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial
Conference of U.S., to Rep. Howard Coble, Chairman, House Judiciary Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property (Sept. 29, 1997), stating Judicial Conference's position
that, by "allow[ing] cases to be fied in federal court before the property owner has pur-
sued all available remedies at the state level," H.R. 1534 "would be contrary to the princi-
ples annunciated [sic] in" Williamson).
407. See supra notes 180-267 and accompanying text (explaining why H.R. 1534's ex-
haustion provision can fairly be characterized as changing "substance" of takings law).
408. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lack-
ing such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.") (em-
phasis added).
409. See id.; id. at 532 ("RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or pre-
ventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, uncon-
stitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional
protections."); see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206-07 (construing Boerne to require
two-part test for federal statute defended as exercise of Section 5 power).
410. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (contrasting conduct to which Patent Rem-
edy Act responded with "the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic § 5
legislation"); Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-27, 530-34 (same); see also, e.g., South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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within Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, a fed-
eral law that prohibited all literacy tests for voting despite the Court's
holding that only tests adopted or maintained with invidious intent
violate the Fifteenth Amendment. 41 1 The literacy-test ban was "sub-
stantive" in the sense that it invalidated tests without proof of a neces-
sary element of a constitutional violation.412 The Court has explained
that the law nevertheless fell within Congress' enforcement power be-
cause it was congruent and proportional to the constitutional viola-
tions at which the law was aimed.413 Although the literacy-test ban
was an exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, the Court's rationale for upholding the ban applies to Congress'
"parallel" power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.41_4
H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision was substantive in roughly the
same way as was the federal statutory ban on literacy tests. The statu-
tory ban on literacy tests authorized federal courts to grant a remedy
(invalidation) in cases that did not involve a violation of the Constitu-
tion: namely, cases involving literacy tests that were not adopted or
maintained with invidious intent.41 5 Similarly, the exhaustion provi-
sion would have authorized a federal-court remedy without proof of
an element (exhaustion of state-court compensation remedies) that
would otherwise be required to establish a constitutional violation. If
anything, though, the exhaustion provision was less "substantive" than
the literacy-test ban. The exhaustion provision would have authorized
a judicial remedy (an award of just compensation) only in cases in
which the Constitution required that remedy: namely, cases in which
a taking was proven.
411. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308,333-34; Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (discussing these two cases).
412. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980) (stating that South
Carolina v. Katzenbach "makes clear that Congress may * * * prohibit state action that,
though in itself not violative of [the Fifteenth Amendment], perpetuates the effects of past
discrimination").
413. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526 (describing South Carolina v. Katzenbach and later
cases as recognizing "the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive measures to
respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights"); il. at 530
("The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil
presented. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted re-
sponse to another, lesser one.") (citing Katzenbach); see also Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at
2210 (quoting, in part, these passages from Boerne).
414. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (describing Congress' power to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment in light of precedent on Congress' "parallel power" to enforce Fifteenth
Amendment). Compare U.S. CONsr. amend. XV, § 2 ("The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.") with U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5 (sub-
stantially identical wording).
415. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 176.
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Thus, the opponents of H.R. 1534 were right to say that H.R.
1534's exhaustion provision made "substantive" changes in the law of
takings.416 Nonetheless, that does not resolve the question whether
the provision fell within Section 5. The resolution of that question
turns on whether the provision satisfied the two-part test of Florida
Prepaid.
3. Application of the Court's two-part test to H.R. 1534"s exhaustion
provision
a. Evidence of Fourteenth Amendment violations
Under part one of the Florida Prepaid test, "we must first identify
the Fourteenth Amendment 'evil' or 'wrong' that Congress intended
to remedy."4 7 A "critical part" of this identification process is assess-
ing evidence that the evil or wrong actually existed.41 8 When we apply
this process to H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision, we conclude that the
evidence of constitutional violations did not satisfy part one of the
Florida Prepaid test.
The main concern of the supporters of H.R. 1534 was that people
were not getting just compensation for takings by local land-use agen-
cies.4 19 They believed that there were two main causes of this prob-
lem. First, some local agencies used long and complicated procedures
for reaching a final decision about permissible land uses.420 Second,
416. See supra notes 111-15 (citing instances in which opponents of H.R. 1534 attacked
it as changing "substance" of takings law); see also supra notes 180-267 (discussing prece-
dent establishing that Williamson's exhaustion requirement is substantive in the sense that
exhaustion is an element of cause of action for violation of Just Compensation Clause).
417. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
418. Id. at 2210.
419. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-242, at 10 (1998) (stating that, under current law, "prop-
erty owners * * * are effectively denied their fifth amendment rights"); see also supra note
402 and accompanying text (explaining that purpose of H.R. 1534 was to enforce Just Com-
pensation Clause against local agencies).
420. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. 58040 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Many localities have erected labyrinths of hurdles that property owners must go through
before a final decision is rendered on the disposition of the uses of their property. As a
result, federal takings claims rarely ripen but instead are usually choked-off on the vine by
weeds of bureaucratic red tape and regulatory review."); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 6 (1998)
(identifying one main purpose of H.R. 1534 as "to provide private property owners * * *
some certainty as to when they may file the [taking] claim in Federal Court" and stating
that this purpose was accomplished by, among other things, "defin[ing] when a final agency
decision has occurred"); id. at 10 (asserting that "property owners * * * are effectively
denied their fifth amendment rights" because process for obtaining final decision from
local agency "can take years"); id. at 22 ("Currently, a property owner can go through
multiple attempts to get a permit without ever getting a definite answer as to what the
property owner can or cannot do on the property owner's property.").
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federal courts used the takings-ripeness doctrine to avoid deciding the
merits of takings claims against local agencies in most cases.421
The second cause cannot support Section 5 legislation. Section 5
empowers Congress to remedy or prevent only violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Federal courts cannot violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by refusing to decide takings claims against local agen-
cies, because the Amendment is aimed exclusively at state, not fed-
eral, action.4' Of course, the federal courts have refused to decide
these claims at the instance of defendant local agencies relying on the
takings-ripeness doctrine.423 Still, one can hardly fault these defendant
agencies, much less charge them with violating the Fourteenth
Amendment, for taking advantage of the takings-ripeness doctrine de-
veloped by the federal courts. Thus, the use of Section 5 to support
H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision must rest on the other problem iden-
tified by the bills' supporters: the procedures used by local agencies to
reach a final decision.
Congress had scant evidence that these procedures were constitu-
tionally inadequate.42 4 Most of the evidence before Congress con-
cerned two propositions: (1) federal courts usually dispose of
regulatory taking claims, often on ripeness grounds, without reaching
the merits of the claims; and (2) it takes an average of about 10 years
for a regulatory takings claimant to pursue a case from the local
agency to completion in federal court.4' The evidence on the first
421. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. S8022 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Many citizens who attempt to protect their property rights guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment * * * are barred from the doors of the federal courthouse. "); id (one pur-
pose of H.R. 1534 is to "address[ ] the procedural hurdles * * * which currently prevent
[takings claimants] from having fair and equal access to federal court"); id. at 8023-24 (dis-
cussing failure of federal courts to address takings claims against local land-use agencies on
the merits).
422. See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 (1973) ("actions of the Fed-
eral Government and its officers are beyond the purview of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment").
423. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 69 (testimony of attorney Jeff Garvin)
("[W]hat has happened in Florida, and * * * across the country is the governmental agen-
cies, a lot of them, use the existing case law on jurisdiction as a means of keeping the case
from being heard on the merits.").
424. See 143 CONG. REc. H8941 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Lofgren)
(referring to "the absence of any quantitative evidence that justifies this [Le., H.R. 1534's]
massive intrusion into States [sic] rights"); H. REP. No. 105-323, at 16 (minority report,
stating, "There is no hard or quantifiable data which supports this ill-considered intrusion
into the law of takings.").
425. See 144 CONG. REc. S8034 (daily ed. July 13,1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (under
current ripeness law, property owners "have to go 91/2 years to vindicate their claims"); 143
CONG. RaC. S12482 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Gorton) ("More than 80
percent of the time when property owners try to access Federal courts, they are thrown out
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point cannot support the use of Section 5, for the reason discussed
above: It does not involve misconduct by state actors. The evidence
on the second point might have been relevant if it had shown how
much of the 10 year period is spent seeking a final decision from the
local agency or just compensation in state court. Undue delay in those
processes might well violate the Fourteenth Amendment.426 As it
was, however, the evidence did not provide a breakdown.4 7
There was anecdotal evidence of delays by local agencies in mak-
ing land use decisions, but it suffers from several problems.4' First,
on procedural grounds * * *. Of the 20 percent who are successful in having their cases
heard in Federal court, it takes an average of nearly 10 years of litigation and negotiation
to get it through the process."); id. at E2100 (remarks of Rep. Hill) (to the same effect); id.
at H8947 (remarks of Rep. Pryce) (to the same effect); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 9 (1998)
(citing article by Gregory Overstreet, supra note 30, and describing it as "conclud[ing] that
federal judges had avoided reaching a determination on the merits in a takings claim for
ripeness reasons in over 94 percent of all takings cases litigated between 1983-88"; also
citing study of more recent reported federal court cases finding that "over 80% of the
takings cases originating in the U.S. district courts between 1990-97 were dismissed before
the merits were ever reached due to the ripeness doctrine"); House Hearing, supra note 70,
at 52 (prepared statement of Donald Betsworth, President, N.C. Home Builders Ass'n, on
behalf of National Ass'n of Home Builders, referring to study showing that "over 80 per-
cent of all compensation claims in Federal district court never get a hearing on the merits"
and that "it takes on average some ten years to gain a hearing on the merits"); id. at 168-86
(reproducing Memorandum from John J. Delaney and Duane J. Desiderio, Linowes &
Blocher law firm, to Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of House Judiciary
Comm. (Sept. 22, 1997), surveying federal case law and concluding, id. at 169, that "[o]f
those 12 Appellate Cases where takings claims were found ripe, it took property owners,
on the average, 9.5 years to have an appellate court reach its determination") (emphasis
omitted); Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 22-38 (same).
426. See Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923) (Just Compen-
sation Clause is satisfied by "prompt" ascertainment and payment of compensation); cf.,
e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654-55 (1992) (delay at certain stages in crimi-
nal process can violate due process); Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 267
(1987) (delay in civil regulatory process at issue could violate due process); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (same).
427. Cf. S. REP. No. 105-242, at 10 (1998) (stating that process of getting final decision
from local land-use agency "can take years for property owners who are left in regulatory
limbo").
428. See, e.g.,144 CONG. REc. S8023 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch)
(describing Schulz, 849 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd in part & rev'd in part, 98 F.3d
1346 (9th Cir. 1996), in which "property owners submitted a total of thirteen (13) revised
plans over 3 years to renovate their home" without obtaining local agency's approval); S.
Rep. No. 105-242, at 8 (1998) (also citing Schulz as case illustrating need for legislation);
143 CoNG. REc. E2100 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Hill) (describing a pro-
ject that took local officials eleven and a half years to approve); id. at H8942 (describing a
land-use dispute that lasted five years at the local-agency level); Senate Hearing, supra note
39, at 16-18 (testimony of Jeff Garvin) (attorney describing six years that his clients spent
seeking approval from local bodies for land use); id. at 43 (reproducing Letter from John J.
Delaney and Duane Desiderio, Linowes & Blocher, to Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney
General, DOJ (Sept. 5, 1997), that cited three cases involving lengthy or improper agency
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long delays do not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment. It
depends on how long they are and what causes them.42 9 Without in-
formation on those points, it is not even clear that the delays to which
the legislative material referred had a "significant likelihood" of being
unconstitutional.430 Second, even supporters of H.R. 1534 acknowl-
edged that the anecdotes were exceptional and that most local land-
use agencies behave responsibly.431 Indeed, the exceptional nature of
action on private land-use proposals). In addition to this anecdotal evidence of local
agency delay, H.R. 1534 included a finding that "local authorities, through complex, costly,
repetitive and unconstitutional permitting, variance, and licensing procedures, have denied
property owners their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights." H.R. 1534, § 2(8), 105th
Cong. (as reported in Sen. on Feb. 26, 1998). That finding deserves weight, but it would not
prevent the Court from examining the underlying evidence. See Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63
(1995). After all, if legislative findings were conclusive, the ability of statutes to withstand
constitutional challenges would depend in large part on the ingenuity of legislative staff.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12; Max Kidalov, Recent Developments in Legislative Law,
H. 3591: Affirming Traditional Principles of Protection of Private Property and the Environ-
ment, 6 S.C. ENvTu. LI. 295,301 (1997) (Lucas makes clear that legislative findings cannot
be used as a "clever way to justify regulatory growth" without regard to Just Compensation
Clause).
429. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (holding that plaintiff did not establish viola-
tion of due process by relying on 9-month delay in administrative adjudication, because
plaintiff did not explain the reason for the delay); see also United States v. Eight Thousand
Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in U.S. Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 562-65 (1983)
(adopting multi-factor test for determining whether government's delay in filing forfeiture
action violated due process, under which reason for, and length of, delay, among other
factors, would be considered).
430. Cf. Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 ("it simply cannot be said" that state actions
subject to Patent Remedy Act "have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional");
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 ("Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congres-
sional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional."). The Senate
Report on H.R. 1534 observed that "local land-use authorities * * * can abuse the system
by purposely withholding a final agency decision." S. REP. No. 105-242, at 10 (1998). The
report did not cite any evidence that such deliberate delays were occurring. Cf. id. at 29
(minority report asserting that, "[n]o evidence has been presented to support the thinly
veiled suggestions * * * that local governments are either incompetent or routinely act in
bad faith in their dealings with developers"). Some witnesses at the legislative hearings on
H.R. 1534, however, did assert that local agencies were guilty of deliberate delay or other
abuses. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 49 (prepared statement of Professor Daniel
R. Mandelker) (asserting that "[lI]and-use agencies across the country have applied the
ripeness requirement to frustrate as-applied takings claims in federal court" and describing
three such cases); House Hearing, supra note 70, at 68 (same); id. at 49-50 (prepared state-
ment of Donald Betsworth, President, North Carolina Homebuilders Association, on be-
half of National Association of Homebuilders) (stating that "government agencies * * * do
not always act in good faith when making land use decisions"; describing one case in which
agency required land owners to dedicate almost half of their parcel as condition for subdi-
viding it).
431. See 143 CONG. REc. S12482 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Gorton)
(while complaining about federal court delays in processing takings claims, asserting that
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the instances of agency delay seems to be confirmed by the fact that
the same instances, amounting only to a handful, were repeatedly
cited by different supporters of H.R. 1534.432 There is a final problem
with the evidence of constitutional violations supporting H.R. 1534's
exhaustion provision; the problem is intertwined with the need for
"congruence" between the exhaustion provision and the established
violations.433 Even proof of a pattern of unconstitutional delays by
local agencies would not have supported H.R. 1534's exhaustion pro-
vision. That is because the exhaustion provision would not have alle-
viated delays by local agencies. The exhaustion provision would have
avoided only the delays that takings claimants would otherwise en-
counter in state courts.434 To support the exhaustion provision, Con-
"[m]ost State and local governments use their power responsibly, respecting the rights of
private property owners when making land use decisions"); id. at H8942 (remarks of Rep.
Canady) ("In most zoning cases, * * * abuse does not occur."); id. at 8945 (remarks of Rep.
Gallegly) ("Most government agencies use [land-use] powers very responsibly."); Senate
Hearing, supra note 39, at 73 (testimony of Hal Daub, Mayor of Omaha, Nebraska) ("It is
not an issue of impugning anyone's integrity or arguing if someone operates in bad faith or
even maybe intentionally in a dilatory matter, in my opinion, because I think all local
officials that are appointed by mayors and city councils, and city attorneys and county
attorneys, are all trying to do the right thing."); see also House Hearing, supra note 70, at
35 (testimony of John C. Dwyer, Acting Assoc. Attorney General, DOJ) ("The 'horror'
stories that are recounted in support of H.R. 1534 are few in number. There seems to be
little, if any, evidence of a systemic nationwide problem.").
432. Seven cases illustrative of the need for H.R. 1534's ripeness provision were cited at
least three times, and as many as seven times, in the legislative material on H.R. 1534 or
one of the other bills in the 105th Congress that contained a ripeness provision: (1) Suitum,
520 U.S. 725, cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8024 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch); 143 CONG. Rc. H8945 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1997) (remarks of Rep. Gallegly); S.
REP. No. 105-242, at 10-11; Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 43; House Hearing, supra
note 70, at 46, 164, 188-89; (2) Schulz, 849 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1994), affd in part &
rev'd in part, 98 F.3d 1346 (9th Cir. 1996), cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8023 (daily ed. July 13,
1998) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 8; Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at
42,55; (3) Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
987 (1993), cited in 144 CONG. REC. S8023 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen.
Hatch); S. REP. No. 105-242, at 8; Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 42,55; House Hearing,
supra note 70, at 74,163; (4) Santa Fe Village Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 914 F. Supp.
478 (D.N.M. 1995), cited in 144 CONG. REc. S8023 (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. REP. No.
105-242, at 9; Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 44, 57; House Hearing, supra note 70, at 76,
165-66; (5) Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496 (9th
Cir. 1990), cited in Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 42, 49, 55 ; House Hearing, supra note
70, at 68, 163; (6) Glendon Energy Co. v. Borough of Glendon, 836 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Pa.
1993), cited in Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 43, 50; House Hearing, supra note 70, at
68-69; (7) Healing v. California Coastal Comm'n, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 758 (Cal. App. 1994),
cited in Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 43, 50; House Hearing, supra note 70, at 69, 164-
65.
433. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (articulating "congruence" requirement).
434. One of the legislative findings in H.R. 1534 implicitly recognized that delays by
local agencies were addressed by the bill's modification of the final decision requirement
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gress needed evidence of unconstitutional delays or other
constitutional violations in the compensation procedures provided in
state courts.435 Congress had no such evidence when it considered
H.R. 1534.436
Congress would get no help from evidence that regulatory takings
by state and local governments were widespread.437 That evidence
does not support legislation under Section 5 because it does not estab-
lish violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just as a state's in-
fringement of a patent does not by itself violate the Due Process
Clause of Fourteenth Amendment,438 a state or local government's
regulatory taking of property does not by itself violate the Just Com-
pensation Clause.4 3 9 A violation of the Just Compensation Clause oc-
rather than by its elimination of the exhaustion requirement. See H.R. 1534, § 2(8), 105th
Cong. (as reported in Sen. on Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that local land-use procedures "have
denied property owners their fifth and fourteenth amendment rights," and that, "to safe-
guard those rights, there is a need to determine what constitutes a final decision of an
agency in order to allow claimants the ability to protect their property rights in a court of
law").
435. Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746-48 (1974) (holding that even "seri-
ous problems of delay" that plaintiff would encounter in seeking administrative, followed
by judicial, relief for allegedly illegal action of Internal Revenue Service did not violate
Due Process Clause).
436. There were some "assertion[s] ** * that state courts in the large majority of states
are biased in favor of local land-use regulators." Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 89. The
supporters of H.R. 1534 offered no evidence in support of these assertions, however. See S.
REP. No. 105-242, at 29 (1998) (minority report stating that there was no evidence "to
suggest state courts lack the competence to fairly and efficiently address takings claims");
Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 89 (reproducing Congressional Research Service Report,
which found no "published empirical study clearly supporting the assertion of state-court
bias on land-use matters"). In contrast to the scant evidence of constitutional violations
supporting H.R. 1534, abundant evidence of such violations has supported some other
modem federal statutes, such as Section 306 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act, that have been upheld by lower federal courts under Section 5. See, e.g.,
Oregon Short Line R.R. Co. v. Department of Revenue Or., 139 F.3d 1259, 1265-67 (9th
Cir. 1998); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass'n of Am. R.R. in Support of Respondent at
19-22, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct.
2199 (1999) (No. 98-531).
437. See, e.g., House Hearing, supra note 70, at 49-50 (prepared statement of Donald
Betsworth, President, North Carolina Homebuilders Ass'n, on behalf of National Associa-
tion of Homebuilders) (describing "typical scenario" in which local agency required land
owners to dedicate almost half of their property in return for permission to subdivide
land); see also H.R. 1534, § 2(1) (as reported in Sen., Feb. 26, 1998) (finding that "property
rights have been abrogated by the application of laws, regulations, and other actions by all
levels of government that adversely affect the value and the ability to make reasonable use
of private property").
438. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208.
439. See, e.g., Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195.
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curs only when the state fails to provide just compensation or
adequate procedures for getting it.4 0
b. Congruence and proportionality
Suppose that Congress could amass evidence that would satisfy
the first part of the Florida Prepaid test. The evidence would have to
show that states lacked adequate procedures for compensating regula-
tory takings by their local agencies. Thus, suppose the evidence
showed that state compensation procedures were almost always in-
credibly lengthy and expensive, and that those procedures often re-
sulted either in decisions erroneously finding that no taking had
occurred, or in awards that under-compensated the victims of regula-
tory takings.441 Also assume that the length, expense, and error rate
440. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195 ("The recognition that a property owner has not
suffered a violation of the Just Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation through the procedures provided by the State for
obtaining such compensation is analogous to the Court's holding in Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 * * * (1981)," where Court held that violation of Due Process Clause did not
occur until state had failed to provide remedy for state officer's tort); see also Del Monte,
119 S. Ct. at 1641 ("Even when the government takes property without initiating condem-
nation proceedings, there is no constitutional violation 'unless or until the state fails to
provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the property loss."') (quoting Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 n-12 (1984), a procedural due process case following Parratt).
441. The Williamson exhaustion requirement appears to require a takings claimant to
exhaust only those state procedures that can lead to compensation, such as suits in inverse
condemnation. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 195-96. It is conceivable, however, that states
could attempt to require a takings claimant, as a prerequisite to invoking state compensa-
tion procedures, to bring a separate proceeding to determine whether the action chal-
lenged as a taking was authorized under state law. The rationale for such a requirement
would be that a compensable taking can occur only through action that is governmentally
authorized. See United States v. North Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333
(1920) ("In order that the government shall be liable [for just compensation] it must ap-
pear that the officer who has physically taken possession of the property was duly author-
ized so to do * * *."); Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 333-34 (1910) (to the same
effect); Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (applying same principle to regulatory taking claim). Many states have statutes akin
to the federal Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et. seq., to deter-
mine whether an official's action is authorized by state law. See, e.g., BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADmn SAnlsrV LAw § 1.13, at 32-33 (3rd ed. 1991). In proceedings under
such state administrative procedure acts, a state court may not be able to award just com-
pensation. See, e.g., supra note 169 (citing Illinois case law to this effect). If states on a
widespread basis required takings claimants to resort to APA-style review, and if that re-
quirement significantly increased the time and money needed to exhaust state compensa-
tion remedies, Congress might have the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to allow takings claimants who had gotten a final decision to bypass state
procedures by filing in federal court. See United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S.
645, 656 (1884) (holding that, even though government erred by appropriating property
without bringing formal condemnation proceedings, plaintiff can "elect[ ] to regard the ac-
tion of the government as a taking" and seek just compensation); see also Del-Rio Drilling,
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were so large that they violated the Fourteenth Amendment.442
Given such evidence, the elimination of exhaustion requirement pro-
posed in H.R. 1534 would have been sufficiently tailored to remedying
or preventing these violations that it would satisfy the second part of
the Florida Prepaid test."3
Most importantly, the exhaustion provision would not create any
new liability.4 " It would merely allow federal courts to hear inverse-
condemnation claims that would otherwise have to be heard initially
in state court. Thus, the exhaustion provision would give the claimant
the option of a federal forum, but the claimant would still have to
prove a regulatory taking to recover just compensation." 5 In this re-
spect, the exhaustion provision would have worked like the provisions
in the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA") that eliminate the prudential
standing rules for plaintiffs asserting certain violations of the FHA.4 6
The FHA fell within Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment,' 7 which parallels Congress' power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment." 8 The Court has not specifically linked the
FHA's elimination of prudential standing rules to the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court's precedent is
consistent with such a linkage, however, and reflects a valid use of that
enforcement power.449
Because it would not have created any new liability, H.R. 1534's
exhaustion provision differed from the federal laws struck down in
146 F.3d at 1363-64 (holding that plaintiff could sue for a taking even if government action
was "legally flawed in some respect," as long as government action was not ultra vires).
442. Cf. Stearns Co., Ltd. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264, 272 (1995) (administrative
procedures for property-use can be so burdensome that they violate the Just Compensation
Clause).
443. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207 ("for Congress to invoke § 5, it * * * must
tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing" identified violations of Fourteenth
Amendment).
444. See H.R. 1534, 105th Cong. § 6(c) (proposed 28 U.S.C. § 1343(f), providing that
"[n]othing in [specified subsections, including exhaustion provision] alters the substantive
law of takings of property, including the burden of proof borne by the plaintiff"); see also,
e.g., 144 CONG. Rc. S8040 (daily ed. July 13, 1998) (remarks of Sen. Coverdell) (S 2271
"does not define a 'taking' or establish a trigger for when compensation is due").
445. See S. REP. No. 105-242, at 19 (1998) (stating that "it is extremely difficult to prove
a takings claim, and this bill does not in any way redefine what constitutes a taking").
446. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,372 (1982); Gladstone Realtors
v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
447. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 439 (1968).
448. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 344-49 (1879) (discussing enforce-
ment powers of 13th and 14th Amendment in similar terms).
449. See Engdahl, supra note 124, at 166 (arguing that enforcement power of Thirteenth
Amendment supports FHA provisions eliminating prudential standing rules).
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Boerne and Florida Prepaid. The RFRA imposed liability on state
and local governments (and created defenses to legal proceedings
brought by them) based on conduct for which the Constitution did not
impose liability.45 Similarly, the Patent Remedy Act imposed liabil-
ity for state conduct-patent infringement-that did not always trig-
ger liability under the Due Process Clause." The liability-creating
features of the RFRA and the Patent Remedy Act diminished the
congruence between those statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment
violations at which they were aimed.452 H.R. 1534's exhaustion provi-
sion did not have that problem.
H.R. 1534's exhaustion provision might have put additional bur-
dens on local governments, but the burdens would not have invali-
dated the provision. Specifically, the exhaustion provision might have
exposed local agencies to more litigation, especially if taking claimants
thought they stood a better chance of getting relief in federal court
than in state court. Moreover, the additional litigation in federal court
might have been more burdensome for a local government than state-
court litigation. After all, federal-court litigation is often more expen-
sive, and many lawyers for local government agencies may be rela-
tively unfamiliar with federal-court rules.45 3 On the other hand, these
additional burdens would be offset if the exhaustion provision spared
local-agency attorneys from having to litigate takings-ripeness issues
in federal court.454 In any event, the additional burdens that H.R.
1534's exhaustion provision might have imposed would not have been
heavy enough to make that provision fail the second part of the
Court's two-part test, in light of the evidence of state constitutional
violations that would have to exist to satisfy the first part of the test.
450. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534 ("Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA
without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise.").
Namely, RFRA prohibited the application of neutral, generally applicable laws in ways
that substantially burdened a person's exercise of religion but that did not violate the Free
Exercise Clause (because they did not reflect animus or discrimination toward individuals'
exercise of religion).
451. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210 (observing that the Patent Remedy Act
exposed states to "expansive liability," despite which "Congress did nothing to limit the
coverage of the Act to cases involving arguable constitutional violations").
452. Cf. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 216-22 (1875) (holding that fed-
eral statute was not "appropriate" to enforce Fifteenth Amendment because it imposed
criminal liability regardless whether conduct discriminated on basis of race).
453. See Senate Hearing, supra note 39, at 13 (testimony of Larry Curtis, Mayor of
Ames, Iowa) (asserting that "[iun many cases, having to defend [takings] litigation in Fed-
eral court will be more costly than litigating the same claim in State courts").
454. See S. RaP. No. 105-242, at 19 (1998) (observing that "localities already must liti-
gate property rights claims on Federal ripeness grounds, which may take years to resolve").
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V. Conclusion
This article has explored unsettled, fundamental issues of consti-
tutional law arising from recent congressional proposals that take a
new tack toward property-rights reform. The proposals would revise
the process by which a property owner can seek just compensation in
federal court for a regulatory taking of his or her property by a local
land-use agency. Specifically, the proposals would negate the U.S.
Supreme Court precedent that requires the owner to exhaust available
and adequate state compensation procedures before going to federal
court. Opponents of the proposals argued that the legislative elimina-
tion of the Court's "exhaustion" requirement would violate Article III
and exceed Congress' power.
This article concludes that the elimination of the exhaustion re-
quirement would not violate Article III but would exceed Congress'
power on the current legislative record. The elimination of the ex-
haustion requirement would not violate Article III because the re-
quirement is not dictated by Article III. Instead, the exhaustion
requirement is akin to the prudential rules of justiciability associated
with Article I. Specifically, the exhaustion requirement conserves
federal-court resources, as do the prudential rules of justiciability, by
giving state courts a chance to award just compensation for regulatory
takings by local agencies. Unlike the prudential rules of justiciability,
however, the exhaustion requirement is rooted in the Just Compensa-
tion Clause, not in Article III, and is supported by federalism princi-
ples, not separation-of-powers principles.
Because of those differences, Congress cannot eliminate the ex-
haustion requirement using its power to make rules for the federal
courts, even though Congress can use that rulemaking power to elimi-
nate the prudential rules of justiciability associated with Article III.
Congress potentially can eliminate the exhaustion requirement under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To do so, however, Con-
gress needs evidence that state courts are violating the just compensa-
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment on a fairly widespread
basis. Currently, Congress lacks such evidence.
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